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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
The primary objective of the thesis is to analyze, from 
an economic viewpoint, the determinants of cooperation among 
farmers in developing countries. In pursuing this 
objective, quite diverse but interrelated literature were 
reviewed: general economic theories of cooperation; property 
rights; origin and nature of the firm, and indigenous 
cooperation.
From the review of the literature seven factors were 
deduced as determining agricultural cooperation, with six of 
them affecting cooperation in general. The validity of 
these in determining cooperation among farmers was then 
tested by means of case studies and a sample survey.
First is the presence or absence of indivisibilities in 
productive inputs and/or processes. Second is whether 
timeliness in the execution of farm tasks is necessary. 
Third is the degree of elasticity of substitution among 
such inputs and/or processes. Fourth is the presence or 
absence of economies, whether size/scale economies or 
associational economies.
Fifth is the extent of transaction costs, which 
consist of search, information, bargainihg, decision—making 
and monitoring costs. Sixth is the extent of inequality in 
the distribution of income/assets among the potential 
members of a group. And seventh is the kind of atmosphere 
that surrounds the exchange relationship.
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Empirical research focused on Northern and Central 
Luzon in the Philippines. The most widespread form of 
indigenous cooperation in these two regions was the 
formation of labour teams to transplant and reap paddy. 
These were analyzed by means of a case study of two 
agricultural teams and a sample survey of twenty eight 
agricultural teams.
The results indicated that six of the seven 
hypothetical variables were operative. Indivisibilities 
were not a relevant factor because they were absent from the 
farm tasks involved. Nevertheless, this cannot be 
interpreted to mean that this variable would be irrelevant 
in other tasks such as irrigation.
Income/asset distribution was highly skewed but its 
potential for diminishing cooperation in the case of the two 
study teams was countered by the presence of other factors 
such as neighbourhood and kinship, which created a bond 
among members. However, it should showed up as a 
significant variable in the sample survey- As for the other 
variables, the results indicated that the existence of the 
labour teams and the degree of cooperation achieved were the 
result of (1) the necessity for the timely accomplishment of 
farm tasks; (2) a zero elasticity of substitution between 
labour and machinery; (3) the realization of both 
associational and scale economies; (4) low transaction 
costs; and (5) the existence of a non—calculative 
atmosphere.
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FOREWORD
This thesis has been the result of a long-standing 
concern with cooperative farming which began with my 
involvement in work among small farmers in Mindanao, in the 
southern part of the Philippines. Many of these farmers 
were poor, eking out a meager existence from small farms on 
both lowland and upland areas. I was curious as to why the 
poor farmers from the same village, or even those who were 
closely related or were household neighbours, did not band 
together to improve their livelihood.
The potential for such a coming together was present. 
For one, considerable numbers had attended a development 
seminar which was conducted in each village. In this 
seminar, the participants were required to live together in 
one place. At the end of the seminar, it was evident that a 
new bond had been forged among the participants, some of 
whom had hardly known each other previously, although they 
came from the same village. This bore fruit in some common 
"projects" such as preparations for the patronal feast of 
the village. More economic manifestations of cooperative 
behaviour which the seminar had fostered was membership in 
the municipal-wide credit union. However, in the domain of 
their main livelihood, which was farming, there was little 
evidence of this new bond.
Another indication of the existing potential for common 
action was the accepted folk wisdom* that collective action
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was more effective than individual action in tackling 
problems that faced the individual or the community. Such 
wisdom was contained in the popular saying about the use of 
a broom made from coconut palm fronds- Sticks from the 
fronds had to be tied together in order to fashion a broom. 
Hence, the saying arose that with one stick, a person could 
not sweep away the dirt on the floor, but with many sticks 
tied together, the job could be done quickly and 
effectively. Folk wisdom such as this was invoked in the 
development seminar.
At the time also, the example of the agricultural 
communes of China was popular in development circles in the 
Philippines which led me to wonder if the same could not be 
adopted by small farmers in a market economy.
All these factors together motivated me to look deeper 
into the factors that determine cooperative behaviour among 
small farmers. It is my hope that the results of this 
research will be useful to those who are engaged in 
organising the poor in the rural and urban areas, whether in 
the First World or the Third World, to undertake collective 
action to address the problem of their poverty.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Objective and Significance of this Study
The primary objective of this study is to analyze, from 
an economic viewpoint, the determinants of successful 
cooperation among rural people in developing countries. 
Since the rural sector encompasses the majority of the 
population of these countries, the results of this research 
could be of help in the development of this sector, making 
use of the most important resource a country has, namely, 
its people. However, in the course of pursuing this 
objective, it was discovered that this was not possible 
without studying the factors that go to affect cooperative 
behaviour or group action in general, whether in the context 
of a Third World rural village or that of a modern 
corporation. Hence, we begin this study with an analysis on 
a general level and then shift our focus to indigenous 
forms of cooperation in the rural areas of a developing 
country.
Interest in forms of cooperation has been aroused 
because of attempts by both government and non-governmental 
bodies to either collectivize agriculture and industry, or 
to organize rural people for various purposes such as viable 
productive enterprises. The drive to collectivize in the 
Soviet Union and China inspired similar programmes in Third 
World countries. In agriculture, we have the example of
13
the Tanzanian ujamaa■ In industry, we have the labour- 
managed firms of Yugoslavia. Even in countries which are 
not avowedly socialist, there have been similar attempts. 
Israel's kibbutzim, which antedate the Russian Revolution, 
are well-known. Less well known forms of Israeli group 
farms are the moshavim ovdim and the moshavim shitufi. In 
the Philippines, which is the focus of this research, there 
has been the Samahang Navon movement, a nationwide program 
which attempted to organize rural villages into pre- 
cooperatives and eventually into cooperatives. More
recently, due to the advent of the Aquino government, 
interest has been revived in collective farming as an 
integrated part of agrarian reform.
International bodies, both governmental and non­
governmental, which give development aid, encourage 
cooperative endeavours on the part of the beneficiaries. 
The International Cooperative Alliance (ICA), based in 
London, was formed in order to spread the gospel of 
cooperation and cooperatives. Various non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) engaged in development work, whether 
based in First World or Third World countries, also favour 
the organization of urban and rural poor into cooperative 
bodies for various purposes.
This research was undertaken in the spirit of trying to 
assist those who are trying to decide whether cooperation
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and cooperatives or collectives are to be promoted or not. 
Briefly, it attempts to uncover the basic factors that go to 
make for cooperation which provides the basis for
cooperatives and collectives- The research will be 
successful if indeed these factors are isolated and
identified. If they are so identified, then the disciple of
cooperation can determine whether, in a given situation,
they are present or not.
If they are present, then the organization of, say, a 
group of rural or urban poor into cooperative bodies could 
be more easily fostered as a result of the identification 
of these factors. If they are absent, then the decision 
could be taken to adopt an alternative strategy, say, to 
give development aid to individual households rather than to 
a group or to base a development strategy on individual 
households rather than on groups.^
On the other hand, the opposite decision could be made, 
i.e., eventually to establish cooperative groups by taking 
steps to ensure that those factors conducive to cooperation 
become present. In any case, the isolation and 
identification of these factors is crucial.
This follows the tenor of Apthorpe and Gasper's 
(1981) suggestion of how cooperatives should be evaluated, 
i.e. by being open to alternative ways of attaining the same 
objective and not being wedded to cooperativism/collectivism 
as an end in itself-
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1.2 Methodology
The methodology used to identify and isolate the 
factors that affect cooperation is quite simple and
straightforward. First, these factors are deduced from a 
review of quite diverse but relevant literature. Then the 
validity of these deduced factors are tested by means of 
case studies of two agricultural labour teams.
One team is engaged in both the transplanting and
reaping of palav (paddy), but the team was studied in depth 
only during the harvest season. The other team is engaged 
only in the transplanting of palav. The two teams are 
located in two separate baranoav (village) in two regions 
of the Philippines.
A f t e r . compiling the case studies, the hypothetical 
variables are further tested by means of a sample survey of 
twenty eight agricultural labour teams in ten baranoav of 
the two regions.
Indigenous or traditional forms of cooperation were 
chosen as the focus for testing the hypothetical variables 
rather than modern forms of cooperation, i.e., cooperatives. 
There are several reasons for this. First, at the time this
research was undertaken, there did not appear to be many
existing modern agricultural cooperatives in the regions 
accessible to this writer. In fact, it is an impression 
of this writer that few modern cooperatives exist in the
16
rural areas of the Philippines. Most of those that do exist 
and are successful are in urban areas and are composed of 
salaried employees, whether public or private, and small 
business entrepreneurs such as market stall holders.
Second, this writer was of the opinion that more could 
be learned about the factors that bring about cooperation by 
studying indigenous cooperation rather than modern co­
operatives which were, in many cases, organized by external 
agents.
Third, there have been very few studies of indigenous 
cooperation from an economic point of view and a study such 
as this could make up for that lack.
Among indigenous forms of cooperation this writer 
chose to focus on agricultural activities because of 
interest in collective or group farming. In the localities 
which were studied, the most widespread and the most regular 
form of indigenous cooperation took place in the form of the 
organization of labour teams for various tasks in rice 
farming.
There was also indigenous coopeation in non-farming 
activities. These took the form of social security 
societies, i.e. death benefits, in one locality (San Ramon). 
In the other locality (Nagpandayan), the villagers 
organized themselves for the singing of the Passion of Jesus 
Christ during Lent. Neither of these activities, however.
17
were as widespread as the organization of labour teams 
mentioned above.
The two villages in which the case studies were done
are located in Northwestern Luzon or Region 1, and in
Central Luzon or Region 3 (see Map of the Philippines)- 
They are the villages of San Ramon in the municipality of 
Manabo, province of Abra, and Nagpandayan in the 
municipality of Guimba, province of Nueva Ecija. Their 
choice was the result of several factors.
First, due to resource constraints and the unsettled 
peace and order situation in the southern part of the 
country, Luzon was chosen as the general area where the
research was to be carried out. Second, the presence of two
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), with whom this writer 
had contact were working in Regions 1 and 3- They had a
good knowledge of the area and had also established rapport
with the people living there- Finally, a brief summary 
using a structured interview was undertaken in 43 villages 
in Central Luzon. This was followed by a preliminary period 
of participant observation in both regions. Based on the
results of the survey and participant observation, the two
villages named above were selected.
Two villages were selected for in—depth investigation 
rather than one to increase the level of generality of the 
study and the conclusions arrived at.
18
I B A T  A N E  s
I &OALUPIII I j 
I f U G . ^  '^ C A H IG U I.!
MANABO . 1
( Reg ion :[) î
L
t  V  TAftLAC 
» * •  ^I
I SANN^WJSIH^
L _3T 4a“?* ,
MEJRO MANILA I
/ lUtUGl'^^^ - 'i»
~f
/
/
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 
Provincial and regional map
Philippine Copyright. 1983 by National Book Store, Inc. 
  Cartographic Design : Heinrich Engeler 1980
Scale 1 : 5 .0 0 0 .00 0
50 100 150 200 260 300Km
I Capital •  Provincial Oty
PUBLISHED AND EXCLUSIVELY DISTRIBUTED BY
^l@WBOflKSro»LINt
ISBN 971-08-9^09-4 
2.95
.GUIMBA (Region III)
\
jC alig.I -  —  \
\  lUGIAsik. _
r o m b lo N
.TAIIAS I
°XTrOtbO V  <ÿ»' \ / I  PO«Ol/V ) y^THMN .:) S .o \ /A I è-0A„ \
ABAC iK .
CAGAYAN 0 ( SUlU I
S A B A H  
(NORTH BORNEO)
AOUSAN DEL SUR
BUKIONON
DEL NORTE
NORTH
COTABATO
MAGUINOANAO
vy
7
1  I :  /
r  I SIIUTU I /
ARCIf SAHGII (
ARCIf TAIAUD
The main period of participant observation was carried 
out from June 1983 to January 1984. The bulk of this time 
was spent in the municipality of Manabo which consisted of 
five population centres comprised of two barangays each. 
The focus was on San Ramon but regular visits were also made 
to the other villages, which were within easy reach of San 
Ramon.
Soon after the wet season transplanting in June, a 
random sample of sixty four farmers in Manabo were 
interviewed to inquire into whether or not they were members 
of land preparation and transplanting teams and the reasons 
for their decision. The sample was drawn from the 
membership list of the irrigators' association which 
encompassed almost all of the farmers in the municipality. 
The results of this survey are reported elsewhere (Francia 
1988) and are recapitulated in Chapter four. The kabesilva 
of twenty three transplanting and reaping teams were also 
interviewed regarding the reasons for the existence of their 
teams, the number of member households, etc. The results of 
this set of interviews are also reported in the same 
article mentioned above.
One labour team in San Ramon was chosen for closer 
observation during the harvest season which took place from 
November 1983 to January 1984. Another larger team in San 
Ramon was also observed for comparative purposes.
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The same methodology was carried out in Nagpandayan. 
However, the labour team chosen for closer observation was a 
transplanting team and was larger than a second team 
observed for comparative purposes.
It would have been ideal to have set up a control group
of non—member households of cooperative labour teams,
2
whether they were labour demanders or suppliers, since this 
thesis attempts to determine how the choice between hired 
labour (individual action) and cooperative labour 
(collective action) is made as part of the objective of 
isolating the determinants of cooperation among farmers. 
However, it would have required an equally detailed 
investigation as that of the cooperative labour teams. This 
was not feasible, given resource constraints.
Moreover, without the existence of the labour teams, 
there would be no choice to speak of, except to hire labour 
or to resort to family labour. Very little information has 
been published about cooperative labour teams in the 
Philippines. It was hoped that, in spite of the
inadequacies of this study, an understanding of the factors 
that affect cooperation among farmers in a developing 
country could still be achieved.
The results of the survey of 64 farmers, which included
2
These terms are defined in Chapter Three.
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both members and non—members of land preparation and 
transplanting teams, and the results of participant 
observation also gave a good idea of the reasons for joining
A
or not joining an agricultural labour team. C^sidering the 
resource constraints, it was felt that setting up a control 
group of non—members would not significantly add to the 
information already available.
Buttressing the decision not to have a control group of 
non—members households was the fact that participant 
observation indicated that a relatively substantial number 
of village households in the research localities tended to 
be a member of a workteam for at least one farm task, 
whether it was land preparation, transplanting, weeding or 
reaping. This was borne out by the results of a random 
sample survey of thirty households in Nagpandayan, who were 
not members of a transplanting team. (Please see Table 5—5, 
p. 213). Forming a random sample of households who did not 
join any workteam at all would have not have been easy, 
given resource constraints.
In addition, in the preparation for the sample survey 
of agricultural labour teams, a number of barangay in the 
municipality of Guimba were investigated for the existence 
of such teams.^ It was found out that no teams existed in 
some of them. The information secured as a result of the
^There are sixty four baranoav in Guimba
22
above investigation also rendered the creation of a control 
group of non—member households less compelling.
For the sample survey, all the five population centres 
in Manabo were included. For Guimba, five villages, where 
agricultural labour teams existed, were chosen. Three are 
located in the north of the municipality and two, including 
Nagpandayan, are in the south. In the ten villages chosen, 
only transplanting teams were surveyed. The team was the 
unit of analysis.
For each team, a sampling frame was constructed based
4
on information provided by the team leader or kabesilva . 
Where the team was small, nearly all the member households 
were interviewed. Where the team was large, a random sample 
was drawn. To this was added the kabesilya's household. An 
exception was the case study team in Nagpandayan all of 
whose members, except four households who were not available 
at the time, were interviewed. As much as possible, the 
respondents for each member household included both spouses.
The survey was carried out in Guimba in October 1984, 
employing professional interviewers of the Development 
Academy of the Philippines (DAP) based in Metro Manila. The 
DAP is an agency of the Department of Education. For 
Manabo, the survey was carried out in November 1984,
4
From the Spanish cabecilla or petty leader.
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employing public elementary school teachers as interviewers. 
A pre-test of the survey instrument was carried out in 
Guimba in September 1984. The results were analyzed by 
means of the ordinary least squares technique of multiple 
regression.
Simultaneous with the survey of transplanting teams in 
Guimba, structured interviews were also conducted on a 
randomly selected sample of 30 households in Nagpandayan who 
did not belong to a transplanting team. For Manabo, data 
from a random sample of households made in 1982 were 
available.
The monetary unit in the Philippines is the peso. The 
exchange rate vis—a—vis the U.S. dollar has averaged P20.00 
to US$1.00.
24
CHAPTER 2s A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
In this chapter, a review of the diverse but relevant
literature is made as a first step toward identifying and 
isolating the factors which affect cooperation. The 
literature can be arranged into four categories: (1)
economic analysis of cooperative behaviour in general; (2) 
the so-called property rights literature; (3) discussions 
on the origin and nature of the firm and (4) studies of 
exchange labor and other forms of indigenous cooperation in 
agriculture.
Before beginning the review of the literature, however, 
it will help to know how cooperation is defined and various 
types distinguished.
2.1 Definition and Types of Cooperation
Webster's Third New International Dictionarv (1986) 
defines the verb cooperate as: "1. to act or work with
another or others to a common end; 2- to act together :
produce an effect jointly; 3. to associate with another or 
others for mutual often economic benefit."
Cooperation is defined as: "1. The act of
cooperating, joint operation; common effort or labour; 2. 
Association of persons for their common often economic 
benefit, association in a venture the profits or benefits of 
which are shared; collective action for common well being or
25
progress; 3. Biological: a dynamic social process
associated with organisms living in some degree of
aggregation (as in communities or colonies) and
characterized by sufficient mutual benefit to outweigh
disadvantages (as competition) associated with crowding." 
The last definition (which looks at cooperation from the 
viewpoint of biology) can be applied to cooperation among 
human beings which is also a dynamic social process 
characterized by sufficient mutual benefits which outweigh 
the disadvantages associated with working together.
The International Encvclopedia of the Social Sciences
(1968) defines cooperation as:
"Joint or collaborative behavior that is directed 
toward some goal and in which there is common
interest or hope of reward- Cooperation may be
voluntary or involuntary, direct or indirect, 
formal or informal, but always there is a 
combination of efforts toward a specific end in 
which all the participants have a stake, real or 
imagined. At its higher intellectual levels 
cooperation involves reciprocity of intent as well 
as jointness of behavior, and it may even become 
an end in itself. There is no limit to the 
potential range for cooperation; it is to be found 
in groups as small as the dyad and as large as 
leagues of sovereign states.
According to the Encyclopedia, cooperation can be 
regarded as an ethical norm, as a social process, or as an 
institutional structure. As an ethical norm, cooperation is 
stressed in all major religious and moral systems. As a 
process, "Cooperation is central to the formation of type 
and to change in types. Closely related to competition,...
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cooperative behaviour is one of the central mechanisms of 
the evolutionary process...." (pp. 384 — 5)
As a social structure, cooperation can be observed in 
organizations created for joint behavior toward a given 
goal. These structures "range in size from primitive hunting 
groups to modern insurance companies and in kind from 
criminal conspiracies .. to the World Health Organization... 
They are often religious, political and cultural in 
character as they are economic." (page 385)
To summarize the preceding discussion on the meaning of 
cooperation, there are three essential elements of 
cooperation. First and foremost, there is the commonality 
of interest, goal, or purpose. Without this commonality, 
there is no reason for an individual or group to act 
together with another.
Second, cooperation involves two or more individuals. 
One does not cooperate with oneself, one cooperates with 
others, with a group.
Third, cooperation involves joint action. Although, 
several individuals may have a common goal or purpose, the 
very commonality of the goal does not necessarily compel
each individual to cooperate with others to obtain that
goal. Each can attempt to do it by acting alone. For
cooperation to occur, they must act together.
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Five types of cooperation are distinguished by the 
Encyclopedia: automatic, traditional, contractual, directed 
and spontaneous. An example of automatic cooperation is the 
"unplanned cooperation between two groups (whether national, 
economic, religious, or racial) which may exist simply by 
virtue of an independently perceived threat to the security 
of each; such cooperation may be stimulated by action or 
threat of action by an outside group..." (p. 385).
Traditional cooperation is not regulated by instinct, 
volition or simple location but by traditional social norms. 
It is "one of the mores, as binding upon the participants as 
any other part of morality" (p. 385). Prime examples are 
the village community of Asia and Medieval Europe, and craft 
and merchant guilds the world over in ancient and medieval 
times.
In contractual cooperation, the terms are "specific and 
conditional upon the will of the participants or governed 
by legal sanctions, and they are precise both in terms of 
length of cooperation and of what is specifically required 
by the relationship. Contractual cooperation commonly 
increases sharply in historical periods during which the 
close ties of the traditional community are supplemented by 
the more individualistic and utilitarian ties of an open 
society." (page 385)
Examples of formal contractual cooperation given are
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various types of cooperatives and profit-sharing plans while 
baby-sitting and car pools exemplify informal contractual 
cooperation.
The oldest and most universal form of directed 
cooperation is military organization. In the modern world, 
"large—scale business enterprise, labour unions, school 
system, and even religious and recreational organizations 
could hardly survive without the form of organization that 
arises from command or direction. The source of cooperation 
here is only incidentally or derivatively a common 
recognition of goal or a clear norm." (page 386)
Spontaneous cooperation is situational in character and 
constitutes the essence of relationships within the family, 
neigbourhood, play goups, and other close, personal forms of 
association. It is most common where there is a basis of 
amity and can contribute a great deal to the success of the 
directed type of cooperation.
The preceding discussion of various types of 
cooperation shows the application of the term to a wide 
spectrum of situations and groups. It should be noted that 
the various types can overlap. For instance, a business 
firm exhibits both contractual and directed cooperation.
Since the focus of this thesis is on indigenous forms 
of cooperation, a definition of what it means will be 
suggested here. Indigenous cooperation means that it was
29
initiated and developed by the people of a locality without 
the aid of an external agent. Non—indigenous forms of 
cooperation, by contrast would be introduced into a locality
or group by an external agent. An example of the latter is
r
the modern cooperative from the veiwpoint of developing
V. '
countries. In some instances, it was imposed by the State 
on local communities.
2-2 Economic Analysis of Cooperative Behaviour in General
A work which is relevant to the topic of this paper
I* r
r ‘
that of Olson (1971). He gives his book the subtitle of 
"Public Goods and The Theory of Groups”. By "public good" 
he means "an inseparable, generalized benefit" which must be 
available to everyone if it is available to anyone. More 
specifically, "the achievement of anv common goal or the
satisfaction of anv common interest means that a public or 
collective good has been provided for that group. The very 
fact that a goal or purpose is common to a group means that 
no one in a group is excluded from the benefit  ^or 
satisfaction brought about by its achievement... It follows 
that the provision of public or collective goods is the
fundamental function of organizations generally..." [p. 15].
Olson then raises the question whether there is any 
relation between the size of the group and individual 
incentives to contribute toward the achievement of group 
goals. In other words, should a theory of groups
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distinguish between large and small groups? In a large 
organisation, the individual member's efforts will generally 
not have a noticeable effect on the situation of his 
organisation, and he can enjoy any benefits brought about by 
the efforts of others even if he does nothing. This is the
well-known free rider problem. This lessens the likelihood 
of a large group providing a collective good. In order to
do this, it has to offer incentives, other than achievement 
of the collective good itself. These incentives Olson calls 
"non—collective" goods, or goods which can also be secured 
through individual action.
One example he gives later on in the book is the
provision of social security benefits to members by labor 
unions in order to attract membership. Olson thus
formulates the proposition that, outside of special
incentives or coercion, large groups of rational, self- 
interested individuals will not act to further their common 
interests. However, small groups, by definition, would not 
have the same problem, and therefore would be more likely 
than a large group, to provide a collective good. Is this 
true?
Olson argues affirmatively. The gist of his argument
is as follows: In a sufficiently small group, there will be
at least one member whose share in the collective good will 
be greater than the total cost of the collective good.
Therefore, even if he were to bear the whole cost of
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providing the collective good, he would still gain. Would 
an optimal amount of the collective good be provided?
Yes, if the share of that individual in the marginal 
total benefits equals the marginal cost of acquiring more of 
that collective good. The acquisition of more of a 
collective good entails more benefits as well as more costs 
to the group. If the share of the individual (who stands to 
gain from the provision of the collective good even if he 
were to bear the whole cost) in the additional group 
benefits were equal to the marginal cost of such benefits, 
then he will provide the optimal amount of the collective 
good.
Thus Olson concludes that "some sufficiently small 
groups can provide themselves with some amount of a 
collective good through the voluntary and rational action of 
one or more of its members. In. this, thev are distinguished 
from real 1 v large groups'* (pp. 32-33; underlining supplied). 
Again, on page 36, Olson concludes:
The most important single point about small 
groups in the present context, however, is that 
they may very well be able to provide themselves 
with a collective good simply because of the 
attraction of the collective good to the 
individual members. In this, small groups differ 
from large ones. The larger a group is, the 
farther it will fall short of obtaining an optimal 
supply of any collective good, and the less likely 
that it will act to obtain even a minimal amount 
of such a good. In short, the larger the group, 
the less it will further its common interests.
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An example of a small group that Olson mentions is the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization in NATO where a large 
country like the United States bears a "disproportionately'* 
large share of the cost of collective defense, presumably 
because its share in the collective good is greater than the 
total cost of providing the good.^
For groups in general, Olson states a necessary 
condition for the optimal provision of a collective good 
through the voluntary and independent action of the members. 
This condition is: The marginal cost of additional units of 
the collective good must be shared in exactly the same 
proportion as the additional benefits, for then, each 
member's marginal costs and benefits will be equal at the 
same time that total marginal cost equals total marginal 
benefits.
Size, for Olson, is thus a very important determinant 
of cooperative behaviour. Related to size are the "costs of 
organization" which consist of "the costs of communication 
among group members, the costs of any bargaining among them, 
and the costs of creating, staffing, and maintaining any 
formal group organization" (p. 47). The bigger the group, 
the greater are the costs of organization and the less 
likely that the group will achieve its collective good.
^See also Olson and Zeckhauser (1966).
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A shortcoming of Olson's work is its limitation to 
special interest groups such as labour unions, farmers' 
associations, professional associations, etc- operating in 
the United States. His theory of groups is geared toward 
explaining their existence, although he also uses it to 
evaluate economic theories of the state and of Marx's 
theory of class.
Olson does not explain the existence of "market groups" 
which are formed for the production of a good or service for 
sale in the market. He writes that the main concern of his 
study is the "group situation outside the market place" or 
non—market groups" (Cf. p. 27). Because of this focus, he 
comes to the conclusion that size is the main determinant of 
whether or not cooperative behaviour will take place, 
mentioning other factors only in passing.
Olson approaches the problem of cooperation using the 
calculus of marginal costs and marginal benefits. Another 
set of literature treats the problem of cooperation from the 
perspective of game theory which has the advantage of more 
adequately taking into consideration the fact that choices 
are inter-dependent.
The Prisoners' Dilemma is a now famous representation 
of the problem of cooperation. It not only elaborates on 
the free—rider problem but also predicts that non- 
cooperation will inevitably be the result of each player
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pursuing his own individual interest even though cooperation 
would result in higher pay-offs for al1 players.
To borrow Collard's (1978) formulation of the 
Prisoners' Dilemma (and substituting present day letters of 
the alphabet for the Greek letters), A denotes a 
cooperative strategy while B denotes a non-cooperative one. 
With two players, the pay-offs are as in Table 2.1 
(reproducing Table 4.1 of Collard).
Table 2.1 Pav-Off Matrix
Player 2
: Strategy : A : B :
Player 1
: A :
:
AA, AA :
:
AB, BA :
: B : BA, AB : BB, BB :
Collard notes that it is the relative sizes of the pay—
offs which determine whether a game is of the Prisoners'
Dilemma type or not. Thus, in a Prisoners' Dilemma game, 
the ranking of the pay-offs for Player 1 are:
free rider's cooperative non-cooperative sucker's 
pay-off (BA) pay-off (AA) pay-off (BB) pay-off (-4B)
and symmetrically for Player 2. With this assumed ranking 
of pay-offs, selfish behaviour will drive both players to 
choose the non-cooperative pay-off (BB, BB).
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However, if the ranking of the pay—offs for Player 1 
(and symmetrically for Player 2) were
AA > BA > BB > AB
then cooperation will be chosen by both players. This is no 
longer a Prisoners' Dilemma but an assurance game. Because 
the payoff for cooperation is greater than the payoffs for 
other types of outcome for both players. Player 1 can expect 
that Player 2 will cooperate, and vice versa. Thus 
cooperation is assured. Unfortunately, Collard notes, the 
type of situation denoted by the Prisoners' Dilemma appears 
more common than assurance games.
If the Prisoners' Dilemma predicts that, in the 
situation that it describes, the players will choose non- 
cooperation (and thus make everyone worse off than if they 
choose cooperation), there is evidence that falsifies the 
prediction. Weintraub (1975, p. 37) points out that "many 
psychological studies have indicated that the Prisoner's 
Dilemma game, if played several times, leads to a 
determinate equilibrium which is likely to be group 
rational' [i.e. cooperation]." He also notes that public
goods do get produced (albeit underproduced) in spite of the 
fact that their provision is typical of the Prisoners' 
Dilemma situation, i.e., the pay-off for free—riding is 
greater than for cooperation, and so on.
Collard suggests that altruism and trust explain why
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the Prisoners' Dilemma is overcome. Altruism is embodied in 
the fact that each player gives a weight 'XT' to the pay-off 
of the other player, i.e., the outcome to Player 2, is of 
concern to Player 1. Further, each player believes the 
other will cooperate with a certain degree of probability 
. The necessary levels of and i.e., the level of 
altruism and trust depends on the difference between the 
cooperative pay—off and the free—rider pay-off. The bigger 
the free—rider pay-off relative to the cooperative pay-off, 
the greater the level of altruism and trust that is 
necessary to falsify the prediction of the Prisoners' 
Dilemma.
Collard further postulates that 'ff is a function of 
"various factors, including whether or not he [the other 
player] has given an assurance of cooperation, my trust in 
human nature, his previous record of cooperation, our 
subscription to a common ethic and so on" (p. 39). He
concludes:
People are able to make the imaginative 
leap to cooperative behaviour if they are aware 
of the social advantages of cooperation and if 
their self-interest is modified by an pc—biased 
ethic. They are able to perceive that the 
temptation and sucker pay-offs are illusory and 
that the game really boils down to cooperation 
and non—cooperation. But if this is so, is it a 
matter of indifference to us whether cooperation 
is described in terms of (modified) pay-offs or 
ethics? The great and essential difference is 
that by retaining a pay-off structure in which 
the pay-offs are self-interested, as the basis, 
one is able to show how powerful the ethic has 
to be in order to secure cooperation. The 
economist, in his humdrum fashion, then feels 
able to predict for specific socio-economic 
situations whether or not spontaneous 
cooperation is likely, (pp. 43-44).
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Axelrod (1984), however, argues that it is not 
necessary to assume altruism and trust in order to solve the 
Prisoners' Dilemma. The question he poses is: "Under what
conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists 
without central authority?" (p. 3), To answer the question, 
he runs computer simulations of iterated Prisoners' Dilemma, 
using different strategies submitted by various experts and 
hobbyists.
The result of the simulations is that a strategy of 
reciprocity (called TIT FOR TAT) is the most robust in 
leading to cooperation. It consists of the decision rule to 
cooperate first and then to reciprocate whatever the other 
player does in response. Axelrod states that a necessary 
condition for the emergence of cooperation is the existence 
of even small clusters of individuals who employ the 
strategy of reciprocity and who will discriminate between 
those who respond to cooperation and those who do not. 
Otherwise, if a world of unconditional defection is assumed, 
cooperation will never get started.
Yet he also says that "There is no need to assume trust 
between the players. The use of reciprocity can be enough 
to make defection unproductive. Altruism is not needed: 
Successful strategies elicit cooperation even from an 
egoist." (p. 174). In this last statement, Axelrod seems to 
have moved from the initial position in the game to a 
subsequent position where the use of reciprocity has had its
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effect on egoists' responses.
The question still remains: What leads an individual
to decide to cooperate first, and what accounts for the 
existence of "small clusters" of such individuals? It would 
seem that one would have to assume altruism and trust, and 
these cannot be explained by the science of economics.
Another necessary condition for the emergence of
cooperation, according to Axelrod, is what he calls the
"shadow of the future." This is the condition that the 
other players with whom one interacts will be around for an 
indefinite period of time and this fact will have a bearing 
on a player's response in the present. To quote:
For cooperation to be stable, the future 
must have a sufficiently large shadow. This 
means that the importance of the next encounter 
between the same two individuals must be great 
enough to make defection an unprofitable 
strategy when the other player is provocable.
It requires that the players must have a large
enough chance of meeting again and that they do
not discount the significance of their next 
meeting too greatly, (page 174)
Finally, to summarise some of the points brought up 
earlier, a cooperative outcome to a Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
is more likely if (1) it is played repeatedly and (2) among 
the same group of players, in contrast with a one-off play 
of the game.
2-3 The Property Rights Literature
The property rights approach to economic analysis is so
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named because of the importance it attaches to property 
rights assignments in the analysis of a given situation. A 
part of this literature discusses the establishment of 
property rights, including collective rights, which are the 
ultimate expression of cooperative behaviour. Other parts 
of this literature do not directly address the problem of 
cooperative— individualistic behaviour but touch on the 
subject and suggest some very important factors-
A major source of the property rights approach to 
economic questions is the discussion of externalities and 
how they can be "solved". An externality arises when some 
of the benefits (costs) that arise out of the actions of 
individuals or groups are appropriated by other individuals 
or groups. The usual example is that of a factory whose 
smoke pollutes the air- Initially, at least, residents 
living near the area bear the costs of the polluted air 
(e.g. increased incidence of respiratory ailments), and not 
the factory owner(s) who may not live in the area. In this 
case, a non—beneficial externality has been created. If no 
corrective action is taken, more air may be polluted than is 
necessary.
Coase (1960), in considering the problem of the 
polluting factory, writes that the liability (or conversely, 
the right to clean air) can be assigned, either to the owner 
of the factory or to the residents living in the vicinity. 
Previous solutions tended to place the burden on the factory
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owner. Since the factory produces something useful and 
creates employment, curtailing the smoke by installing some 
device involves a cost, which has to be compared against the 
benefits derived from cleaner air. The residents in the 
vicinity of the factory are just as liable for the existence 
of the nuisance, i.e., polluted air. They could move else­
where, and they would if the benefits from moving were 
greater than the costs.
Hence, it would pay both the factory owner and the 
residents to strike a bargain, the result of which would be 
greater total wealth. This would happen if striking such a 
bargain were costless. But if no bargain is struck, it is 
because transaction costs exist, some of which may be 
prohibitive. For instance, the residents could come 
together and pay the factory owner to reduce smoke or to 
close down altogether, that is, the residents have to work 
together in dealing with the factory owner(s). But to 
determine what each resident ought to contribute, each 
individual's marginal utility for clean air would have to be 
specified. This means that some individuals may value clean 
air more than others, and so would have to contribute more. 
It is difficult to discover each individual's marginal 
utility, resulting in an incentive for the individual to 
understate it in order that he may contribute a smaller 
amount. Thus, cooperative behaviour is prohibitively costly 
in this instance.
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Government regulation is another way of resolving the 
problem, e.g., zoning regulations. But this, too, entails 
costs, e.g., government bureaucracy. To evaluate these two 
"solutions", private bargaining versus government fiat, the 
proper procedure, according to Coase (p. 34) is to compare 
the "total social product" yielded by the two "social 
arrangements".
Another source of the property rights discussion was 
the attempt to make the theory of the firm more in tune with 
reality. In theory, the firm was regarded as a monolithic 
unit, pursuing one goal, namely, profits. In reality, a 
firm is made up of individuals who may have different goals. 
Furubotn and Pejovich's (1972) review of the literature 
distinguishes between two groups within the modern, capital­
ist corporation: the owners and the managers. The owners 
are the shareholders who have the right to appropriate the 
residual (profits) of the firm. However, where the owner­
ship of the firm is widely dispersed, as is usually the case 
in modern corporations, the managers (qua managers, because 
they may also be shareholders) have an incentive to 
appropriate some of the residual for themselves in the form 
of bigger staff and offices, company cars and other 
perquisites.
The incentive for managers to resort to individualistic 
behaviour exists because of the high cost to shareholders of 
detecting, policing and enforcing profit maximizing
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behaviour on managers, i.e. the principal—agent problem. 
Those who suspect the managers of non-cooperative behaviour 
may not have access to information that will prove them 
right. Even if they did, they would still face the costs of 
presenting such information to numerous other shareholders, 
and in an easily digestible form. Even if they succeed in 
doing this, they still have to convince the other 
shareholders that they are not engineering an opportunistic 
takeover themselves. Thus, the costs to shareholders of 
bringing about cooperative behaviour on the part of managers 
are high.
Conversely, the costs of individualistic behaviour on 
the part of managers is quite low since they cannot easily 
be exposed. At the same time the cost to them of cooperative 
behaviour is the perquisites which they would have to forego. 
However, they face a constraint in the form of the existence 
of a stock or capital market. Because of the existence of 
such a market, the shareholder who suspects management of 
appropriating the corporation's profits (which should be 
going to him) has the option of selling his stocks. The 
more the shareholders that do so, the more the value of the 
stock falls, leading still more shareholders to unload their 
shares, resulting in a downward spiral. The end result 
could be a takeover of the corporation by another firm, with 
the consequent replacement of managers, or the dissolution 
of the firm.
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Furubotn and Pejovich overlook the fact that rank 
and file employees alee reeert te individualietie behavieur. 
Because monitoring costs with respect to employees such as 
secretaries, clerks, etc- are nonzero, they can also indulge 
in individualistic behaviour, e.g. appropriate office 
suppliés for themselves, take a longer coffee break, etc. 
The extent to which they do so will again depend on the 
relative costs of such behaviour.
Another strand in the property rights literature is 
concerned with the creation of property rights (Pejovich, 
1972). Marx and Engels were the first to argue that 
property rights are endogenously determined as a result of 
changing production relations. As capital becomes more and 
more concentrated, the scale of manufacturing grows even 
larger and machines have to be made bigger and bigger. This 
was thought to lead to the establishment of collective 
property rights since such large manufacturing enterprises 
could only be run by the State. Wiles notes that a Soviet- 
type economy (STE) encourages the use of large four-wheeled 
tractors and discourages the introduction of the small hand 
tractor since this would lead to the breakup of kolkhozi or 
collective farms into small, private farms (pp. 113, 
140,146).
An example of collective rights which were endogenously 
determined is the analysis of the open-field system in 
northern Europe by Dahlman (1980). Before inorganic
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fertilizer was invented, European farmers relied on the 
manure from livestock (sheep and cattle) to grow grain. 
That they grew livestock for other purposes is, of course, 
evident, but the production of manure was one very important 
reason. In order to manure their fields efficiently and 
reap economies of scale, the villagers decided to graze or 
pasture their livestock as one unit on their arable lands 
during the off-season. This meant that, for a given length 
of time during the year, boundaries marking off individual 
farms were ignored and collective property rights were 
established over all arable land.
In order to make the arrangement work, a village 
committee was formed to oversee the common pasturing of 
livestock. Moreover the large fields were divided into 
smaller plots and the cultivator's rights were dispersed 
among these plots. This was done in order that not one 
cultivator would have the potential to secure greater 
benefits for himself by threatening to withdraw his large 
field from the common pasture, or totally with the other 
large cultivators for a similar purpose.
To quote Dahlman :
Large scale, communal grazing is desired 
within the context of land held in private 
ownership. Each owner must be persuaded to open 
up his land to grazing by others. By virtue of the 
increasing returns to land in grazing, this is the 
more important the more land the individual farmer 
controls, for the more he adds to the total 
grazing area. Yet the larger any one farmer, the
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greater his bargaining power vis—a—vis the rest. 
The more land he controls, the more he can cause 
economic damage to the others by threathening to 
pull out of the communal grazing. This difficulty 
is inherent in the desire to combine private 
property with collective control. Its decision in 
the open field system, elegant in its simplicity, 
is scattering. ...What the scattering thereby 
achieves is the creation of an incentive for the 
farmer to participate in the collective decision­
making and control necessary to regulate the use 
of the large grazing areas in both the commons and 
in the arable fields, (pp. 124-125)
Economies were also realized by having one herdsman or 
shepherd to oversee the flock, rather than a number of 
herdsmen or shepherds overseeing an equal number of smaller 
flocks.
Dahlman's original purpose was to explain why farmers 
in northern Europe in the Middle Ages tilled scattered 
fields for many years rather than consolidate their fields 
in one location by exchanges with other farmers.^ However, 
his analysis indicates several costs and benefits of 
cooperative/individualistic behaviour. The need for 
cooperative behaviour (collective property rights) arose 
from two exogenous factors, namely, a very low elasticity of 
substitution between animal manure and other types of 
fertilizer, and the existence of scale economies that could 
result from cooperative behaviour. In order to maintain
Wiles (1977, p. 103) maintains that the scattered 
plots are explained by general risk insurance, e.g. to 
minimize the damage to one's crop brought by hailstorms or 
cattle breaking in, by noblemen's hunting parties, etc.
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such behaviour, the distribution of assets in the form of 
land was altered by the breakup of large fields.
With respect to the first factor, if farmers had had 
access to inorganic fertilizer at competitive prices, it 
seems reasonable to suppose that they would have substituted 
such fertilizer for animal manure since the farmer could 
have applied the necessary quantity rather than depend on 
something over which he had little control. Another 
possible substitute would have been night soil, which has 
long been used as farm fertilizer in China. However, 
perhaps due to cultural mores, this may not have appealed to 
north European farmers as a substitute for animal manure. 
In either case, the elasticity of substitution between 
animal manure and both inorganic fertilizer and night soil 
was zero.
Given that the only source of fertilizer was animal 
manure produced by their livestock, the possibilities of 
reaping economies of scale by pasturing their flocks as one 
unit must have subsequently occurred to the villagers.
Since an adequate supply of grain was crucial, 
especially to tide one over the winter season, the costs of 
non-cooperative behaviour must have been relatively high, so 
high in fact that villagers with relatively large 
contiguous fields agreed to their dispersal. Thus, even, 
though transaction costs of organizing, bargaining and 
policing any agreement were positive, the establishment of
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collective property rights over arable land and the 
cooperative behaviour it entailed was brought about.
2.4 The Origin and Nature of the Firm
Briefly, the firm is a group of resource—owners 
organized to use their resources jointly to produce any 
number of products and/or services. A discussion of the 
firm is relevant to the problem of specifying the costs and 
benefits of cooperative/individualistic behaviour since a 
firm involves teamwork or cooperation. Coase (1937) 
proposed that firms come into existence because, under 
certain conditions, they represent a more efficient way of 
organizing economic activity than the market.
A factor of production (or the owner thereof) 
does not have to make a series of contracts with 
the factors with whom he is co-operating within 
the firm, as would be necessary, of course, if 
this cooperation were as a direct result of the 
working of the price mechanism (e.g. the market).
For this series of contracts is substituted one.
At this stage, it is important to note the 
character of the contract into which a factor 
enters that is employed within a firm. The 
contract is one whereby the factor, for a certain 
remuneration (which may be fixed or fluctuating), 
agrees to obey the directions of an entrepreneur 
within certain limits. The essence of the 
contract is that it should only state the limits 
to the powers of the entrepreneur. Within these 
limits, he can therefore direct the other factors 
of production, (p. 391)
In addition, if a contract through the market is to be 
made for a long period of time, the contracting parties may 
find it difficult to fully specify the contract terms
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because of the difficulty involved in forecasting. This 
would be especially true if the contract involved services. 
Thus it would be more economical to carry on the 
transaction within the firm where the direction of resources 
becomes dependent upon the entrepreneur.
Finally, Coase makes the point that "a firm will tend 
to expand until the costs of organizing an extra transaction 
within the firm become equal to the costs of carrying out 
the same transaction by means of an exchange on the open 
market or the costs of organizing in another firm" (p. 395).
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argue that the firm comes 
into existence because of the existence of team productive 
activities in which the joint use of inputs leads to a 
larger output than the sum of the products of the separately 
used inputs. The example that Alchian and Demsetz gives is 
that of two men lifting heavy loads onto a lorry.
The joint use of inputs leads to problems of metering 
the marginal productivity of each input in order to reward 
each input owner accordingly and to match marginal product 
with marginal cost. If rewards (and costs) are not matched 
with marginal productivities, there is an incentive on the 
part of the input owner to shirk.
Because of the difficulty of measuring each other's 
marginal productivity input owners agree to leave the 
decision to one person, a monitor. In order that he, in
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turn, will not shirk on his monitoring duties, he is given 
the right to claim the residual, after all costs have been 
paid (including the appropriate rewards to input owners) of 
the team's activity.
It is also essential that the monitor have the "right 
to alter individual membership and performance of the team" 
(p. 782). In order to discipline team members and thus
reduce shirking, the monitor must have the power to revise 
contract terms of individual members. In order to meter 
marginal productivities, he must have the power to manage 
the ways by which inputs are used in team production.
Alchian and Demsetz claim that their theory of the 
origin of the firm "takes a step down the path pointed out 
by Coase." According to them, while Coase introduced the 
notion of transaction costs as determinative of whether a 
firm will exist or not, he does not consider the facts of 
team production, team organization, metering and shirking 
problems and the residual claimant status of the employer or 
monitor.
Alchian and Demsetz also bring into consideration 
technological developments which lower the cost of market 
transactions but at the same time expand the role of the 
firm. They cite the following example:
When the "putting out" system was used for 
weaving, inputs were organized largely through 
market negotiations- With the development of 
efficient central sources of power, it became
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economical to perform weaving in proximity to 
the power source and to engage in team 
production. The bringing in of weavers surely 
must have resulted in a reduction in the cost of 
negotiating (forming) contracts. Yet, what we 
observe is the beginning of the factory system 
in which inputs are organized within a firm. 
Why? The weaver did not simply move to a common 
source of power that they could tap like an 
electric line, purchasing power while they used 
their own equipment. Now team production in the 
joint use of equipment became more important. 
The measurement of marginal productivity, which 
now involved interactions between workers, espe­
cially through their joint use of machines, 
became more difficult though contract 
negotiating cost was reduced, while managing the 
behaviour of inputs became easier because of the 
increased centralization of activity. The firm 
as an organization expanded even though the cost 
of transactions was reduced by the advent of 
centralized power. The same could be said for 
modern assembly lines. Hence, the emergence of 
central power sources expanded the scope of 
productive activity in which the firm enjoyed a 
comparative advantage as an organizational form, 
(p. 784).
Alchian and Demsetz then test their propositions by 
seeing whether they explain the different types of firms: 
profit—sharing firms, socialist firms, the corporation, 
mutual and non-profit firms, partnerships and employee 
unions. With respect to partnerships, these tend to arise 
in artistic or professional intellectual skills, e.g., law 
firms, because of the great difficulty of monitoring 
individual performances. Each partner monitors himself and 
therefore is a residual claimant. Because of the need for 
self—monitoring, "partnerships are more likely to occur 
among relatives or long-standing acguaintances. not 
necessarily because they share a common utility function.
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but also because each knows better the other's work 
characteristics and tendencies to shirk" (p. 790; under—
scoring supplied).
Williamson (1975) develops further Coase's consider—  
ation of whether a transaction will be mediated by the 
market or will occasion the need for internal organization. 
Transaction costs are the main consideration for him. If 
they can be reduced by the market, more than by internal 
organization, then there is no need for the latter. 
However, if originally, internal organization, i.e., the 
firm, were the more efficient mode but transaction costs 
increase because of increase in firm size, then 
organizational innovation can occur, as it has occurred, 
which can make the firm still a more efficient mode of 
handling transactions vis—a—vis the market. From this, 
Williamson draws the conclusion that the giant conglomerate 
firm is not necessarily less efficient than the market in 
allocating resources and suggests that antitrust policies 
should be formulated which keep this in mind.
The organizational form of productive activities 
evolves from simple to complex in response to increasing 
transaction costs. The simplest form is the worker peer 
group with no head and no subordinates. "These groups 
involve collective and usually cooperative activity, provide 
for some type of other— than—marginal productivity and income 
sharing arrangement..." (Williamson, pp. 41-42).
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Three occasions are cited for the formation of peer 
groups. First is the existence of indivisibility in 
physical assets or in setting up information systems, with 
the opportunity for scale economies. Second is the 
opportunity for risk—pooling (insurance) "if such membership 
can provide income guarantees to buffer the effects of 
unanticipated contingencies in terms superior to that which 
market insurance can provide" (p. 43). Third is the
opportunity for associational gains which are occasioned by 
"increased productivity among members of the group who feel 
a sense of responsibility to do their fair share... but, 
left to their own devices would slack off" (p. 44).
Whether the peer group will be formed or not revolves 
around the question of how successfully the group deals with 
transaction costs. In particular, because it is a peer 
group, there is no decision centre but rather an "all- 
channel network" exists where everything is communicated to 
everyone and joint decisions are reached- Bounded 
rationality sets a limit on the efficiency of such a network 
as group size increases. Bounded rationality is human 
behaviour which is "intendedIv rational but only limitedlv 
so" (Simon, 1961, p. xxiv). The limitations spring from 
"neurophysiological limits on one hand and language on the 
other. The physical limits take the form of rate and 
storage limits on the power of individuals to receive, 
store, retrieve, and process information without error...
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Language limits refer to the inability of individuals to 
articulate their knowledge or feeling by the use of words, 
numbers or graphics in ways which permit them to be 
understood by others..." (Williamson, pp. 21—22).
Another source of transaction costs, opportunism, may 
be surmountable only by auditing members' performance and 
paying compensation in accordance with observed productivity 
("experience rating"). But these measures violate the very 
meaning of a peer group. Thus, the group may break up.
However, the group does not necessarily have to 
dissolve. It can be transformed into a more complex form in 
which there is a decision centre and one individual is 
assigned the tasks of auditing and experience—rating. 
Williamson calls this organizational form "simple 
hierarchy".
On the other hand, a complex hierarchy evolves when a 
set of technologically separable work groups corresponding 
to the stages in the production of a final good, each 
organized as a simple hierarchy, merge into one firm in 
order to minimize transaction costs. This is known as 
vertical integration-
As firm size and the degree of vertical integration 
increase, transaction costs increase correspondingly, and 
new, still more complex organizational forms evolve in 
response. Thus there is the unitary form (U— form) of
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enterprise which is appropriate for small to "lower middle- 
sized firms" turning out one product, e.g. oil, tobacco. It 
is the "traditional functionally organized enterprise" (p. 
152). Its structure is illustrated in Figure 2—1 (which 
reproduces Figure 5, p. 134 of Williamson).
SALES FINANCE ENGINEERINGMANUFACTURING
CHIEF EXECUTIVE
Figure 2—1. Structure of the Unitary Form
of Enterprise
As the firm diversifies, the multi—divisional (M—form) 
organization emerges. Its structure is illustrated in 
Figure 2—2 (reproducing Figure 6, p. 138 of Williamson).
STAFF
SALES FINANCE ENGINEERINGMANUFACTURING
OPERATING 
DIVISION B
OPERATING 
DIVISION C
OPERATING 
DIVISION A
GENERAL OFFICE
Figure 2-2. Structure of the Multidivisional 
Form of Enterprise
The advantages of the M—form over the U—form for the larger 
firm are stated succinctly by Williamson (pp. 137-138):
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In relation to the U—form organization of 
the same activities, the M-form organization of 
the large, complex enterprise served both to 
economize on bounded rationality and attenuate 
opportunism. Operating decisions were no longer 
forced to the top but were resolved at the 
divisional level, which relieved the communica­
tion load. Strategic decisions were reserved 
for the general office, which reduced partisan 
political input into the resource allocation 
process. And the internal auditing and control 
techniques, which the general office had access 
to, served to overcome information impactedness 
conditions and permit fine tuning controls to be 
exercised over the operating parts.
Moreover, because of the extensive internal control 
apparatus that is part of the M—form, made possible by the 
separation between strategic (long-term) and operating (day- 
to-day) decision-making, the M—form firm can be regarded as 
a "miniature capital market" (p. 145) that can detect the 
divergence of managers' behaviour from the firm's overall 
goal of profit maximization more effectively than 
traditional capital markets.
Economic theory has taught that attempts by managers to 
"opportunistically promote their own goals at the expense of 
corporate profitability" would result in a devaluation of 
the firm's stock in the stock market. This was supposed to 
occasion a change of management, with those who perceived 
the lapse taking control of the corporation and quickly 
restoring profit maximizing behaviour. Thus we have the 
fiction of "frictionless" capital markets. Those who 
perceived the lapse in managers' behaviour cannot, in fact, 
take over quite so easily, as was discussed in section 2—2-
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A final element which renders internal organization a 
better alternative to the market in mediating an exchange is 
what Williamson calls "atmosphere" or the provision of a 
satisfying exchange relation where the exchange process 
itself is regarded as an object of value (p. 38). The
relevance of atmosphere arises when the question of the 
intensity of metering transactions arises. Individuals may 
choose internal organization over the market because there 
is greater flexibility in fulfilling the terms of an 
exchange.
In his discussion of the existence of indivisibilities 
in physical assets as well as in information systems as an 
occasion for the formation of worker peer groups, Williamson 
argues that such indivisibilities do not necessarily imply 
collective organization because, "technologically speaking, 
there is nothing that prevents one individual from procuring 
the physical asset in requisite size and contracting to 
supply the services of this asset to all of the members of 
the group. Similarly, there is no technological bar that 
prevents one individual from assuming the information 
gathering and dissemenation functions..." (p. 42). What
leads to collective organization according to Williamson, 
are the existence of transaction costs due to bounded 
rationality and opportunism. Therefore, the basis for 
collective organization in Williamson is transactional in 
origin.
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However, it cannot be denied that without the existence 
of the indivisibilities in physical assets or information 
systems in the first place, there would be no incentive for 
collective organization where such inputs are essential for 
a particular activity in which individuals are interested. 
Moreover, if such indivisibilities occasion the formation of 
worker peer groups in a particular activity, there is no 
reason why it should be limited to.the explanation of the 
existence of such groups only and not to the existence of 
simple and complex hierarchies involved in the same activity 
and which have evolved from the worker peer groups. In this 
instance, it can be said that the existence of 
indivisibilities are a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for collective organization.
Williamson does not restrict himself to discussion of 
the choice between market transactions and internal 
organization but goes on to discuss the choice between 
degrees of cooperation and non—cooperation within the firm. 
Thus he distinguishes between "consummate" and "perfunctory" 
cooperation where the former involves initiative on the part 
of an employee and the latter means minimal job performance 
(p. 69). An extreme case of non—cooperation by employees in 
a firm is industrial sabotage.
Leibenstein (1975, especially chapter 3; 1978) takes a 
close look at behaviour within the firm. According to him, 
because labour contracts cannot be completely specified.
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there is an area within which both managers and employers 
can adjust their "effort levels" upward or downward. This 
fact gives rise to "X— inefficiency", accounting for a lot of 
the potential for development.
Traditional economic analysis has emphasized 
allocational efficiency, i.e., the condition which obtains 
when all resources are employed in their most productive 
uses. However, it has not considered the fact that, even 
when allocational efficiency has been achieved, efficiency 
gains can still be obtained by motivating resource owners to 
use their resources more efficiently by increasing their 
effort levels.
Such motivation can come from various sources such as 
competition, payment by results, organization, etc. Thus a 
manager or worker may possess knowledge which, when applied, 
can lead to greater productivity or higher profitability. 
The fact that he possesses such knowledge is not easily 
discovered by the others in the firm, including 
stockholders, who would benefit from the application of such 
knowledge. He may, however, divulge or apply such knowledge 
when competition from other firms increases or when the 
system of compensation is altered.
2.5 Indigenous Forms of Cooperation
In the preceding two sections, a brief review was made
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of the economic literature in two areas which are related to 
the problems of specifying the determinants of cooperation. 
In this section are reviewed economic, sociological and 
anthropological studies of indigenous forms of cooperation, 
which is the immediate focus of this study. The open-field 
system can be viewed as an indigenous form of cooperation. 
The examples given in the literature below are of more recent 
occurrence.
2.5.1 Indigenous Cooperation in General
The aim of Galjart's (1981) paper is to address the 
issue of what use may be made of traditional cooperative 
organizations for modern productive purposes. He notes that 
the pooling of resources by rural groups "is nowadays not 
much less wide-spread than market groups". However, the 
individual in a traditional society will depart from 
traditional notions about equivalence and compare inputs 
with expected rewards. He concludes that "the decision to 
participate in joint efforts can be better explained in 
terms of equitable ratios of inputs and expected outputs 
than in terms of customary practice" (p. 10).
Galjart mentions the "frequent recommendation" that 
groups engaged in collective work should be small (ten to 
twenty persons) in order to exercise more effective "social 
control" over members' work. Also, deliberations are easier
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to organize. However, in order to reap economies of scale, 
"higher level associations" can be formed.
2.5.2 The Labour Group
For Wong (1971), the existence of mutual aid teams or 
MATs in pre—Communist China were an example of how Chinese 
farmers efficiently utilized the scarce resources at their 
command. The labour MATs arose because of labour scarcity 
during the peak seasons in the wheat and rice regions, 
especially in the task of planting and harvesting. This 
scarcity could be dealt with by labour-saving devices, which 
would have meant greater capital investment and the 
introduction of new kinds of inputs, but which in fact did 
not occur. The rich and middle income farmers could afford 
to hire labour. The poorer farmers, who were the majority, 
had to "buy" labour with labour, i.e., labour exchange or 
jen-kuno pien kuna.
A deeper reason for the existence of labour MATs,
according to Wong, was the necessity for a Chinese farmer to
increase his "operational farm size" (pp. 339—340). It was
found that a peasant couple, during the transplanting of
rice, could only attend to a 0.7 acres of land (3,415
sq.m.), which was not enough to grow rice for family
2
consumption, given soil fertility. Since the Chinese 
farmer was generally capital poor, he lacked the equipment 
to extend his operational farm size, or he lacked the means
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to be able to hire labour. Thus, he entered into labour 
exchange agreements.
To quote Wong:
In many areas in China, the amount of land 
a peasant could work on was limited by what he 
and his family could manage during the busiest 
peak. Paradoxically, his low labour product­
ivity plus the climatic constraint defined the 
amount of land he could undertake to cultivate, 
even more than the overall constraint from the 
unfavourable man— land ratio in that area. Given 
the situation of limited technical substitution, 
his "operational farm size", which in this case 
is a function of the labour resources at his 
command, had to be small, sometimes even at a 
level lower than what was required for his 
survival. MATs were one way to help him to 
raise his "operational farm size" (pp. 339—340).
Still another reason for labour MATs was a "certain 
degree of increased efficiency through a limited process of 
division of labor in addition to the increased enthusiasm of 
people working in groups of their own volition" (p. 339).
This also gave rise in North China to the formation of 
labour gangs called chakuno or "poor peasants hiring out 
their labour to work the land of others in groups".
Wong also observes that MATs were popular because they 
were more informal than working for wages which entailed 
stricter monitoring. Such informality arose because member—  
ship was based on kinship and friendship, and on a more or
2
Wong does not mention the farm size in this 
particular example but elsewhere in the article mentions 
that the median size of rice farms, based on a survey of 22 
provinces, was 2.05 acres.
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less equivalent social standing. These considerations 
reduced the risks of conflict that could arise if membership 
were selected on factors other than these.
In a footnote, Wong alludes to the small size of labour 
MATs: an "optimum crew" of ten for harvesting rice —  four
reaping, four threshing, and two carrying grain from reapers 
to threshers —  and six or seven for rice transplanting.
In a study of group farming in South Korea, Reed (1979) 
focuses on transplanting teams for rice, which were the most 
widespread form of indigenous cooperation. In general, three 
types of teams existed. One type was the team formed by a 
farm household arranging for exchange labour with several 
other households, membership remaining unchanged for a 
number of years. The second type was that of the 
professional planters' contract work team who exchanged 
labour among themselves and hired out their labour to large 
farmers, both within their own village and in other 
villages. It was composed of small farmers and landless 
labourers.
The third type was the cooperative work team (CWT) 
whose members transplanted each other's fields but did not 
hire out their labour. The CWT usually encompassed 82.2% of 
the households in one village and planted 81.1% of village 
village and planted 81.1% of village farm area. They 
averaged 27-3 member households, with 38.5 transplanters per
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day, 71.1% being female. They operated for three or four 
weeks, putting in 10 to 12 hours per day. Villages where 
CWTs were organized averaged 32.8 households in size, while 
the sample of villages studied had an average size of 47.3 
households.
Employing discriminant analysis, Reed tested thirteen 
variables which would account for the existence of one of 
the three types of teams in a village. In one set of 
villages, four variables turned out to be statistically 
discernible. These were the man— land ratio, the number of 
village households, the percentage of households in the 
largest kin group and the degree of inequality. In a second 
set of villages, only the man— land ratio and the degree of 
inequality showed up as significant. His conclusions, in 
brief, were:
Cooperative workteams appear in villages 
where the labour shortage is moderate and 
inequality between households is low. Contract 
workteams, based on class relations, tend to 
appear in villages where the labour shortage is 
severe and inequality is high. Villages of 
different sizes and kinship structures form 
cooperative workteams, but strong kin ties and 
small village size seem to discourage contract 
teams even where the labour shortage is severe, 
(p. iii)
Ziche and Salih (1984) discuss traditional communal 
labour in Sub—Saharan Africa, organized largely for 
agricultural field tasks but used also for non— farm tasks 
such as house construction, repair of communal wells and
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village roads. Among all communal undertakings, the 
agricultural task of weeding uses up the most communal 
labour because it has to be completed in a relative^;brief 
span of time (a few weeks) in order that yields will be 
optimum (p. 11).
Communal labour, however, is inefficient because it is 
undertaken primarily for non—economic reasons: "to
strengthen cohesion of social systems, to aid weak or 
unfortunate group members; to work together in a sociable 
manner; to confirm or possibly enhance the prestige of those 
who call for communal labour; and to practice social 
equalization" (p. 7). The labour productivity per
participant was found to be much lower than if each 
individual worked on his own. There were no "associational 
gains" from working together, i.e., no mutual stimulus to 
perform better.
Elaborating on the objective of working together in a 
sociable manner, the authors note the forms of enjoyment 
that accompany communal labour: "In many cases there is
singing and dancing, or wrestling of young males, to be 
enjoyed after work has been completed for the day" (p. 14).
Also, the one who called for communal labour provided large 
amounts of food and drink. In the case of communal labour 
for weeding one hectare, the host spends as much as one 
fifth of the yield (sorghum) per hectare for food and drink.
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With increasing monetization, communal labour has been 
increasingly replaced by wage labour, partly because the 
latter can be recruited at will and dismissed for poor 
performance or if employment opportunities are lacking. 
However, with the use of money to pay for agricultural 
labor, the employer loses the opportunity to enhance his 
prestige by giving the generous amounts of food and drink 
involved in traditional communal labour, and he also loses 
any claim on the help of his fellow villagers in time of 
emergency.
Ziche and Salih also observe that traditional communal 
labour is practiced almost exclusively among primary groups 
based on kinship or neighbourhood because of the solidarity 
engendered within these groups. Sizes of communal labour 
groups in agricultural field tasks in the Sudan ranged from 
17 persons per work day for harvesting sorghum, to 21 
persons for cotton picking to 28 persons for weeding (Table
2, p. 18).
In the Philippines, Anderson (1981) examines exchange 
labour (ammovo) in Northern Central Luzon. Ammovo groups 
are formed for the agricultural field tasks involved in rice 
farming, most notably ploughing and harrowing and 
occasionally in transplanting and harvesting.
Among the circumstances that give rise to the formation 
of ammovo groups are (1) labour scarcity during peak periods
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of rice farming; (2) long turn-around time between crops 
since there is only one single rainfed crop; (3) shortage of 
cash; (4) the availability of draught animals or hand 
tractors and the unavailability of four-wheeled tractors for 
contract ploughing at a reasonable price; and (5) the 
tendency to regard farming as an exclusive occupation 
(implying the lack of non— farm employment opportunities due 
to relative isolation).
Membership in these groups tends to be based on "house 
neighbours or field neighbours who are kinsmen, friends or 
trusted neighbours who thus can be expected to uphold the 
contract fully and with whom one enjoys the companionship of 
work and afterwards, drinking, gossiping, and storytelling" 
(p. 20). Since the groups are used largely for ploughing
and harvesting, they tend to be composed of males. In 
general, too, members tend to be of the same socio-economic 
status.
The advantages or benefits of being a member of 
exchange labour groups are (1) assurance of labour when 
needed; (2) assurance of good quality work; (3) cash 
conservation and avoidance of long-term debt; and (4) the 
benefits of companionship, fostering solidarity and 
rendering the task easier.
On the other hand, the disadvantages or costs of 
membership are (1) a serious commitment and a major
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expenditure of time and energy; (2) loss of other income- 
earning opportunities; and (3) the need to maintain harmony 
within the group and with potential work partners.
Over time, certain factors have led to the decline of 
exchange labour groups. One factor is population growth, 
which has led to smaller sizes of farms, forcing cultivators 
to seek non—farm work to supplement their incomes and to 
resort to wage labour on their farms to economize on their 
own time. Another factor is the increase in the number of 
large tractors, beginning in 1971, which could be hired for 
land preparation (ploughing and harrowing) at reasonable 
prices. However, due to increases in fuel prices, these 
have become more expensive and has led to a re—emergence of 
exchange labour groups which use the carabao and hand 
plough.
2.5.3 Irrigators' Groups
Siy (1982) studied an indigenous organizational form 
for irrigation in Northern Luzon known as zanjera. Recent 
estimates place the number of zanjeras at 1,000 with 
membership ranging from 10 to 2,000 households, irrigating 
from one hectare to 1,000 hectares of rice land. These 
organizations had their origins in the late 18th and early 
19th centuries, with those in operation today being 
established within the last fifty years or more, and 
evolving into rather complex structures. A typical zanjera
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would have a president, vice-president, treasurer, 
secretary, foreman, work-unit leader and cook, and would be 
divided into several work groups composed of 5 to 20 members
The most striking feature of the zanjera is the 
distribution of cultivated land among its members, who were 
each given an equal area of land in each section of the 
irrigation system. This ensured that members were not 
divided into upstream and downstream users with the 
consequent conflict between the former who would appropriate 
more than an adequate amount, resulting in the latter not 
getting enough water. In the absence of such a distribution 
of fields, there would be an incentive for the upstream 
users to underinvest in the system, i.e., not give their 
equal share of labor and material for system repair and 
maintenance, and overinvestment on the part of the 
downstream users.
In addition, a monitoring system was instituted through 
the meticulous keeping of records of materials contribution 
and work attendance, and through the imposition of fines.
Breakdowns in the zanjeras began to occur as a result 
of population pressure and the emergence of a market for 
land in the irrigation system. Due to the increase in 
population, original shares were divided among the offspring 
of an original shareholder, so that a new shareholder would 
not have his land equally distributed throughout the system.
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giving rise to the distinction between upstream and down­
stream users. The same result occurred with the sale or 
lease of land to non—members.
In order to keep the zanjera intact, two measures were 
taken. The first was to try to screen new members in order 
to ensure that the organization's new membership would not 
shirk on their responsibilities. The other was to emphasize 
the rewards, both material and non—material, for 
nonshirking, i.e., by greater provision for food and drink, 
exchange of wit and gossip, etc.
Siy reports that nine zanjeras joined together into a 
federation in order to pool enough manpower and materials to 
build a brush dam on the river from which they all draw 
their irrigation water. No single zanjera. could build the 
dam by itself, which is washed away by floods at least once 
a year and has to be reconstructed each time.
The brush dam is over a hundred meters in length and 
spans the entire width of the river. To build it, from 500 
to 1,000 persons are needed. Each zanjera is also required 
to provide a certain amount of construction materials. 
Construction of the dam usually requires three to five days. 
When weather conditions are not favorable, the work could 
last more than a week.
The federation also constructed the main canal leading 
from the dam to each lateral canal. It mobilies all its
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members three to five times a year to maintain and repair 
the main canal.
2.5.4 Marketing Cooperatives
Although not strictly a study on indigenous 
cooperation, Osuntogun's study (1972) of Western Nigerian 
marketing cooperatives of cocoa is relevant to the topic of 
this thesis because he tries to identify the factors that 
account for the success or failure of these cooperatives. 
His index of success/failure is the degree of loyalty of 
members to the cooperative.
The first problem Osuntogun faces is how to measure 
members' loyalty. He does this by devising a weighted index 
which combines the percentage of members who sell their 
produce through the cooperative and the percentage who pay 
their annual subscription.
Three explanatory variables are regressed on the index 
of loyalty, namely, the price paid for members' cocoa, the 
value of loans to members, and their participation in the 
cooperative which, in turn, is measured by an index of 
attendance at meetings.
Osuntogun's data come from the records of 45 
cooperatives covering the period 1956 to 1969. Both time 
series and cross-sectional analysis of the data indicated 
that the price and social participation variables were
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significant but not the value of loans to members. In
particular, the cross-sectional analysis, utilizing a sample
2 —2 size of 45 cooperatives, yielded an R of 0-40- No R was
indicated -
2.6 Summary and Conclusions 
2-6.1. Summary
This chapter has reviewed diverse but relevant 
literature regarding cooperation. The review has suggested 
the following factors which affect cooperation in general : 
(1) indivisibilities in inputs or processes; (2) the 
elasticity of substitution among inputs; (3) the existence 
of economies^; (4) transactions costs; (5) the distribution 
of income /assets; and (6) atmosphere. For agricultural 
activities, in addition to the above factors, the need for 
timeliness in the execution of work was cited.
In the property rights literature reviewed in section
2-3, the example of the polluting factory discussed by Coase 
suggests that it is the economic indivisibility of a natural 
resource such as air which gives the occasion for 
cooperation among the residents affected. If the residents 
fail to act jointly it is because of high transaction costs, 
which in this case means the difficulty of measuring each
shorthand term for economies of size/scale and 
economies due to associational gains.
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resident's marginal utility of air on which to base a 
monetary contribution towards paying the factory owner to 
install anti—pollution devices.
Furubotn and Pejovich state that it is the degree of
transaction costs, i.e. the costs of monitoring managers' 
behaviour within a firm, that determines cooperative 
behaviour on their part.
Dahlman suggests that the establishment of collective 
rights over arable land in the open field system was 
determined by the existence of economies of scale that would 
be reaped if the livestock of all the villagers were 
pastured collectively and that in order to ensure that this 
was done, large fields were divided into smaller plots, that 
is, that the distribution of assets among the villagers was 
made more equal. What he does not discuss but which is
deduced from the situation, is the possibility of 
substituting other kinds of fertilizer such as night soil or
chemical fertilizer (had it been invented at that time) for
animal manure. Then collective rights over arable land 
might not have been rational. This factor is what is 
referred to as the elasticity of substitution among inputs. 
The existence of a village committee to oversee the whole 
affair meant that transaction costs existed and had to be 
dealt with.
In the review of the literature on the origin and 
nature of the firm in section 2-4 Coase (1937) argues that
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the costs of bargaining and the cost of information can make 
the firm a more economical way of carrying out an economic 
activity than a market transaction. He refers to the
interaction of the factors within a firm as cooperative and
also refers to cooperation which is "a direct result of the 
price mechanism (e.g. the market)" (p.391).
A l e h i n  and Demsetz add that monitoring costs, i.e. the 
difficulty of metering inputs in order to match rewards with 
marginal productivities, are also part of transaction costs 
which affect the choice between market transactions and 
setting up a firm. They hint at the existence of 
indivisibilities as the basis for team production in their 
use of the example of two men lifting a heavy load onto a 
lorry. Because of the indivisibility of certain inputs, 
these have to be used jointly, and hence gives rise to team 
production. They refer to this explicitly when they cite 
the shift from the putting out system of producing textiles
to the factory system because of the development of
efficient central sources of power.
Williamson continues in the same line as Coase and
r
Alcl^in and Demsetz, introducing the idea of organizational 
changes in order for a firm growing in size to cope with 
increasing transaction costs. He also argues that the 
indivisibility of assets is one basis for the establishment 
of worker peer groups but that it is only a necessary but
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not sufficient condition for collective organization. 
He introduces the notions of associational gains and of 
atmosphere as affecting cooperation. Finally, Williamson's 
discussion of perfunctory and consummate cooperation 
underlines the fact that even after an individual has chosen 
internal organization over market transactions, various 
degrees of cooperation and non—cooperation are still
possible, even the extreme case of industrial sabotage. The 
degrees of cooperation and non—cooperation are also
determined by transaction costs.
Leibenstein also refers to transaction costs, 
particularly monitoring costs, in explaining the existence 
of X—efficiency within a firm. He also writes of motivating 
resource owners to increase their effort levels, which is 
another source of X—efficiency.
In the review of indigenous forms of cooperation
(section 2.5), Galjart, a sociologist, writes of the fact 
that much traditional forms of cooperation today is based on 
economic rationality- He cites the small size necessary 
for collective work groups to ensure better monitoring and 
minimize bargaining and decision making costs.
Wong cites the capital—poor Chinese peasants' inability 
to substitute capital for labour combined with his inability 
to hire labour, as a major reason for the formation of 
mutual aid teams. The other attractions of forming MATS
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were: the achievement of economies of scale due to division 
of labour; associational gains due to working in groups; 
an atmosphere of informality, based on kinship, friendship 
and equivalent social standing. The latter implies a more 
or less equal distribution of assets.
In South Korea, village—wide cooperative work—teams 
existed where socio—economic inequality among households was 
low. Otherwise, contract workteams appeared whose members 
were the smaller farmers and landless labourers which would 
imply less socio—economic inequality among members. Strong 
kinship ties and small village size also encouraged the 
formation of village—wide CWTs, presumably because 
transaction costs would be low as a result. The villages 
where the CWTs existed were small, comprising 32.8 
households on the average.
For Sub—Sabaran Africa, Ziche and Salih mention that 
timeless in the weeding of sorghum was a consideration in
'h
the use of communal labour. Such groups were based on 
kinship or neighborhood which reduced transaction costs.
Anderson, in explaining the existence of lamd 
preparation teams in Northern Philippines, cites the 
elasticity of substitution between four-wheeled tractors and 
draught animals or small hand tractors as a prominent 
factor. Other factors were: timeliness (assurance of
adequate labour when needed); transaction costs (basing the
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teams on neighbors and kin so as to ensure contract 
fulfillment); atmosphere (companionship in work and 
merriment afterwards) and socio—economic equality.
Indigenous irrigators' associations in the northern 
Philippines have survived partly because of (1) low 
transaction costs through strict screeening of members, 
meticulous record keeping, good organization, and the 
imposition of fines, and (2) congenial atmosphere through 
the provision of food and drink after work, the exchange of 
wit and stories, etc..
A federation of zanjeras was also formed because of the 
existence of an indivisibility in productive inputs, i.e. 
the need to construct a large brush dam annually and to 
construct and maintain a main canal to distribute the water.
A factor affecting cooperation which is not mentioned 
in the literature on property rights and the origin and 
nature of the firm but which is cited in the literature on 
indigenous cooperation is timeliness in the performance of 
farm tasks. This is mentioned by Ziche and Salih in 
explaining why much of communal labour in Sub—Saharan Africa 
takes the form of weeding sorghum since this task must be 
accomplished in a relatively brief time period. Anderson 
also cites it as a reason for the existence of land 
preparation teams in northern Philippines.
It is also to be noted that the literature reviewed on
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indigenous cooperation relate to agriculture. Since 
agriculture is characterized by biological processes, 
farmers are very much aware of the necessity of timing the
different farm tasks. Due to the relative scarcity of 
labour that occurs because farm tasks in capital-poor 
developing countries are labour— intensive, farmers resort to 
either hiring workers or joining an agricultural work team, 
depending on the advantages and disadvantages of each 
arrangement.
2.6.2. Conclusions
From the review of the literature, the term 
"cooperation" is used to refer to different situations. In 
general, it can refer to a market transaction between two
parties, or it can refer to the joint effort of persons
within the same organization. In a market transaction, both 
parties may be cooperating with each other to achieve a
common goal, namely, the satisfaction of needs or wants.
However, in a market transaction, the particular need 
or want is different for each party. In an organization, 
the particular need or want is common to its members. Thus, 
in a market transaction, one party may need carpentry 
services while the other needs money to pay for hospital 
bills. In a labour union, the^ members are seeking higher 
wages, better job security, etc., that is, they have the 
same particular goals in common.
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However, for the same particular goal that an 
individual has in common with others, it may be that two 
options are open : to achieve it on his own, or in concert 
with others who have the same goal. Action by the 
individual on his own may or may not involve market 
transactions- For instance a student reviewing for
examinations may review alone or he may pay a tutor to 
assist him. He could also join a small review group made up 
of other students. On the other hand, collective effort in 
an organization does not involve any market transactions by 
definition. The organization, however, can enter into 
market transactions with non—members as in the case of
Kibbutzim and cooperatives.
If an individual chooses to act alone, we will label 
this individual action. If he chooses to act in concert 
with others, we will call this cooperation in the narrower 
sense because he is after the same particular goal as the 
others. For convenience, we will refer to this as 
collective action. If an individual acts entirely on his 
own, i.e. without any market transaction being involved, we 
will label this "pure" individual action. If it involves a 
market transaction, there is a further choice to be made
between cooperative and non-cooperative strategies. The
former will also be referred to as cooperative behaviour 
and the latter individualistic behaviour. Market
transactions will be called cooperation in a broad sense to
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distinguish it from collective action, since both involve
4
cooperation. Cooperation in the broad sense means that the 
parties to an exchange have the same general goal.
After having chosen collective action, one can think of
cooperative and non—cooperative strategies as still being
?
options for the individual, the existence of / depending on 
his experience within the group, which collective action 
necessarily implies. Collective action also implies some 
form of what Williamson calls internal organization, no 
matter how rudimentary.
The choice between individual action and collective 
action can be distinguished from the choice between 
cooperative and non-cooperative strategies not only in point 
of time. They can also be distinguished by the fact that, 
in the second stage, i.e. the choice between cooperative and 
non—cooperative strategies, the individual's choice is 
affected by what strategies the other (s) will adopt, 
whether it be in the context of a market transaction or 
of collective action. In the first stage, there are no 
interaction effects.
A further distinction between the two stages of choice 
is that some factors may not be immediately relevant in the
4
One is hardput to think of examples where exchanges 
between two individuals with different particular needs or 
wants do not involve market transactions. We refer of 
course to economic exchange.
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second stage. For instance, the existence of
indivisibilities in inputs or processes may be the occasion 
for collective action but ceases to be an immediate concern 
to the individual once he has formed or joined a group. Of 
course, if the indivisibility is a necessary condition for 
the group's existence, then the group will dissolve if the 
indivisibility ceases. The same argument can be applied to 
the factors of the elasticity of substitution, the existence 
of economies and the timeliness of execution of farm tasks.
The factors of transaction costs, distribution of 
income/assets, and a non—calculative atmosphere are 
considered by an individual before he joins a group, and 
continue to be of immediate concern to him ever after he has 
joined the grbup because they immediately affect the 
quatity of his interactions with the other members.
The various choices open to an individual in seeking to 
achive a goal he has in common with others are summarized in 
the following decision tree:
Individual
Action
Collective
Action
"Ftire"
Individual
Action
Market
Transaction
Cooperative
Strategies
Non-cooperative
Strategies
perative 
Strategies
Non-cooperative
Strategies
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The main concern of the thesis is with the choice
between individual action and collective action and within 
the latter, the choice between cooperative and non- 
cooperative strategies.
It can be decuded from the literature that one, several
or all of the factors suggested above become relevant in
affecting cooperation, depending on the particular situation 
being examined. For agricultural situations, it is assumed 
in this thesis, that timeliness in task execution is a
factor which only affects agricultural cooperation and not 
non—agricultural cooperation with the remaining six factors 
affecting both types of cooperation.
Thus, within the context of agricultural cooperation, 
one^ several or all of the seven hypothetical variables can 
be relevant, depending on the situation. The same can be 
said for the six variables in a non—agricultural situation. 
Thus, in the establishment of collective property rights 
over arable land in the open field system, the elasticity of 
substitution, economies, transaction costs, distribution of 
assets and presumably atmosphere come into play. The 
variables of indivisibilities in inputs/ processes and 
timeliness of task execution are not relevant. This is an 
example of agricultural cooperation. The case of residents 
cooperative to solve the problem of the polluting factory 
will be discussed in the next chapter as an example of non— 
agricultural cooperation.
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It can also be deduced from the literature that again, 
depending on the situation being examined, the factors
affecting cooperation become necessary but not sufficient 
conditions or they may become necessary and sufficient 
conditions.
Thus in the case of collective property rights over 
arable land, a zero elasticity of substitution between
animal manure and night soil/inorganic fertilizer was 
a necessary but not sufficient condition. It was also 
necessary that the distribution of field sizes become more 
equal in order for cooperation to take place. But a more
equal distribution of assets, although necessary, is not
also sufficient by itself to ensure cooperation. This can 
also be said of the other factors relevant to the situation: 
existence of economies, low transaction costs, and a non— 
calculative atmosphere. Taken singly, each is in the nature 
of a necessary but not sufficient condition for collective 
property rights to be established over arable land. It is 
only when they are present together that the institution is 
established.
In the case of cooperative behaviour on the part of the 
top managers of a firm, only one factor is relevant and it 
is both a necessary and a sufficient condition, namely, low 
transaction costs.
The following chapter will discuss in depth each of 
these factors proceeding to utilize them in the analysis of
83
the findings of the two case studies on agricultural work
teams in chapters Four and Five and in ^ t e  analysis of
sample of cooperative labour teams. In this manner, it is 
hoped that more light will be shed on the factors that
affect indigenous cooperation and thus contribute to the 
economist's ability "to predict for specific socio-economic 
situations, whether or not spontaneous cooperation is
likely" (Collard, p. 44),
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CHAPTER 3: THE DETERMINANTS OF COOPERATION
3.1 Introduction
Having identified the factors that determine 
the choices between both individual and collective action 
and cooperative and non-cooperative strategies, this chapter 
will discuss these factors in detail. For simplicity, 
reference will be made to the determinants of cooperation 
only- They are postulated to be : 1) the existence or
absence of indivisibilities in productive inputs and or 
productive processes; 2) the degree of elasticity of 
substitution among productive inputs and/or processes; 3) 
the existence or absence of economies of size and scale and 
associational gains; 4) transaction costs; 5) the 
distribution of income or assets among cooperators, and 6) 
the atmosphere governing the exchange relationship.
For agricultural cooperation, the literature suggests 
an additional factor namely, 7) the need for timeliness in 
the execution of an agricultural activity. This is 
discussed in this chapter since the next two chapters 
present case studies on cooperation in agricultural tasks. 
The timeliness in the execution of a task, however, may also 
be a factor which affects cooperation in non—agricultural
SItuatiorC
In the literature reviewed in the preceding chapter, a 
distinction was made between an assurance game and a
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Prisoner's Dilemna game (Collard, 1978). It was argued that 
the latter type of situation will result in cooperation only 
if the individuals involved possess some degree of altruism 
and trust, the degree depending on the difference between 
the payoffs to cooperative and to individualistic behaviour. 
The question would then be if one were interested in seeing 
cooperation take place, what would bring altruism and trust 
about? The science of economics would appear to be ill- 
equipped to provide an answer.
In the case of an assurance game, where the payoffs to 
cooperative behaviour are greater than the payoffs to 
individualistic behaviour (or defection, as Axelrod would 
call it), the question can also be posed as to what would 
bring these about. Here, the science of economics is in 
familair territory, and the attempt can be made to provide 
some answers. If answers are indeed provided, then some 
idea can also be had about ^r^Cning Prisoner's Dilemmas into 
assurance games by means of influencing the factors which 
determine the respective payoffs. If a Prisoner's Dilemma 
situation cannot be turned into an assurance game, then the 
attempt can be made to reduce the difference between the 
payoffs, thus reducing the degree of altruism and t r u ^ t  
necessary to bring cooperation about.
Regarding the choice between individual and collective 
action, it can also be said that this will depend on their 
respective payoffs. Put in another way, what are the
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factors which affect the costs and benefits of cooperation?^
It should be pointed out, however, that cooperation is 
not necessarily good in itself. Thus, criminals cooperating 
with each other in forming a drug syndicate is not in the 
public interest. The desirability of cooperation depends on 
the particular purpose involved. There are instances where 
a useful outcome can better be achieved by individual 
action. Paintings, poetry and musical compositions are a 
case in point (although some recent musical achievements and 
murals have been the result of group action).
3-2 Indivisibilities
Indivisibilities in physical inputs can arise because 
of purely technological considerations. A machine can be 
built in only one size because existing technology can do no 
better. An example is the first computer which was huge 
compared to the variety of sizes which exist today. 
Indivisibilities also arise because of purely economic 
considerations. For instance, while land is physically 
divisible, a farm household may not be able to continue 
farming if the area it cultivates falls below a certain 
minimum.
The externality that is the result of a polluting
Since we can think of the costs of cooperation as 
being the benefits of individual action/non—cooperation, and 
of the benefits of cooperation as being the costs of 
individual action/non-cooperation, we shall refer only to 
the costs and benefits of cooperation.
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factory comes from the indivisibility of a resource. It 
could be the air or it could be the water in a river. 
Although air and water are physically divisible, they may 
not be economically divisible, i.e., it may not pay to 
separate the polluted from the clean air or water. Hence, 
parties who use the air or water in a specific location for 
different purposes have to cooperate in the use of these 
resources.
Indivisibilities also exist in some processes which are 
called overhead processes. These are processes which are 
necessary if any output is to be produced at all. Examples 
are the design of a new car or the typesetting of a book.
These indivisibilities mean that relatively large 
quantities of other inputs such as labour, which are used in 
combination with the indivisible input or process, are 
required in order to use that input or process efficiently, 
if at all. For manufacturing, Alchian and Demsetz cite the 
development of efficient central sources of power, i.e., 
large generators, which make team production more economical 
than the "putting out" system involving individual weavers. 
The new sources of power made possible bigger and better 
output, which meant more income.
While the "putting out" system involved cooperation 
between the capitalist and the individual weavers, the 
introduction of central sources of power brought the weavers 
and the capitalist together in one place and increased the
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need for cooperation and coordination.
For agriculture, the study on the zanjera or indigenous 
irrigators association in northern Philippines showed that 
the basis for the organization of several zanieras into one 
federation was the necessity to build a large dam and main 
canal. The size of these physical structures meant that no 
single zanjera could tackle the job.
In this connection, it is helpful to cite the
experience of the collective ej ido in Mexico. Under the
ej ido. the households of a village community owned in 
common the arable land, pasturage and woodland surrounding 
the village. However, cultivation and usufruct were 
individual. In 1936, collective ej idos were established in 
Laguna region, in Northern Mexico, which meant that the land 
was also cultivated collectively. The reason for this was 
that it was feared that parcellation of the land would 
destroy the gravity irrigation system (Wiles, p. 138). 
However, when small pumps and cheap wells were introduced,
collective ejidos went into a decline (Eckstein, 1965, 
p. 145).
It is interesting to quote Wiles on this :
Mexican collectivization had above all a 
technological excuse, as we have seen ; the fact 
of irrigation by river and ditch. This at that 
time made individual ej idos impossible. But much 
of the disaster the movement has subsequently 
undergone is due to the cheap well and pump.
Whole areas have reverted to individual 
farming just because of this - with the Banco 
Ejidal putting up the money. There are few more
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brilliant confirmations of basic Marxism - except 
that technical progress has deconcentrated 
capital. The Soviet government would of course 
have refused to supply drills and pumps, as it has 
refused to supply small tractors- (p. 146)
3-3 Elasticity of Substitution
In order to produce a product or service, productive
inputs have to be used jointly, but there is also a degree
of substitution among them. Thus, up to a certain extent,
labour can be substituted for machinery or, as in
agriculture, fertilizer for land. The incentive for such
substitution comes from the changes in input prices. The
tendency would be to substitute units of a cheaper input for
units of one which has become more expensive, while
maintaining output. The limits to such a substitution arise
from technological and budgetary constraints- In some
instances, cultural rigidities come into play. The degree
to which units of one input are substituted for units of
another input in response to changes in their respective
prices is defined as the elasticity of substitution 
2
(signa). If, for a one percent change in the ratio of 
their respective prices, there is more than a one percent
2
The elasticity of substitution, signa, is defined as: 
d (A/B) ^B/^A
sigma — ----—--------------  —-
d (Pg/PA) A/B
where A = input A
B = input B
Pa ” price of A
Pg = price of B
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change in the ratio with which they are jointly used, then 
sigma is greater than one and there is a high elasticity of 
substitution between the two inputs.
The examples here are agricultural. In the case of 
the Soviet kolkhoz. the hand tractor is a substitute for the 
large, four— wheeled one and is more affordable. Soviet 
authorities discriminate against the smaller hand tractor 
since they feared its introduction would render small scale 
farming economical and lead to the break up of the large 
kolkhozi or collective farms since the latter would be a 
more rational set up if only larger, four— wheeled tractors 
were available.^ However, there are some farm situations in 
which the large tractor is more economical to use than the 
hand tractor, so that even in a free market, the hand 
tractor does not completely ease out the large tractor. 
This is true in the Philippines where rice farmer^ sometimes 
use the large tractor for ploughing and harrowing to shorten
4
turn-around time and the hand tractor for the final
'^Kolkhozniks or members of the collective farm were 
restricted in their movement out of the farm. Wadekin 
(1977) reports that for a time they were not permitted to 
migrate. Wiles notes that they were not issued internal 
passports unlike other Soviet citizens- This created a high 
man-land ratio on the farm, making smaller tractors more 
economical. In contrast, in the U.S. tractors got higger 
and bigger because of an increasing labour shortage on the 
farms, aided in part, by labour mobility.
4
Turn—around time in the context refers to the time 
period between harvesting of the previous crop and planting 
of the next one. The farmer would want to shorten this 
either because the rains have come earlier than expected, or 
he wishes to be the first to harvest his crop- Another 
sense of turn—around time is "dead" while machinery 
turning around in a field after a pass.
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leveling of the field before it is planted.
In case of the open field system in Northern Europe, 
the substitution of night soil for animal manure might have 
prevented the establishment of collective rights over arable 
land, even if one did not completely substitute for the 
other. In this case, it could be said that a cultural 
rigidity prevented substitution, resulting in sigma being 
zero.
With respect to the MATs in pre-Communist China, Wong 
explicitly states that one of the circumstances that led to 
their formation was the absence of cheap labour— saving 
devices, which would have enabled the small farmers to 
hurdle the labour constraint during peak seasons of planting 
and harvesting. The decline in exchange labour groups in 
land preparation in the Philippines was attributed in part 
by Anderson to the increase in the number of large tractors 
available for contract ploughing. However, when fuel prices 
increased, leading to an increase in the hire price of the 
large tractors, there was an incipient resurgence of the 
exchange labour groups.
Thus, a second factor which affects the relative costs 
and benefits of cooperation the elasticity of substitution. 
If sigma is greater than one and if the substitution favours 
individual action, then the costs of such behaviour are low 
ceteris paribus, and correspondingly, the costs of
92
collective action are high. If the substitution favours 
collective action, then the reverse would be true.
3.4 Economies
By economies is meant a reduction in the unit cost of 
attaining a commodity or service that an individual wants to 
attain as a result of group or collective action. The 
sources of economies arising from group action can be 
considered under two aspects : technological and
psychological.
is rULpAcW, ^
The technological source of economies nprirtgb— ffom— f.hs 
phofinmpiii-iro-' the U—shaped cost curve which graphically
depicts the law of diminishing returns in the short run and 
economies of scale in the long run. The former is known 
also as economies of size where factor proportions change as 
the amount of one input is increased, other factors held
constant.
The psychological source of economies springs from
modifications of behaviour as a result of working in a team 
rather than individually. Working in a team can be the 
result of adding more workers to perform a task which 
previously had been done by one person, keeping the
quantities of all other productive factors constant. It is 
analogous to the concept of economies of size, with the 
difference being that the reduction in unit costs comes, not
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from technological but from psychological considerations 
which will be discussed below.
3.4.1 Economies of Size and Scale
Although for purposes of empirical work, many 
economists prefer to apply production functions which depict 
constantly diminishing marginal productivity of factors, 
still there are those who admit the possibility of real 
world situations which indicate a range of rising and then 
falling marginal productivities.^ It is these latter 
conditions which are relevant for the discussion in this 
section regarding economies of size.
As more units of a variable input are combined with 
fixed quantities of other inputs to produce a good or 
service, it is possible that the marginal product of the
r
The CES and Cobb—Douglas production functions, which 
are widely used in empirical work, do not have regions of 
increasing marginal productivity (cf. Ferguson and Gould, 
n.3, p. 137). Nevertheless, this does not preclude the 
possibilitiy of the phenomenon from occurring in the real 
world. Thus Stigler (1966, p. 128) in discussing 
diminishing returns, states that it is possible that there 
is an initial stage of increasing marginal product of the 
variable factor. Heady (1961, chapter 3) reviews a range of 
production functions appropriate for agriculture, including 
those where both increasing and diminishing marginal 
products to a factor are present.
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variable input increases at first, reaches a maximum and 
then declines. However, diminishing marginal product does 
not mean that total output is falling. In fact, it may be 
rising, and so also with average product, which is total 
output divided by the total number of units of the variable 
input. A stage is reached where total output and average 
product also fall.
These results happen because some inputs are held 
constant in quantity, which leads to the distinction between 
the short-run and the long-run periods of time. The latter 
is defined as the time period where all inputs can be varied 
in the quantities employed.
The converse of rising, then falling, marginal and 
average products are falling, then rising, marginal and 
average costs. The latter, when depicted graphically, 
result in U-shaped cost curves. Thus, if an individual is 
contemplating carrying out an activity where certain inputs 
are fixed, the costs to him of doing it alone will be high. 
When he joins with one other person, unit costs will fall; 
if one more person joins in, then costs fall even further, 
and so on. These are known as economies of size.
The preceding discussion can be illustrated by a 
hypothetical example shown in Table 3-1. There are eight
6
The example is borrowed, with modifications and 
additions, from Ferguson and Gould (1975, p. 131).
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parcels of 5,000 sq.m. each, with varying numbers of 
workers, producing an agricultural output. For simplicity, 
we assume that no other inputs are involved. It can be seen 
that the marginal product of labour first rises, reaches a 
peak, and then falls as the number of persons working the 
same area of land increases. The same is true with average 
product, which is total output divided by the number of 
workers. On the other hand, marginal and average costs 
first fall, bottom out, and then rise, with the former 
falling and rising faster than the latter.
Marginal cost in real terms is simply the ratio of the 
additional worker to the additional output. Thus, for an 
output of 24 units, .071 units of labour are required to 
produce one additional unit of output.
TABLE 3-1 Hypothetical Example of 
Diminishing Returns
Tract
Number
No. of Land- Total 
Workers Labour Product 
Ratio 
(sq.m./worker)
Marginal
Product
Average
Product
Marginal
Cost
Average
Cost
1 1 5000 10 — 10.0 — .100
2 2 2500 24 14 12.0 .071 .083
3 3 1667 39 15 13.0 .067 .077
4 4 1250 56 17 14.0 .059 .071
5 5 1000 71 15 14.2 .C66 .070
6 6 833 83 12 13.8 .083 .072
7 7 714 94 9 13.1 .111 .077
8 8 625 94 5 12.1 .200 .085
Average cost in real terms is the ratio of the total number 
of workers to total output. Thus for the same output of 24
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units, .083 units of labour are needed to produce one unit 
of output on the average- These results are usually 
attributed to the fact that each unit of the variable input 
labour, has a constantly diminishing amount of the fixed 
input, land, to work on- This is shown in the constantly 
diminishing land— labour ratio in column 3-
The relevant column to consider in Table 3-1 is the 
last column or average cost and the relevant entries are 
those for the second to the fifth tracts- The point is 
that because average cost has a U-shape, the individual is 
better off working with one or more other workers rather 
than tackling the job by himself-'^
A simple example would be a group of university
students reviewing together for examinations- Under certain
i
assumptions, the cost of reviewing with a group is lower 
than if one reviews by himself from the physical fact of
It could be asked whether, in this particular example, 
the five workers are members of a cooperative team or 
whether one worker hires the other four- The answer is that 
the existence of economies of size are a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for a cooperative work team to be 
organized- Other factors, such as transaction costs, have 
to be taken into consideration- If the transaction costs of 
a cooperative arrangement are lower than that for an 
employer—employee relationship, then given economies of 
size, the workteam will be a cooperative one-
g
The assumptions are: (1) the members of the group are
equally capable and industrious, and (2) the state of the 
art is given, i-e-, no invention is available which enables 
one to review just as well as a group-
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several heads being better than one. The use of the word 
"several" means that, intuitively, a study group should 
remain small to be efficient. A larger group will result in 
diminishing returns.
In the long run, all inputs in a productive activity 
are variable, and an increase in their quantities has been 
found to result in reduced costs in producing one unit of 
commodity or service that is the goal of the activity. Such 
economies are known as economies of scale. However, there 
is a limit to which volume can be expanded since it may not 
be possible to expand management equi—proportionally, 
leading to problems of coordination. This would result in 
diseconomies of scale. Depicted graphically, economies and 
diseconomies of scale also result in a U-shaped average cost 
curve-
One source of scale economies are indivisibilities in 
physical assets as well as in overhead processes. With 
respect to physical assets, current technology may limit the 
size of, say, machinery to a large one, so that as the 
volume of output is increased, unit costs decrease as excess 
capacity is used up. With respect to overhead processes.
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the "setting up" cost of for instance, the design of a new 
car or typesetting of a book, are high. But as more cars 
produced or as more copies of the book are printed, these 
costs are spread out over more and more untis, thus reducing 
unit costs-
A second source is specialization and division of 
labour. Instead of one person doing several tasks in the 
productive process, he can concentrate on one task which he 
does repeatedly due to the larger volume of output, 
resulting in increased efficiency. These were cited by Wong 
as one of the benefits of the Chinese mutual aid team in 
pre-Communist China.
A third source are financial economies realized through 
quantity discounts on the purchase of large amounts of 
inputs or through lower costs per unit of capacity when 
larger sizes of equipment are bought- The possibilty of 
reaping financial economies through quantity discounts is a 
major incentive for the formation of cooperative consumer 
stores and farmers' marketing cooperatives all over the 
world.
A fourth source would be the statistical law of large 
numbers. For instance, inventories do not need to increase 
in proportion to sales because there is greater stability in 
the aggregate behaviour of large numbers of buyers.
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3.4.2 Psychological Sources of Economies -
Members of a group or team interact among themselves 
and this leads to modifications of behaviour. When the 
group is small, such interactions can lead to efficiency 
increases. An example would be the natural reluctance of 
anyone to be considered the least productive member of a 
work group and the tendency for competition to arise. 
Williamson also mentions the sense of responsibility that 
comes into play in worker peer groups (which are relatively 
small) in contrast with working alone.
As the group or team grows in size, their efficiency 
declines, not only because of the physical factors involved 
in coordination or management but also because (1) of the 
increasing probability of including more members with 
diverse personalities and background which in turn increases 
the probability of conflict, and (2) the sense of 
responsibility is diluted by the very fact that the 
individual's actions will matter less and less in the total 
outcome as the group grows larger in size. This latter 
phenomenon gives rise to the free rider problem which Olson 
cites as the major reason why large groups will not succeed 
in promoting common interests or collective goods unless 
non-collective goods are also provided.
The role of these psychological factors has been 
recognized on both the level of traditional communal labour
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and modern factory work groups. Ziche and Salih have 
mentioned the practice of the African Swazi people of 
placing hardworking members of a communal labour team beside 
lax ones and of organizing the team according to sex, in 
order to utilize the natural competition that they noticed 
arose between the male and female members (p. 9). On the 
level of the modern factory work group, the recognition of 
the psychological factors which arise in group work has led 
to the reorganization of the labour force in Japanese firms 
into small work teams, resulting in the well—publicized 
efficiency of the Japanese worker. These examples 
illustrate the concept of x—efficiency elaborated by 
Leibenstein.
A final psychological factor that comes into play when 
the individual joins a group rather than tries to achieve a 
goal on his own is the increased sense of hope or 
expectation of achieving that goal, which can lead to 
increased effort levels and efficiency. The role of 
expectations in influencing economic behaviour has received 
widespread attention in the so-called expected income 
hypothesis where it has been largely proven that expected 
income, rather than actual income, has determined levels of 
consumption and investment.
The increase in the efficiency of human labour that 
results from human interaction in a group can be called 
"associational gains", to borrow a term from Williamson.
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Conversely, the decline in efficiency can be called 
"associational losses". Such losses are expected to occur 
as the group grows in size. However, due to organizational 
innovation, the work group can be kept small even though the 
entire organization grows in size, thus preserving 
associational gains.
The various types of economies discussed in the 
preceding paragraphs can be distinguished from each other 
for analytical purposes. In practice, it may be difficult 
to do so.
3.5 Transaction Costs
Any transaction or exchange between two parties 
involves certain costs. First, one has to locate those who 
would benefit from, and therefore be interested in, an 
exchange. Second, he has to determine whether the partner 
to the exchange can be expected not to fool him, i.e., 
trustworthiness. Third, some time and effort are required 
in order to come to an agreement with respect to the terms 
of the exchange. Fourth, monitoring has to be done in order 
to ensure that the other party keeps his part of the bargain 
or agreement.
In the example of the polluting factory given by Coase, 
he postulated that the transaction costs of cooperative 
behaviour on the part of the residents living in the area
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would be prohibitively high, resulting in nothing being done 
to solve the problem of air pollution. In this particular 
case, the terms of the exchange, i.e., the amount of money 
each resident should contribute in exchange for clean air, 
could not be determined.
In the case of the non-cooperative corporate managers, 
the costs of monitoring their behaviour by shareholders were 
high, enabling the managers to pursue their own goals to a 
certain extent. This situation led to the recognition that 
the firm was not a monolithic entity but was made up of 
individuals who may not act in accordance with the goal of 
the firm, which is profit maximization.
In order to reduce the risk that the other party will 
renege, screening is done. Such screening can take various 
forms. Where there is a great deal of self—monitoring that 
is necessary (usually in peer groups), membership is based 
on consanguineal relations or on long standing 
acquaintanceship (as a result of being friends or 
neighbours) or on a combination of both. In case of a group 
marked by employer—employee relations (simple and complex 
hierarchies), screening is done by investigating the 
background of the prospective member, and consulting the 
experience of previous employers or associates by means of 
letters of recommendation and the like.
The screening of prospective partners to an exchange
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and their subsequent monitoring involves information costs. 
If such costs are prohibitive, the exchange will not take 
place.
Monitoring costs are affected by altruism and trust as 
defined by Collard. If one is concerned for others who are 
partners to an exchange, and if he has some belief that they 
will cooperate, then he will keep his part of the bargain 
and do a better job of it than in the absence of altruism 
and trust. And so also for the other partners. Thus, less 
monitoring is required of the actions of the partners to an 
exchange, hence, reducing monitoring costs. The greater the 
degree of altruism and trust, the lesser monitoring costs 
are.
What Axelrod calls "the shadow of the future" also 
affects monitoring costs. If one partner to an exchange 
expects to continue to deal with the others in the future, 
then there is an incentive for him to cooperate, i.e., keep 
his part of the agreement, and thus less monitoring is 
necessary. The longer is the shadow of the future, the 
greater is the incentive to self—monitoring, and hence the 
lesser monitoring costs are.
The transaction costs of team work are reduced by 
keeping the size of the group small. In particular, the 
larger a group is, the greater is the probability of a free 
rider problem. However, where large group size brings on
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other advantages such as economies of scale, transaction 
costs can be reduced by organizational innovations as 
pointed out by Galjart and demonstrated by Williamson.
To sum up, transaction costs are made up of (1) search 
and information costs; (2) bargaining and decision-making 
costs; and (3) monitoring costs. Thus, cooperation is 
determined, among others, by relative transaction costs.
3.6. The Distribution of Income/Assets
The distribution of income or assets as a factor 
determining cooperation is most prominently mentioned in the 
literature on indigenous forms of cooperation which involve 
peer groups. In organizations characterized by employer— 
employee relations, the employer would, by definition, be 
wealthier than his employees.
In the case of the open field system, which involved 
the whole village, inevitably there were inequalities in the 
distribution of assets in terms of field sizes. It was 
feared that these would lead to the bigger cultivators 
dominating the management of the system in their favour by 
threatening to pull out their fields from the communal 
grazing arrangement. (See p.45 ) If this happened, the
small cultivators would see little advantage for themselves 
and would pull out, resulting in the break-up of the system.
As it turned out, the bigger cultivators agreed to 
break up their large contiguous fields in exchange for
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fragmented, small ones. The cost to them of agreeing to 
such an undertaking must have been less than if they
refused, resulting, perhaps, not only in diseconomies of
scale but also in ill-will (which is a liability) towards 
them on the part of the other villagers.
With respect to indigenous labour groups that Wong and
Anderson observed, members had the same socio-economic
status. This worked toward the reduction of conflict among 
them.
It was a different story where the cooperative work 
teams of South Korea were concerned. Since they encompassed 
entire villages (although small, comprising 47.3 households 
on the average), there were bound to be inequalities in 
socio-economic status. Thus Reed observes that participation 
in meetings to organize the cooperative workteam (CWT) 
varied proportionately with farm size. Landless and small 
farmer households had lower attendance at these meetings 
because they had less voice in decisions arrived at. To 
quote Reed :
Conspicuously missing from the meetings in 
... villages (with CWTs) were the landless 
households... and many of the poor farmers- In 
spite of the importance of the decision to these 
labour surplus households, their low status limits 
their participation in village affairs. This 
also turned out to be the case in the other 
sampled villages ... nonparticipation in the 
decision to form the CWT is inversely related to 
size. Thus, the evidence is that even in these 
more cooperative villages, economic class is a 
determinant in the level of participation in the 
village decision-making process, (p. 180)
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Thus it was inevitable that a conflict between the 
larger farmers on the one hand, and the smaller farmers and 
landless households on the other, would occur after the CWT 
had been formed, in deciding the value of the labour unit on 
which remuneration was based, with each side favouring a 
different accounting system (pp. 185—196).
The phenomenon of village—wide CWTs itself was 
partially determined by the degree of socio-economic 
inequality existing in a village. Where this was low, CWTs 
made an appearance. Where it was high, contract workteams, 
made up of smaller farmers and landless households, made 
their appearance.
Thus the distribution of income/assets also affects the 
choice between individual action and collective action as 
well as between cooperative and non-cooperative strategies.
3.7 Atmosphere
A sixth factor affecting the relative costs of 
cooperative and individualistic behaviour is what Williamson 
calls "atmosphere". It arises in the context of the 
intensity with which transactions are metered, i.e., concern 
with an exact quid pro quo. To some, the exchange itself is 
an object of value and not simply a means to an end. 
Williamson contends that internal organization provides a 
less calculative atmosphere than market transactions, and
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that among modes of internal organization, peer groups 
provide this better than hierarchies (n. 15, p. 258). Within 
groups where the employer— employee relationship exists, 
resentment is engendered where performance is too closely 
monitored, resulting in negative spill-over effects-
Wong refers to Chinese peasants' preference for 
exchange rather than wage labour because of the lesser 
monitoring that tended to come with the former. On the 
other hand, Ziche and Salih cite the increasing preference 
by African farmers for wage labour because it permitted them 
to exact a more efficient job performance against the 
general tradition of inefficient communal labour brought 
about by the stress on the social objectives of such labour, 
yjz., to enhance prestige through generous provision of food 
and drink, assist weak or unfortunate group members, etc.
Castillo (1982), in her review of the literature on 
indigenous forms of cooperation in the Philippines, notes 
that a major factor that led to such cooperation was the fun 
the participants would get out of it, both during the work 
itself and after. Siy observes that zanjera leaders 
increased the provision for food and drink and emphasized 
the exchange of wit and gossip as a means of countering the 
increasing pressure for free—riding as a result of the 
increase in membership.
In the case of the indigenous exchange labour groups
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cited above, it could be said that they produced a joint 
product namely the accomplishment of a particular farm task 
plus "fun", i.e. food, drink, gossip, etc.
Thus, the "atmosphere" surrounding an exchange is a 
factor which individuals take into consideration in 
choosing between individual action/individualistic behaviour 
and cooperation.
3.8 Timeliness
In the literature on indigenous forms of cooperation 
which are related to agriculture, one factor influencing the 
formation of exchange labpour groups was the necessity of 
the timely delivery of services due to the biological 
characteristic of agriculture. Along with the other factors 
already discussed, timeliness is postulated to affect 
cooperation among farmers. In the following paragraphs, 
timeliness in specific tasks in rice farming is discussed in 
order to illustrate the concept-
Regarding timeliness in transplanting. De Datta (1981) 
notes that the optimum age for transplanting wet—bed 
seedlings is 20 to 30 days, depending on the variety. 
"Thirty—day or older seedlings recover more slowly than 
younger seedlings, especially if they suffer from too much 
stem or root injury during pulling. Such injuries reduce 
tillering, prolong maturity, and may reduce grain yiled" 
(p .230).
&
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Evidence available with respect to the necessity for 
timeliness in rice transplanting referred to deepwater tice 
(rice grown in 51 cm. to 5 to 6 meters of standing water). 
Experiments with improved varieties which were double- 
transplanted showed that grain yields increased along with 
seedling age, reached a peak, and then declined. (See Table 
3-1.) It will be noted that, for IR5, yield declines by
18.9% if the farmer waits for five more days before
transplanting (assuming experimental conditions closely 
follow actual field conditions). Even if he were alone, he 
could begin to transplant on day 50. However because of 
inadequate labour, the task would have to be spread out over 
a longer period, with increasing seedling age.
Reagrding the task of weeding. De Datta (1981) notes 
one experiment with an HYV wherein optimum yields were 
obtained when one hand weeding was done 42 days after 
transplanting (DT) and when two hand weedings were carried 
out 42 and 63 DT. Yields before and after these peaks were 
lower. In the case of one hand weeding, yields fell
drastically on 49 DT. (See Table 3-2). These figures would
indicate the need for a timely delivery of weeding labour.
Regarding timeliness in reaping rice, studies of modern 
rice varieties show that, beyond a certain number of days 
after heading (when the rice grain begins to sprout), if the 
crop is left standing in the field, yields per hectare tend
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Effects of 
Transplanted
Table 3—2
Seedling Age in 
Rice Culture on
a Double- 
Grain Yield
Seedling age (days) in 
First Second Yield
seedbed seedbed (t/ha)
25
IR5
0 4.1
25 20 4.8
25 25 5.3
25 30 4.3
25 35 3.7
25 40 3.2
25
Pelita I-l 
0 4.3
25 20 4.8
25 25 4.8
25 30 3.7
25 35 3.2
25 40 3-2
Source : Noorjamsi, et.al. (1977). Cited in Bhattacharya
and Vergara (1978).
Ill
Table 3-3
Effects of Time and Frequency of Hand Weeding 
on Weeding Time and Yield of Transplanted IR8 Rice
IRRI, 1967 Dry Season
Number
Timing
(DT*)
Time Required 
(hours/ha.)
Grain Yield 
(t/ha.)
1 21 164 7.4
1 28 227 7.1
1 35 201 8.0
1 42 418 8.3
1 49 410 6.7
1 56 349 6.4
1 63 546 5.0
2 21 and 42 280 8.3
2 21 and 42 388 8.1
2 21 and 42 399 7.8
2 21 and 42 470 8.6
No weeding 2.4
DT = days after transplanting
to diminish. One study of the IR 8 variety indicated that, 
without nitrogen fertilizer a amximum yield of 4,799 kg/ ha 
was achieved 38 days after heading, but that this steadily 
diminished afterwards, dropping by 8.5% within 6 days.
With 30 kg of nitrogen fertilizer per hectare, average 
yield peaked at 5,610 kg 34 days after heading but fell by 
9.5% within 10 days (Nanju, 1969). Thus, in order to
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maximize his harvest, the farmer should accomplish reaping 
on the day that the optimum yield is achieved. If he 
spreads out the task of reaping over several days, he would 
suffer losses in yield. Thus, timeliness in the performance 
of the task of reaping is very essential to obtain maximum 
output.
3.9 Concluding Remarks
The preceding sections have discussed the factors which 
are postulated to be relevant in determining the choice 
between individual action and collective action and between 
cooperative and non-cooperative strategies. Six of the 
seven hypothetical variables would appear to apply to non— 
agricultural situations while all seven would be relevant to 
agricultural situations. The context may differ from 
international alliances to the modern corporation to 
indigenous labour groups. Depending on the situation, one 
or more factors may be more crucial than others; some 
factors may not come into play at all. But it is postulated 
that these factors cover the major variables that determine 
cooperation.
To illustrate how factors operate to affect 
cooperation, a non-agricultural example will be presented 
here since the rest of the thesis discusses agricultural 
cooperation.
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In organizing residents for bargaining with the owner 
of the air— polluting factory, all factors discussed 
above are relevant. Theoretically, the residents could use 
gas masks which they can purchase and use individually. 
Thus, there would be no need for cooperation . In effect, 
the mask is a cheap way of separating clean air from 
polluted air, thus rendering the affected air economically 
divisible. Alternatively, the residents could agree to 
setting up "oxygen stations" in strategic points in the 
neighbourhood where each could periodically get a few deep 
breaths of clean air. However, this option would still 
require cooperation because of the "indivisibility" of the 
oxygen station, and all the other factors that determine 
the choice between cooperation and individual action would 
then enter into the picture.
Residents might decide that gas masks were too ungainly 
and unsightly to really be an economic way of overcoming the 
indivisibility of clean air from polluted air. They might 
also reject oxygen stations as a viable alternative because 
of high transaction costs, e.g., they would still have to 
come to some agreement regarding sharing the costs of such a 
station.
The next alternative would be to bargain with the 
factory owner- In doing so, the residents would have to 
consider transaction costs too, i.e., the time spent in 
organization, including coming to an agreement regarding
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each resident's contribution in order to pay the factory 
owner to put in some anti—pollution device, and the means of 
collecting contributions. An incentive for cooperation 
would exist if a large number of persons were involved 
because this would reduce the contribution per person. At 
the same time, large numbers increase transaction costs 
unless organizational structure were designed to minimize 
these.
Wealthier residents could resort to individual action 
by installing their own air purifiers in their homes, e.g., 
air-conditioners operating the whole year round in tropical 
countries or only in summer in temperate zones. This would 
increase the per person contribution for those not as 
wealthy, discouraging them from cooperating. Or the 
wealthier residents might view it as their prerogative to 
dominate whatever organization is set up.
Finally, the manner in which the whole affair is 
conducted (determined to a large extent by the leaders), 
e.g., being too rigid or too lax in determining personal 
contributions and collecting them, could significantly 
affect the degree of cooperation exhibited.
In other situations, such as inducing cooperative 
behaviour from managers in the large modern business 
corporation i.e., profit—maximizing behaviour, only one 
factor (transaction costs) may be relevant, with all the 
others not coming into play at all.
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3.10 Application to Indigenous Cooperation
In the course of specifying the determinants of 
cooperation, I have drawn on empirical investigations of 
indigenous forms of cooperation, usually in the rural sector 
of developing countries. Aside from other literature 
discussed in Chapter 2, an empirical study of indigenous 
cooperation was also undertaken with the end in view of 
determining what factors bring it about. In doing so, I 
employed the analytical framework developed above, testing 
whether the factors postulated are indeed relevant or not.
The focus of the empirical study is indigenous labour 
groups in agricultural tasks. In the Philippines, these 
seem to be the most widespread form of cooperation among 
rural residents. Investigations were carried out in two 
separate localities in Luzon.
In what follows, two case studies in two separate 
villages are presented, followed by an analysis of the 
results of a survey which was conducted in an attempt to
generalize, to a wider level than that afforded by the case
&
studies.
Before discussing the case studies, it should be noted 
that the analysis is complicated by three realities. First, 
members in cooperative labour teams are made up of two 
types of households. First, there are those who have a
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relatively larger farm area to cultivate for a given 
household labour supply. They are labour deficit households 
or labour demanders. They join the team primarily to 
secure adequate labour for farm tasks. Then there are 
members who are labour suppliers or have a smaller farm 
area. They join the team primarily for the wages they can
earn. However, labour demanders are not indifferent to
additional income in the form of wages. Labour suppliers 
also need adequate labour for tasks on their own farm. It is 
possible that some of the postulated factors may not be 
relevant in affecting the choice between individual action 
and joining the team for a certain type of household. 
Whether this is true or not will be discussed in the 
following chapters.
A second complicating factor is the fact that the
team hires itself out to non-members. This fact can 
affect a farming household's choice between individual and 
collective action by, for example, reducing search costs for 
hired labour since the hiring farmer has to deal with a 
representative of the team only rather than many 
individuals. This aspect will also be noted where 
appropriate.
A third complicating factor is that a farming household 
can resort to a combination of labour arrangements for 
transplanting and reaping on its own farm, i.e. it can 
resort to both individual and collective action. This is
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true in San Ramon and in Nagpandayan, although in the latter 
no data were collected as to the extent of the combination. 
Thus, cooperation in certain agricultural field tasks could 
be termed a "weak" form of cooperation versus a "strong" 
form of cooperation where a task is completely undertaken by 
cooperative labour such as the task of irrigation by river 
and canal (gravity irrigation). This suggests that the 
difference between "strong' and "weak" cooperation in field 
tasks might lie in the nature of the task, implying 
differences in the technological factors which affect 
cooperation -
One factor which seems to make for more "robust" 
cooperation in gravity irrigation is the fact that an 
indivisibility in inputs exists in the form of a dam and a 
main canal which is not present in the other farm tasks. 
Because of this, the management of a gravity irrigation 
system requires constant coordination among its users.
Aside from the nature of the tasks, there are also
considerations of household labour supply which limit the
amount of labour that a household can contribute to the pool 
of labour. A household will only recieve as much labour, 
more or less, as it contributes, as will be shown in the 
case studies. This may not be enough to finish the task of
transplanting and reaping in its fields.
Finally, in Chapter Two, a distinction was made two
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types of choices; the choice between individual action and 
cooperation in the narrow sense (or collective action), and 
the choice between cooperative and non-cooperative 
strategies. In Chapters Four and Five, we will focus on 
both in the context of agricultural field tasks. In 
Chapter Six, the focus will be on the choice of strategies 
of cooperation and non—cooperation within the existing 
agricultural work team or what shall also be referred to as 
cooperative and individualistic behaviour.
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CHAPTER 4: A PALAY REAPING TEAM
4.1 San Ramon
The baranoav (village) of San Ramon^ is located in the 
municipality of Manabo, some 438 kilometers by road north of 
Manila in the province of Abra. It is connected by a 2- 
kilometer dirt road to the poblacion (administrative centre) 
and had 307 households and an estimated population of 1,642 
with an estimated household size of 5.35 persons in 1982 
(CENDHRRA, 1982). It is made up of two cultural 
communities: Itnoeg (also known as Tingguian) and llocano,
with the former comprising the majority. However, llocano 
is the dominant language in Manabo and most Itnoegs in San 
Ramon are fluent in it. The Itnoegs are native to San 
Ramon, with the llocanos migrating there from the coast 
before World War 11. The llocanos are lowland people who 
have long been Christianized while the Itnoegs, generally a 
highland people, have only been recently evangelized.
San Ramon lies in a river valley. The main industry is 
rice farming, with some 350 hectares cultivated during the 
wet season (June to December) and slightly less during the 
dry season (January to June). A gravity irrigation system 
was completed in Manabo in 1978, with an effective command
Administratively, San Ramon is divided into two
barangays, San Ramon East and San Ramon West. In reality,
however, only the main street separates the two and for our
purposes, are considered one.
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area of 1,000 hectares, 10 km. of main canal, and 10 lateral 
canals of varying lengths. Some 95% of San Ramon farms are 
irrigated by the system.
Farm size averages 1.19 hectares, ranging from 0.04 to
4.50 hectares. These farms on the average are divided into
2.55 parcels per farm, with an area of 4,676 sq.m. per
2
parcel. Regarding tenure status, 64.5% own their farms, 
34.2% are share tenants and 1.3% are lessees.
Traditional rice varieties are almost exclusively 
planted, growing taller and having a longer maturity period 
than the modern varieties- During the wet season, almost 
all farmers plant a non—glutinous variety for home 
consumption while during the dry season, the majority shift 
to glutinous rice, which commands a higher market price. 
While the majority apply fertilizer and pesticides to their 
crop, relatively small amounts are used. The use of 
weedicides is negligible. Yields of palav (paddy) per 
hectare were 2.52 tons (560 bundles) per hectare for the wet 
season.
The cultivation of palav in San Ramon involves a number 
of sequential processes which takes place over a period 
ranging from 152 days to 182 days for the traditional 
varieties (90 days to 120 days for the modern varieties).
2
Farmers are considered owners if they own more than 
50% of the land they till; similarly for share tenants and 
lessees. Sharing of the net produce is done on a 50-50 
basis.
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First, seedlings are grown in a small section of the paddy 
field. Then the rest of the field is prepared for planting 
by ploughing, harrowing and leveling- Transplanting of the 
seedlings takes place two to four weeks after they have been 
planted.
Fertilizers and pesticides are applied afterwards. 
Weeding is done after the rice plant has reached a certain 
height- After the palay has ripened, the stalks are cut and 
bundled and the bundles are dried in the field, or taken 
home where they are dried. After they are dried, the 
bundles are threshed by pounding, or by a foot thresher.
4.2 The Labour Market for Reaping
During the wet season harvest, which began in mid- 
November 1983 and ended in late January 1984, there were six 
palay reaping teams, ranging in membership from nine to 
thirty three households, or an average of 23.7. Based on a 
study of two of the teams, an average of 2.4 household 
members joined the team. All six teams were led by a
3
kabesilva. who was female. These same teams engaged in
transplanting earlier in the season (July to September).
Members refer to their teams as grupo ti alluvon or mutual 
4aid groups.
^Cabecilla is the Spanish word for petty leader.
4
A 1luvon is llocano for mutual aid, used
interchangeably with ammovo. The Itnoeg bunggov is used in 
the more upland areas of Abra.
Extrapolating from the data gathered from the in-depth 
study of the two teams, it is estimated that the six teams 
reaped an area of 120 hectares through team work and another 
22 hectares by means of family labour, for a total of 142 
hectares. Since the teams are also comprised of 142 house­
holds, one household in effect reaped one hectare. Assuming 
that the remaining 165 households of the village had the 
same capacity, another 165 hectares would be accounted for. 
This would still leave a lack of labour to reap 43 hectares 
(or less if allowance is made for non-cultivation of a 
number of fields).
In fact, there has been a recent influx of families 
from an adjacent municipality due to unsettled peace and 
order conditions. By the end of 1984, total households in 
Manabo had risen to 390, or a 27.0% increase since 1982. Up 
till then, cultivators in Manabo complained of a labour 
shortage during transplanting and reaping ever since the 
irrigation system had become fully operational.
The estimated area of 142 hectares reaped by member 
households of the kabesilya— led teams represents 42.7% of 
the total area reaped, allowing for 5% of cultivable area 
not being cultivated for various reasons. Since there were 
no other organized teams in San Ramon, it was presumed that, 
aside from the area worked by family labour, the remainder 
was reaped by means of individual contractual arrangements 
involving ^  hoc exchange labour or ^  hoc teams of hired 
labour.
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Based on the data gathered from the in—depth study of 
one of the kabesilya-led teams (that of Itlang), it appears 
that there exists a forward labour market for reaping. 
Members of the team hired out the team's labour to other 
members and to non—members two months in advance of the 
reaping season on the average in exchange for a cash advance 
representing the estimated total wage. Forward wages were 
lower than spot wages, e.g. P.70 per bundle for labour 
contracted in advance compared with PI.00 or more per bundle 
at reaping time. The members who contracted out the team's 
labour in advance did so because of their need for cash to 
finance current expenses. They looked upon these cash 
advances as debts to be paid when the reaping season came 
around.
The creditors in turn advanced the sums necessary in 
order to ensure themselves of adequate reaping labour when 
the time came. Of the 43 forward labour contracts entered 
into, only two involved discounted wages. The rest were not 
discounted.
4.3 A Reaping Team
Itlang, 52 years old, was in her third year as 
kabesilya of a group of reapers during the 1983 wet season 
harvest. Previous to her kabesilyaship, another member of 
the group, also female, had been kabesilya for five years. 
Itlang is the wife of the barangay captain (highest village 
official) of San Ramon West.
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The team is engaged in both rice transplanting and 
harvesting for two cropping seasons, which means that the 
team is active for eight months of the year. In the 1983 
wet season transplanting, the team numbered 23 member 
households. During harvesting of the wet season crop, they 
numbered 18 households and during the 1984 dry season trans­
planting, the number remained the same. Thirteen households 
remained members of the team throughout the three seasons. 
Four households joined for two seasons. Two of these were 
members during the 1983 wet season harvest and rejoined in 
the 1984 dry season transplanting. One of the four house­
holds was politely asked to leave the group after the 1983 
wet season harvest because of alleged frequent absences. 
Six households joined the team for one season.
The eighteen households that made up the reaping team 
for the 1983 wet season harvest was composed of 20 families 
with two households having two families each.^ One family 
member, usually either the father or the mother, was the 
primary member, being held responsible for contributing to 
the labour pool. Thirteen (65.0%) of these primary members 
were females, and seven (35.0%) were males. On the average, 
they had been in the team for 12 years. They ranged in age 
from 23 to 62, with an average of 42 years.
An example (see Appendix 1) is the household of 
Ligaya. Her married daughter, Salia, and Salia's family, 
live with her but team members distinguished between Ligaya 
and Salia in their accounting. However, the two families 
had a common kitchen and meals. This was also true of the 
other household of two families.
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Primary members were joined by other household members, 
ranging from one to five in number, with 1.8 other houshold 
members on the average. However, only the names of the 
primary members were listed as being present- There was no 
difference in the rights and duties of primary and secondary 
members other than that the former were held responsible for 
contributing to the labour pool.
Thus, the total labour force that the team could muster 
was 56 reapers. The ages of the other household members who 
joined ranged from 13 years to 65 years, with an average of 
23 years. Two-thirds were male and one—third were female. 
Overall, 55.4% of the team's labour force were male and 
44.6% were female.
The kabesilya arranged the schedule of reaping, 
informing the members regarding any changes. She also 
disciplined the members, gently remonstrating with those who 
were lax in their work, or who were tardy or absent. The 
only other position that could be considered an officer was 
that of bundler, who was always male.
Aside from seeing to it that bundles were of uniform 
size, the bundler had authority to tell members to add more 
palay stalks if he thought the bundles was too thin, or to 
hand in "clean" bundles- by removing leaves and grass if he 
thought the bundle was being padded. In Itlang's team, 
there was no one member who acted as bundler but several 
young males took turns. On a good number of occasions, the
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bundler would be a non-member whose field they were reaping.
Apart from having officers, the kabesilya claimed that 
the group met once during each season to discuss 
difficulties that arose. However, during the 1983 wet 
season harvest, the team held no meeting.
The workday would begin at 7:30 a.m. At 11:30 a.m. the 
team would stop for lunch after which they would rest. 
Lunch would be provided by the family whose field was being 
reaped. If the field were near the barangay, lunch would be 
served in the home of the host, after which members would 
take a siesta, either in the host's home or in their own 
homes. Complaints were made that members did not show up 
for work in the afternoon if they retired to their homes for 
siesta. Work resumed at 1:30 p.m. and went on until 4:30 or 
5:00 p.m. Except for drinking water, no snacks were 
provided.
The team did not end each work day with festivities, 
nor did they similarly mark the end of the harvest season- 
During work, and especially during the lunch break, there 
would be jocular exchanges, gossip and occasional singing.
Usually, the team worked as one unit, working in one 
field in the morning, and moving to a different field in the 
afternoon. On the average, the work group consisted of 17 
members, ranging from 2 to 32. The low number of reapers 
occurred at the tail end of the harvest season, when the 
other team members had already begun transplanting and the
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fields still being reaped were an hour's work from the 
barangay. The group laboured for 62 days, uninterrupted 
except for three breaks of two days (when no work was 
available), one day (Christmas) and two days (New Year's Eve 
and New Year's day) each. (See Table 4-1). After this, they 
worked for three more days, but only in groups of two or 
four since the transplanting of the dry season crop had 
already begun. They reaped a total of 7,830 bundles, which 
is the equivalent of 14.00 hectares in area, and 35.2 tons 
in weight-^
In terms of geographical location, the work of the team 
might be considered as taking place in  ^three concentric 
semi-circles, with the centre in the usual gathering place 
of the team indicated in the sketch map of Manabo.
The first semi—circle covers fields within 15 minutes 
walking time- The majority were reaped from mid—November to 
mid-December. The second semi—circle covers the fields 
within 16 to 30 minutes walking time which were largely 
reaped from mid-December to mid—January. The third semi­
circle encompasses fields more than 30 minutes' walk and 
were usually reaped from mid—January to mid—February. 
Included among the latter are unirrigated fields since they 
lie above the main canal of the Manabo gravity irrigation 
system. The three concentric semi-circles correspond to
^Assuming an estimated yield of 560 bundles per 
hectare and 4-5 kg- per bundle.
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three general types of traditional seed varieties 
differentiated according to maturation period-
On the average, the team accounted for 52.7% of all
bundles reaped on their own farms, with 28.7% reaped by 
hired labour and 19.4% by family labour. (See Table 4-2). 
This situation arose for two reasons. First, member 
households used the labour pool not only to try to
accomplish the task of reaping their own fields, but to pay
their debts previously contracted in gtoney and in kind 
(usually rice), largely from non-members. This diverted the 
team's labour to other farms. To complete the task of
reaping on their own fields, members had to resort to either 
family labour or hired labour. Secondly, even though they 
did not use the team's labour to pay off debts, a number of 
households did not have sufficient family labour to command 
enough exchange labour to reap all their grain. Thus, they 
resorted to family and hired labour.
The terms of the exchange were simple enough: to
exchange equal amounts of labour in terms of bundles reaped. 
Actual field conditions were taken into account in
calculating equivalences. Eight bundles reaped in a muddy 
field with shorter stalks were equivalent to 10 bundles 
reaped in dry fields with long stalks. A shorter stalk 
required more effort to reap as it meant bending down more.
A matrix showing the amounts of labour exchanged by
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Table 4—1
San Ramon Reaping Team: Work Calendar, Man-Hours, 
Distance of Fields and Bundles Reaped
Wet Season (November 1983 to January 1984)
)ay No Date Employèrent No. of No. of Man- ^ Distance^ Bundles
Category Reapers Hours Hours'" (Minutes) Reaped
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 Nov. 16 1 18 7 126 15 104
2 Nov. 17 2 16 4 64 15 101
17 1 10 2 20 15 23
3 Nov. 18 2 16 6.83 109.28 15 99
4 Nov. 19 2 21 8.42 176.82 20 169
5 Nov. 20 2 17 3.5 59.5 20 S3
20 1 13 3.5 45.5 15 30
6 Nov. 21 1 17 4 68 15 57
21 1 5 2.67 13.35 25 13
21 1 10 2.5 25 25 22
7 Nov. 22 2 14 7.5 105 15 84
8 Nov. 23 2 20 146.6 10 156
9 hJov. 24 1 23 8 184 10 ISO
10 Nov. 25 2 15 4.5 67.5 15 70
25 2 16 3.5 56 10 53
11 Nov. 26 2 22 2.5 55 10 62
26 1 16 3 48 15 29
12 hJov. 27 2 13 6.83 88.8 20 70
13 Nov. 28 2 17 2.83 48.11 15 44
28 2 19 1.58 30.02 5 26
28 2 18 3.83 68.94 15 44
14 Nov. 29 2 17 4 68 20 49
29 2 9 3 27 10 19
15 Nov. 30 1 31 3.5 108.5 10 74
30 1 28 2.5 70 15 36
30 2 27 1.5 40.5 17
16 Dec. 1 2 28 4.5 126 15 100
1 1 23 2 46 10 30
17 Dec. 2 1 23 1.5 34.5 15 30
2 1 31 6 186 10 184
18 Dec. 3 2 25 3.5 87.5 10 92
2 20 60 10 63
19 Dec. 4 2 22 4 88 5 95
4 2 11 33 10 36
20 Dec. 7 2 9 7 63 10 69
21 Dec. 8 1 22 6.5 143 15 135
22 Dec. 9 1 32 8 256 10 145
23 Dec. 10 1 30 5.75 172.5 10 115
24 Dec. 11 1 32 6.17 197.44 40 137
25 Dec. 12 1 21 . 6.17 129.57 20 97
26 Dec. 13 1 21 7 147 20 145
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Table 4-1 (can't)
Day No Date Employment
Category
No. of 
Reapers
No. of 
Hours
Man- ^ 
Hours'^
y,
Distance"
(Minutes)
Bundles
Reaped
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
27 Dec. 14 2 31) 6.33 126.6 15 116
28 Dec. 15 1 16 5.43 86.72 15 77
29 Dec. 16 1 14 4.5 63 20 79
16 1 8 4.5 36 3) 44
16 1 6 7T, 18 3) 18
30 Dec. 17 1 24 7.5 180 . 3) 193
31 Dec. 18 1 18 4 72 10 59
18 1 ' 14 0.95 13.3 12 16
32 Dec. 19 2 18 2.3 41.4 15 97
33 Dec. 20 2 3:) 1.5 30 15 50
20 2 3:) 3 60 15 72
20 2 10 1.5 15 20 27
34 Dec. 21 2 19 4.5 85.5 25 109
21 1 9 1 9 3) 12
21 1,2 14 3 . 42 3) 66
35 Dec. 22 1 19 4.3 81.7 10 100
36 Dec. 23 1 21 8 168 15 134
37 Dec. 24 1 14 7 98 20 89
38 Dec. 26 1 13 7 91 3) 111
39 Dec. 27 2 19 4.3 81.7 15 57
27 1 21 4.5 94.5 15 105
40 Dec. 28 2 16 7.5 13) 12 114
41 Dec. 29 1 21 3.5 73.5 45 84
42 Dec. 30 2 16 5.75 92 3) 102
43 Jan. 2 1 15 6.5 97.5 60 79
2 2 15 7 105 4^ ) 96
44 Jan. 3 1 14 7 98 60 102
3 2 8 7 56 40 56
45 Jan. 4 2 16 4 64 15 57
4 2 16 5 80 25 84
46 Jan. 5 1 25 4 100 15 110
47 Jan. 6 1 29 6.5 188.5 35 162
6 2 18 3 54 15 50
48 Jan. 7 2 21 3.75 78.75 3) 97
7 1 15 3 45 30 48
49 Jan. 8 2 14 3 42 15 82
8 1 11 7 77 40 76
50 Jan. 9 1 14 6.5 92 60 92
51 Jan. 10 2 15 7.5 112.5 40 100
52 Jan. 11 2 18 7 126 45 103
53 Jan. 12 1 17 6 102 40 87
54 Jan. 13 1 16 8.5 136 25 100
55 Jan. 14 1 23 6.83 157.1 30 163
56 Jan. 15 2 24 7 168 30 195
57 Jan. 16 1 20 7.5 150 15 140
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Table 4-1 (can't)
Day No Date Employmeijt No. of No. of Man- ^ Distance" Bundles
Category Reapers Hours Hours'^ (Minutes) Reaped
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
58 Janm 17 2 13 4 52 35 100
17 1 15 4 60 45 90
17 1 12 3 36 45 47
59 Jan. 18 1 15 5.83 87.45 20 54
60 Jan. 19 1 7 3.5 24.5 35 30
19 1 6 3 18 40 27
61 Jan. 20 2 19 6 114 45 115
62 Jan. 21 2 2 6.5 13 60 15
21 1 10 6.5 65 45 74
63 Jan. 24 1 2 7 14 60 9
64 Jan. 26 1 4 3.5 14 40 16
65 Jan. 29 1 4 6.5 26 60 24
66 Jan. 31 1 3 2 6 40 16
TOTAL 1,664 474.2 8,126.2 7,830
Notes 1 — exchange labour; 2 — hired labour. 
Includes bundling and related tasks.
From the team's neighbourhood in Barangay 
San Ramon West.
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Table 4-2
San Ramon Reaping Team : Labour Supply 
Debt and Labour Arrangement for Reaping, Wet Season Harvest 
(November 1983 to January 1984)
Member Labour^ Own Debt %Own Harvest Reaped By
Family Supply Harvest (bundles) Exchange Hired Family
(bundles) Labour Labour Labour
Agmaoan 2 605 120 65.8 0.8
Alfon 2 255 KX) 100.0 - -
Bados 2 374 190 12.6 43.3 44.1
Dayapan 4 284 6.3 42.2 51.4
Dosing 2 613 — 42.2 39.5 18.4
El len 4 757 - 55.9 23.9 20.2
Flora 4 630 - 37.0 35.7 27.3
Ganayen 1 203 - 79.8 - 20.2
Itlang 5 474 5(X) 95.8 - 4.2
Ligaya 4 50 705 - . - 100.0
Lourdes 5 657 - 93.6 4.6 1.8
Padaman 2 594 160 79.3 19.5 1.2
Palagtay 2 227 2(X) 60.4 39.6 -
Roman 2 27 100 - - 100.0
F^ omeo 2 211 335 47.9 15.6 36.5
Romy A. 2 403 100 45.9 40.7 13.4
Romy J. 3 490 - 39.2 28.6 32.2
Salia 2 210 550 100.0 -
Sianang 2 60 5(X) 60.0 - 40.0
Tinay 4 892 48.4 14.6 37.0
TOTPL 56 8,016 3,890 — . ~ -
AVERAGE 2.8 401 299.23 52.7 28.0 19.4
Notes Family members who joined the reaping team 
Other parcels were not planted because 
they were located in an area which armed 
dissidents were known to visit.
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each member family in terms of bundles is given in Appendix 
1. It shows the deficit or surplus of exchange labour that 
each family has with respect to other families both 
individually and as a whole. The total amount of labour 
exchanged was 7,538 bundles. This figure includes credits 
to members who acted as bundlers. If the bundler did not 
belong to the family whose field was being reaped, this 
labour was considered worth a certain number of bundles 
reaped, depending on the highest number of bundles reaped by 
an individual member for that field. If, for instance, the 
bundler had been able to reap one bundle before turning to 
the task of bundling, and if the highest individual number 
of bundles reaped for that field that day was 9, then the 
bundler was credited with an additional 8 bundles.
The total of 7,538 bundles of labour exchange differs 
from the total number of bundles reaped by the team of 7,830 
as given in Table 4—1, since the latter figure includes the 
bundles reaped by all members of the team, while the former 
excludes bundles reaped by a family for itself when the team 
reaped for that family.
Those member families who supplied more labour than 
they received were compensated in cash at PI.00 per bundle 
by each debtor family. For instance, the family of Bados 
(no- 3 Appendix 1) gave more labour (worth 50 bundles) than 
it received. The family of Agmaoan (no. 1) paid Bados 
P12.00 in cash to cover its debt. Similarly, all the other
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families who ot^ed Bados labour paid her in cash. Each 
family listed down the names, usually of the primary member, 
of those who reaped for it, and also recorded the number of 
bundles. The list served as a reminder of its debt to the 
other member families.
The group helped each other, not only to reap their own 
fields but to repay debts as well. The less well-off member 
families borrowed from the better— off ones, and from non- 
members as well. The practice has been for a member-family 
to contract debts individually, both in cash and in kind, 
before the harvest, by offering to reap an equivalent number 
of bundles in the creditor's field(s). When the harvest 
comes around, the team will help the member family redeem 
its pledge.
The team assisted twelve member families repay a total 
of P3,230 worth of debts outstanding, by reaping 3,511 
bundles, or 44.8% of the team total. The average debt per 
family was P312.00, ranging from PIOO.OO to P705.00, 
incurred for an average of two months before they were 
repaid. Out of the 43 specific debts, only two carried 
simple interest rates which were 240% and 254.8% per annum, 
while the rest were interest—free since the creditors did 
not discount the wages advanced. Interest charges took the 
form of discounted wage rates of PO-70 and P0.714 per bundle 
compared to the market wage rate of PI.00 per bundle during 
the harvest season. On the average, a debtor family had
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three to four creditors.
4.4 Results of a Preliminary Survey
Before examining in detail the determinants of 
membership in a reaping team, the results of a sample survey 
of sixty four farmers and of interviews with twenty three 
kabesilya from the five population centres of Manabo 
(Francia, 1988) will be discussed. The sample survey gives 
the reasons for a household's decision to accomplish a farm 
task through cooperative labour or through hired labour. 
The sample included non-members of agricultural work teams. 
The interviews with the kabesilya give the reasons for the 
existence of the cooperative labour groups.
The survey provided data on membership in land
preparation and transplanting teams. For land preparation, 
47.6% resorted to family/own labour, 29.0% hired labour, 
9.0^yused cooperative labour and 14.3% resorted to a mix of 
the three arrangements. For transplanting, 40.6% hired
labour, 23.4% resorted to cooperative labour, 1.6% utilized 
family/own labour and 34.4 resorted to a mixed arrangement.
Of the total of 64 respondents, 29 (45.3%) resorted to 
cooperative labour either wholly or partially, while 45 
(70.3%) resorted to hired labour either wholly or partially. 
For co-operative labour, the respondents were not asked
whether the group had a kabesilya or not. For hired labour
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too, no distinction was made as to whether the group was ad 
hoc or had a kabesilya.
The sixty—four farmer respondents were asked by means 
of an open-ended question, their reason for resorting to co­
operative labour or hired labour in transplanting (Table 
4.3). They indicate that budgetary constraints ("to reduce 
expenses") were the main reason (51 per cent) followed by 
the availability of family labour ("wife/children able to 
exchange labour").
On the other hand, family labour supply was the primary 
determinant of resorting to hired labour, as seen by 
combining "respondent not strong enough", "wife/children 
unable to exchange labour" and "children at school" which 
accounted for 70 per cent of all replies. Budgetary 
considerations ("cash available") were cited in only 15 per 
cent of all cases.
It is interesting to note that 7.6% of the hiring
farmers hired labour in order to finish the work quickly,
referring to the timeliness of task execution. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that hired labour better 
assures the farmer of timeliness than cooperative labour
because the cooperative labour groups also hired out their
labour.^
In the course of the survey of kabesilyas, which 
followed that of the sixty four farmers, that it was 
discovered that kabesilya— led teams also hire out the labour 
of the group.
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Table 4.
Reasons for Co-operative and Hired 
Labour in Transplanting 
Wet Season 1983
Reason given Co-operating
farmers
% of 
replies
Hiring
farmers
% of 
replies
To reduce expenses 29 51.0 - -
Cash available - 12 15.2
Respondent not 
strong enough
- - 16 20.2
Wife able to exchange 17 
labour
29.6 - -
Wife unable to 
Exchange labour
- 23 29.1
Children able to 
Exchange labour
4 7.0 - -
Children too young - - 5 6.3
Children at school - - 11 13.9
Tradition 6 10.5 -
To finish work 
quickly
- - 6 7.6
Others 1 1.8 6 7.6
TOTAL REPLIES 57 100.0 79 100.0
A number of respondents gave more than one reply. 29 and 
45 respondents respectively engaged in co-operative and 
hired labour whether wholly or partially-
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Probing deeper, respondents were asked what labour 
arrangement they would prefer in transplanting if there were 
no obstacles. Those who chose cooperative labour wholly or 
partially due to budgetary constraints were asked, "If the 
money were available, would you hire people to transplant 
rather than use ammovo (cooperative) labour?" Almost half of 
the twenty—nine respondents said that they would still 
resort to ammovo labour; fifteen or 52 per cent said thay 
would rather hire labour. Similarly, those who chose hired 
labour arrangements either wholly or partially were asked, 
"If the obstacles to using co—operative labour were removed, 
would you resort to it?" Of forty-five respondents, thirty 
or two—thirds said yes, and nine said no, they would rather 
hire labour.
Most of the reasons given for preference for 
cooperative labour had to do with saving money (Table 4.4), 
while those for hired labour had to do with a desire for 
more leisure ("to have more rest" and "growing old").
Other reasons given for the preference for cooperative 
labour indicated that atmosphere ("cooperative labour 
enjoyable"), economies due to teamwork, and transaction cost 
("cooperative labour easier to secure") were factors taken 
into account. For hired labour, opportunity costs were the 
next major reason, i.e. "to attend to other parcels/farm 
tasks", "to do other (higher income) work", and "to do 
housekeeping".
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Table 4.4
Reason for Preferred Labour^
Arrangement in Transplanting
Co-operating farmers Hiring Farmers
Reasons for -----------------------------------------------
Preference for No- % of all No- % of all
replies replies
Cooperative Labour
1- To save money 11 55-0 10 58-8
2- Co-operative 6 30-0 4 11-8
labour enjoyable
3- Easier to secure 2 10-0 2 5-9
4- Tradition 1 5-0 2 5-9
5- Promotes unity/ — — 6 17-6
teamwork
TOTAL 20 100-0 34 100-0
Hired Labour 
1 - to have more rest
2- Growing old
3- To attend to other
parcels/farm tasks
4- To do other
higher income) 
work
44-4
5-6
16-7
5
2
20-0
50-0
20-0
5- To do house­
keeping
6- Others
5-6
5-6 10-0
TOTAL 18 100-0 10 100-0
A number of respondents gave more than one reason each-
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By occupation, one half of cooperative labour consisted 
of farmers' wives, one— third of farmers and one-seventh of 
landless labourers (Table 4.5). For hired labour, farmers
and farmers' wives still constituted the majority, although
A
landless labourers, out—of—school youth ajia students made up 
one third-
By sex, two—thirds of cooperative labour were female 
and one third was male. In contrast, for hired labour, 
there was a higher participation rate for males (56 percent) 
and a lower one for females (44 percent)-
Table 4.5
Main Occupation of Members 
of Transplanting Groups 
Wet Season 1983
Main Occupation :
Cooperative Labour : Hired Labour
N o . 7. : No. 7.
Farmer 89 33.0 79 23.8
Farmer's Wife 139 49.6 146 44.0
Landless Labourers 39 14.4 74 22.3
Out—of—school Youth 6 2.2 25 7.5
Student 2 1.0 8 2.4
TOTAL 275 100.0 332 100.0
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A survey was also conducted of the kabesilyas of the 
twenty—three cooperative labour teams in Manabo engaged in 
either transplanting or harvesting or both.
An open-ended question was addressed to the twenty- 
three kabesilyas : "What are the reasons for the group's 
existence?" The replies are given in table 4.6, with low 
transaction costs as the most frequently cited reason as 
evidenced by such replies as the existence of compatibility 
among members, the fact that the group was composed of 
neighbours and relatives, and that it was fairly managed.
Reasons for the
Table 4.6
Existence of 23 Co- 
Labour Groups
operative
Reasons No. of replies % of all replies
To reduce expenses 12 27-3
Mutual help 7 15.9
Compatibility among 
Members 9 20.4
Neighbours/relatives 3 6.8
Good/fair management 6 13.6
T radition 3 6.8
Labour scarcity 2 4.5
Income of Landless 2 4.5
TOTAL 44 100.0
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The second and third most frequent reasons were 
financial saving ("to reduce expenses") and mutual help, 
implying the existence of economies.
4.5 The Determinants of Membership in the Reaping Team
4.5.1 Indivisibilities in Reaping
No large machines were employed in reaping. From this 
point of view, reaping in San Ramon did not involve an
indivisibility. In fact, machinery of any size was not 
used, only a small hand tool called the rakkem. which is 
described below.
There is no indivisibility in the process of reaping 
either. It is a simple process of cutting the stalks of
paddy and bundling them. It could be contended that because 
reaping has to be accomplished in a relatively short period 
of time and cannot be "divided" over a number of days in
order to maximise output, that some indivisibility is
present. However, such a phenomenon is better explained as
the need for the timely delivery of reaping services rather 
than as an indivisibility in the reaping process. This will 
be discussed in the next section.
The absence of an indivisibility in the inputs used for 
reaping or in the process of reaping itself does not mean 
that this variable is irrelevant as a factor determining 
agricultural cooperation. It simply means that for the
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particular farm task of reaping as practised in San Ramon, 
indivisibilities did not form basis for the organization of 
reaping team.
However, an irrigators' asociation existed for the 
whole municipality occasioned by the indivisibility embodied 
in the large dam built across the Ikmin river, the water 
being channelled through 1.1 km. of tunnel blasted through a 
mountain, onto a 19 km long concrete and earthen main canal 
which fed ten long lateral canals. The manabo farmers were 
organized by an external, non-governmental agency to build 
and operate the entire irrigation system.
4,5.2 Timeliness in Reaping
Evidence for the necessity of timeliness in the reaping 
of modern varieties of paddy was presented in Section 3.8. 
While similar studies for traditional rice varieties are 
not available, it can safely be assumed that they also 
reach an optimum yield which declines if left standing in 
the field after this. All of the members of the reaping 
team agreed that without the help of the team, they would 
not to able to avoid over—ripening of their crops, resulting 
in losses in output.
A member household has an average parcel area of 3,000 
sq.m. with an average yield of 168 bundles. Each member 
household cultivated 4.05 parcels on the average. Also, 
each member household has 3 household members on the average
144
who engage in reaping, including the tasks of flattening the
tall stalks, bundling and collecting the bundles. With an
estimated capacity of 21 bundles reaped in a 7-hour day, the
household can hope to finish reaping in 8 successive days on
0
that particular parcel. There is an incentive for these to 
be successive days if the grains ripen at the same time. In 
contrast, the team can accomplish the task in 1.2 days, 
given their average size of 17 reapers (including bundlers) 
and a minimum capacity of 8.4 bundles per reaper per 7— hour 
day. If the household has one other parcel whose crop 
matures on the same day as the first parcel, then all the 
more would it have need of the services of the team.
San Ramon farmers say that if a crop is left standing 
in the field too long, the results would be (1) hardening of 
the rice stalks, thus rendering it more difficult to cut; 
(2) the grains more easily fall from the stalk because of 
over—ripening ; (3) increased danger from pests and from
grazing livestock, and (4) shattering of overripe grain when 
threshed and milled.
Thus, membership in the team provides insurance against 
the uncertainty of having adequate labour on hand for the 
timely execution of the task of reaping.
On the other hand, non-member households in San Ramon
seven-hour day was chosen as the standard, based on 
data gathered from Itlang's team.
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were able to secure timely delivery of reaping labour by 
advancing wages in the form of loans to member households of 
the six reaping teams. It was noted earlier that twelve 
member households of Itlang's team of eighteen contracted 
debts of two months before the harvest season. These debts 
were repaid by the team by means of reaping the fields of 
the creditors up to the amount of the debt incurred - Thus, 
a farm household with a good liquidity position could 
advance wages and thus insure the timely delivery of reaping 
labour without having to be team member-
However, because of the limited supply of labour, it 
was not always certain that a liquid farm household would be 
able to contract for an adequate enough amount of labor to
perform the task of reaping within a brief span of time. On
the other hand, membership in a reaping team would more 
certainly insure adequate labour.
This conclusion is borne out by experience in the 
village. On two occasions during the 1983 wet season 
reaping, I met a farmer and a farmer's housewife who were
preoccupied with searching for people who could be hired to
reap their fields. They did not belong to any reaping team. 
They were quite concerned that they had not been able to 
gather an adequate number of reapers in spite of the fact 
that they had offered a higher wage rate, up to double the 
current wage rate of PI.00 per bundle.
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The need for timeliness means that an adequate labour 
force is necessary. Hence this sets a basis for group work 
in reaping.
Benefit/cost considerations of joining a team do not 
differ whether a household is a labour demander or 
supplier insofar as timeliness of execution of reaping is 
concerned. Average farm size for San Ramon households is 
1.19 hectares (1.18 for members of Itlang's team). Assuming 
an average family labour supply of three reapers, the 
household is faced with the need for an adequate and timely 
labour supply for reaping.
In order to ensure the timeliness of task execution to 
both its members and to non—members, the kabesilya would 
break up the team into subgroups when necessary. Usually, 
the schedule for the next day was agreed upon at the end of 
the work day. If it happened that they were split into 
subgroups, they would go to Itlang's home to find out the
schedule for the next day or Itlang would send word to each
member household. The fact that most of them were 
residential neighbours reduced communications costs.
4.5.3 Elasticity of Substitution
The use of traditional varieties and the absence of
straight-row transplanting in San Ramon prevents the use of
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power-driven hand reapers currently manufactured. However, 
even small farmers using modern varieties and straight-row 
planting cannot afford the P18,000 (US$900) reaper, plus 
operation and maintenance expenses. Their use of these 
machines in place of labour will depend on whether they can 
be hired or not and at what price^ or on a government 
subsidized credit scheme to purchase them.
Reaping in San Ramon (and in Manabo in general) is done 
by means of the rakkem which consists of an iron blade 50 mm 
long partially embedded perpendicularly on a rounded piece 
of wood 80 to 90 mm. long and 20 mm. in diameter in the
middle by tapering off towards both ends. (See Appendix 3).
It is held in the palm of one hand with the blade coming out 
between the middle and the ring finger. Each rice stalk
(tiller) is cut individually, closer to the top then to the 
bottom, thus making for a very labour intensive process. 
The use of the rakkem is linked with the practice of
planting seedlings close together which renders it difficult 
to use a sickle to cut the mature crop.
The substitution of the sickle for the rakkem would 
reduce labour requirement for harvesting. In the 1982 
CENDHRRA study of the Manabo Irrigation System, it was found
9
At the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) 
in Los Bahos, Laguna, Philippines, in conjunction with the 
Chinese Academy of Agricultural Mechanization and Sciences 
(CAAMS). Please see Appendix 4.
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that farmers used 45.2 and 40.4 mandays per hectare to reap 
the wet and dry season crops respectively. By way of 
contrast, in Central Luzon where the sickle is used, labour 
for reaping, bundling, hauling and stacking accounted for 24 
mandays per hectare in both wet and dry seasons of 1978 
under the ti1vadora (or large mechanical threèher) system
(Hayami and Kikuchi, 1981, p. 94).
The timeliness required in the task of reaping, 
combined with the labour— intensive technology involved due 
to planting practices, leads to very high demand for labour 
during the harvest season. This is aggravated by the fact 
of overlap between the reaping of the late maturing wet 
season varieties (bayaq) and the transplanting of the dry 
season crop, which is also labour-intensive. Thus, the 
relative costs of not joining a reaping team which assures 
labour to the household when it is needed, are quite high.
4.5.4 Economies
There are several possible arrangements by which a San 
Ramon household can have its farm reaped, namely: (1) by
family labour; (2) by hiring the kabesilya— led teams: (3) by
hiring reapers individually to form an ^  hoc team; (4) by 
joining a kabesilya-led team; or (5) by a combination of the 
foregoing, as in fact members of Itlang's team have done.
There is evidence that the kabesilya— led teams are more
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efficient than family labour in r e a p i n g . B a s e d  on
interviews with members of Itlang's team, the average
capacity of a household of three reapers (husband and wife, 
both age 42, and one son, age 23) is 21 bundles for a seven- 
hour day, including labour for bundling and related tasks. 
This reduces to one bundle per manhour or seven bundles per 
manday.
The data in Table 4-1 shows that a team member reaped
an average of .96 bundles an hour or 6.7 bundles per seven-
hour day. However, the reality is that members did not all
report for work or quit work simultaneously- Often
individuals would arrive at the field after the bulk of the 
team had begun work and others would leave before the rest 
did. However, time began and time ended was recorded at the
time when the majority of the team were present. Hence, the
number of manhours reported in Table 4—1 overstates actual 
manhours and correspondingly understates labour efficiency. 
Field observations indicate that the efficiency of the team 
is higher, averaging 1.2 bundles per manhour or 8.4 bundles 
per manday.
There was no significant difference between the 
relative efficiencies of cooperative and hired labour, based 
on data from the sample survey of 64 farmers. However, 
relative efficiencies between the kabesilya— led teams and ad 
hoc hired labour teams were not estimated because farmer— 
respondents did not distinguish between the two. Labour 
hired out by the kabesilya-led teams would be included in 
the data on hired labour in the survey.
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The greater efficiency of the kabesilya-led team over 
family labour, however, is also available to non-members who 
lend money to individual team members. Thus, these 
households, who in effect hire the team, gain from the 
economies affected by the team and this acts as an incentive 
for the household not to join the team, ceteris paribus.
It is also possible that households who hire ad hoc 
teams enjoy a higher labour efficiency than if they were to 
join a kabesilya-led team. However, estimates of the 
efficiency of aid hoc teams are difficult to make because of 
the fact that the wage was a piece rate of PI.00 per bundle. 
The tendency of workers would be to report for work at 
different times, depending on how much income each 
individual wanted to earn. A number would report earlier 
than the rest in order to choose the part of the field which 
is easiest to reap. A similar difficulty with respect to 
estimating the labour efficiency of Itlang's team was 
mentioned above.
Data from the largest kabesilya-led reaping team (33 
households) indicated an average of 1.086 bundles per man- 
hour for a seven—hour day or an average of 7.6 bundles per 
day. This also tends to be an understatement of the team's 
efficiency for the reason cited earlipr. Unfortunately, 
field observations of this team were few and not enough to 
make a more accurate estimate. The impression, however, was 
that this team worked more quickly than Itlang's team and
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this was probably due to the higher associational gains
resulting from a larger number of reapers. It was observed 
that the group engaged in more banter than Itlang's team.
Due also to the faster pace of the work, they were able to
cover three to four fields in a day. The walking to and
from the different fields provided a break in the monotony 
of the work. The average working group size was 30 persons.
Team members attributed the greater efficiency of the 
team over family labour to the associational gains from
being part of the team. They referred to the competition
that arises among them as each tries to reap as many bundles
as possible in order to command more exchange labour. For 
some, the threat of being considered a slow worker who
should not be on the team goaded them to a faster pace. 
Others referred to the banter, conversation and occasional 
singing which helped them bear the heat of the day, enabling 
them to work longer.
From another perspective, the scale on which each
household was involved in reaping palay was increased by the 
fact of joining the team, since, in effect, the creation of 
the team consists in the pooling of its members' labour and 
a major portion of its farm land for reaping. A certain 
amount of specialization and division of labour takes place 
because of the choice of bundlers who are thought to be more 
capable of the job than others. The larger scale of reaping 
also results in greater expertise in reaping because of the
152
constant performance of the task.
The creation of the position of kabesilya can also be 
considered as part of the division of labour. However, as 
practiced in San Ramon, the kabesilya hardly did any 
supervision of each team member in the field which could 
increase efficiency. If any supervision was done, it was 
carried out by the bundler who could tell the individual 
reaper to increase the size or improve the quality of 
bundles reaped.
4.5.5 Transaction Costs
The sample survey of sixty four farmers in Manabo 
indicated that the transplanting groups, whether cooperative 
or hired, were composed mainly of kin (relatives and in­
laws) and residential neighbours. (See Table 4.7) This 
indicates that both members and non-members of cooperative 
work groups attempted to reduce transaction costs by relying 
on kin and residential neighbours whom, presumably, they 
could trust to keep their commitment to show up on the 
appointed day and to execute the task properly.
Kinship among Filipinos in general creates a closer 
bond and a higher level of trust between two parties who are 
kinsmen than between those who are not. One who is a close 
kin will be more accomodating and can be relied upon more
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Table 4.7
Relation of Transplanting Work Groups to Host Farmers
Wet Season 1983
Relation to : Cooperative Labour : Hired Labour^
MOST rarmer z~
No. 7. : No. 7.
Family 33 8.4 8 1.6
Relatives 104 26.6 148 29.7
In-Laws 85 21.7 88 17.7
Residential
neighbours
115 29.4 140 28.0
Farm neighbours 10 2.6 6 1.2
Others 42 10.7 108 21.7
TOTAL 389^ 100.0 498^ 100.0
No distinction was made between ad hoc hired teams and 
kabesilya-led teams.
Greater than the number of persons in cooperative and 
hired groups because a number of workers transplanted 
for different respondents.
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than one who is not-^^
For members (who are labour demanders) of an already 
established cooperative labour group, search costs for 
reapers would be nil compared to search costs for non-
members, who are also labour demanders, since the latter 
would have to contact each household who was a labour 
supplier individually, assuming he were not hiring a
kabesilya-led team. Of course, search costs to the non- 
member household would be less if labour suppliers came to 
him.
For team members who are looking for employers, i.e. 
they are labour suppliers, search costs would be positive 
but less than those of non—members who are also searching 
for employers. The former, since they can commit the labour
of the whole team and thus cut down the search costs of
hiring farmers, would more readily firtd employment than the 
latter who can only offer their own individual labour or 
that of their household.
For the 1984 wet season harvest, members of one of the 
reaping teams in San Ramon broke off and formed a new team
Observing relationships in a Philippine town, Morais 
(1980, p. 100) says: "[There is] a norm which states that 
towards one's close kin, she/he owes support, trust, loyalty 
and special consideration, simply because that person is a 
close kinsman." Castillo (1977, p. 427) cites data which 
show that Filipinos will more readily assist kinsmen that 
non-kinsmen, assuming both are egually needy.
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Linder a new kabesilya. Thus, there was a total of 7 reaping 
teams for the season. Membership in the new team was made 
up of households from the old team and from among recent
arrivals from a neighbouring municipality. One of the
reasons given for the formation of a new team was that 
member households lived in the same vicinity, which was the 
southernmost part of San Ramon and where the new arrivals 
set up their homes. The fact of living in the same vicinity 
reduced search costs of identifying and locating prospective 
members.
Monitoring costs would be higher for non—member 
households than for member households of cooperative labour 
groups in times of sickness or emergencies. The member 
household can rely on the team members to execute the task 
properly whereas non—member households would still have to 
monitor the hired group, unless he can rely on close kin or
trusted neighbours to do it for him. More than one fifth of
hired workers would be other than family, relatives, etc., 
and would presumably require closer monitoring of their 
performance than if they were kin or neighbours. (See table
4.7)
In what follows, transaction costs within the 
kabesilya-led reaping team of Itlang will be discussed.
Belonging to the same cultural community also helps to 
reduce transaction costs because of shared language and
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values, so that one would tend to be more accommodating and 
trusting of another who is of the same culture. Such 
attitudes are enhanced in a situation of cultural diversity, 
as in San Ramon where there is a substantial minority of 
Ilocanos. Itlang's team is made up of 16 Itnoeg households, 
3 mixed Itnoeg— Ilocano households, and one Ilocano-Visayan 
household. Four of the five remaining reaping teams in San 
Ramon in the 1983 wet season were predominantly Itnoeg, and 
one was completely Ilocano, although it was the smallest of 
the teams, with nine member households. The latter team is 
also referred to as the "Iloco" group. It is perhaps 
significant that the one member household not re—admitted 
into Itlang's team after the harvest season was the mixed 
Ilocano—Visayan household. Screening costs were also 
reduced by the fact that a number had previously worked on 
the same team.
Transaction costs within the team are further reduced 
by the fact that 10 out of 18 member households, or 55.6%, 
belong to one kin group. This dominant kin group centers 
around the household of Itlang, Ligaya, and Sianang, who are 
all sisters. A fourth household is headed by their widowed 
sister—in— law, and a fifth household by Itlang's son. In 
each of the remaining five households in the dominant kin— 
group, one of the spouses is related to either Itlang other 
husband, Barga.
It is significant to note that the household not re­
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admitted to the team after the reaping season was not 
related to any other member household and did not belong to 
the majority cultural community (Itnoeg), being Ilocano- 
Visayan. The reason given for the action was that the 
female spouse was frequently absent from work- An 
examination of the records showed that she had shown up for 
ten work days and reaped 37 bundles, or an average of only
3.7 bundles per day. However, her husband joined the team 
for 23 workdays and reaped a total of 167 bundles for an 
average of 7.26 bundles per day.
The selection of a leader, i.e., the kabesilya, reduces 
bargaining costs since she has the ability and authority to 
settle conflicts in the work schedule. For instance, two 
member households may want to use the labour pool on the 
same day, but the team has manpower sufficient only for one 
claimant. The kabesilya decides which claimant will be 
first attended to. Thus, the reaping team does not fit the 
definition of a peer group given by Williamson in the sense 
that the team as such does not settle conflicts by meeting 
together but delegates such authority to a chosen member. 
Here we have the beginning of simple hierarchy.
Itlang, the kabesilya, was chosen by members to act as 
such because of her ability to settle conflicts, and her 
diligence in reminding members about the schedule of work, 
independent of her status of being the wife of the barangay 
captain (the highest official on the barangay level).
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Although she was only able to complete three years of 
primary education, she exudes quiet authority and was chosen 
by the group rather than appointed. Thus, her decisions and 
remonstrations —  she made few —  were well—accepted.
Information costs are reduced by the mere fact that 
member households are residential neighbours, all living in 
the same district of San Ramon, which is divided into five 
residential districts. (See the sketch map of residential 
locations of team members.) On the average, each member 
household was neighbour to 2.5 other members, or 13.9% of 
the team. Residential neighbour refers, not to member 
households who are literally next-door neighbours, but to 
proximity and accessibility. As indicated in the sketch 
map, Sianang (No. 17) is not a next-door neighbour of Alfon 
(No. 2) but only 20 meters of open space separate their 
homes, neither of which is fenced off, so that one can 
readily go up to their front doors which happen to be on 
ground level.
Team members also frequently meet in the rice mill 
(indicated in the sketch map) where they go to thresh and to 
mill palay. They also meet in the fields since 12 member 
households (or 60% of all member households) have a field 
adjacent to another member household's field.
Normally the kabesilya decides whose field should be 
reaped on the first day and passes on this information to
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the team members through the network of neighbours described 
above. The schedule for the second day is determined at the 
work site or during lunch on the first day. Member 
households who are absent are informed by their neighbours 
or by chance encounters at the rice mill or along the 
streets of the barangay. The schedule for the third, 
fourth, etc. days are similarly set. Last minute changes in 
schedule are also easily relayed to team members because of 
their residential proximity and accessibility.
The team did not experience any difficulty due to 
miscommunications. However, the team of Atigan referred to 
earlier, a much larger, 33-member household reaping team, 
did experience some difficulties which were costly. On one 
day, the team walked for some 30 minutes over the rice 
paddies to reap a field which was presumed scheduled for the 
day, only to find out that the schedule had been changed^ 
because the grain was not mature enough. After some 
grumbling, the team then went to the next field which was 
scheduled for that day, but which required another half-hour 
of fast walking, through under—growth and over paddies. 
Complaints from team members were heard regarding the time 
and energy needlessly spent.
Monitoring costs are also reduced by the fact of being 
residential and field neighbours, since these involves face- 
to-face encounters and reduce the incentive to be absent 
from work without a valid reason. One primary team member
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quit the team after his fields had been reaped in order to 
engage in cattle raising, which was more lucrative. 
Although he offered to pay his remaining obligations in 
cash, team members felt he reneged on his commitment to them 
because of the difficulty of securing labour. Thus, 
subsequent encounters between him and other team members 
tended to be cool and uncomfortable.
In general, absenteeism was not a serious problem, 
although there were afternoons when the number of reapers 
diminished because of siesta-taking. This would occur when 
the field reaped in the morning was near the barangay, 
enabling the team to return to their homes for lunch or for 
a siesta. No fines were imposed for absences. On occasion, 
the team had to return to the same field the next day 
because of absences. Another reaping team, led by Gassip, 
imposed a fine of PIO.OO for each day's absence.
If a member household cannot be present for the reaping 
of its field (s) due to illness or some other reason, the 
other team members will still accomplish the task, with ^  
proper accounting. On the other hand, a hiring farmer or a 
member of his household has to be present to monitor the 
work of ad hoc team.
Finally, monitoring costs are also reduced by the 
simplicity of the reaping operation itself, so that 
individual performance is readily observed and individual 
bundles are easily and quickly checked. Mention has been
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made of the bundler monitoring for size and quality of 
bundles, which is done without much effort. Accounting is 
very simple and each member household can easily calculate 
whether it owes labour to other households or has labour 
owed it. The bundler lists down on a leaf from a notebook 
(or, occasionally, on empty cigarette packs or cartons) the 
number of bundles reaped by those present. When this is
completed, he hands it over to the member whose field was
reaped that day. The small size of the team, also renders
. ^  . 12 monitoring easier.
Over time, members know who among them are better 
reapers, discounting for age differences. These are the
ones the team would desire to retain, replacing the slower 
ones with better workers. However, the team cannot be too 
selective, since it is in competition with other teams, and 
the size of a team can make it more attractive for
prospective employers with relatively large farm areas and 
cash to spare.
4.5.6 Distribution of Income/Assets
The average annual total gross household income of the 
team was P9,048.00, with average per capita income of
12There were no team accounts for Itlang's team. 
However, the larger teams of Atigan had team accounts kept 
by the "secretary" of the team, who was female and had 
completed high school.
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p 1,691.00^^ This was derived from rice farming (69.7%), 
the cultivation and s ^ l e  of mangoes and bamboo (16.6%), 
wages from farm work (7.3%), and swine raising (6.4%). It 
excludes remittances from family members living outside of 
Manabo, either within the country or abroad, and income from 
non-agricultural employment such as cattle—raising.
One household derived as little as 34.4% of its annual 
income from palay farming and as much as 45.1% from wages 
for farm work, whereas another household got 91.6% of its 
annual income from palay farming. The sale of mangoes 
accounted for as much as 58.2% of annual income for a third 
household.
Annual household income ranged from P3,637 to P15,661, 
while per capita income varied from P693 to P4,229, with a 
standard deviation of PI,088 for the latter. These figures 
indicate a relatively high degree of unequal distribution 
among member households.
Regarding assets, the average value per member
household was P45,536, and on a per capita basis, was
P7,520. Included are rice land (90.2 of total assets),
14livestock and work animals.
^’"’Based on 18 member households.
14Not included are fruit trees (due to difficulty of 
capitalization), the land area which they occupy and 
cornlands. However, the latter account for a very small 
proportion of total assets.
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Half of the member households were share tenants, and 
half were owners. No member household was completely 
without land, but four households had only half a hectare or 
less to cultivate. The average farm size was 1.18 hectares. 
The largest farm area was 2.8 hectares. The majority 
(53.6%) of the parcels are located some 16 to 30 minutes' 
walk from the team's neighbourhood in San Ramon, while 32.9% 
are located some 31 to 60 minutes' walk, and only 13.5% are 
within 15 minutes' walk.
All the member households, except for two, had a 
carabao (water buffalo), used primarily for farm work and 
hauling purposes, with 9 households possessing two or more. 
Two households also had a horse each. Thus, on the average, 
a household possessed 1.7 heads of work animals. Except for 
a plough and a harrow, member households had no other large 
farm implements.
Value of total farm assets per household ranged from 
P 4,130 to P 130,325, while per capita assets varied from 
P 516 to P 18,013, with a standard deviation of P 6,541 for 
the latter. These data indicate a very high degree of 
inequality among member household in this respect, higher 
than that of income. The coefficient of variation for per 
capita income, i.e., the ratio of standard deviation to the 
mean, is 0.64 compared with 0.84 for per capita assets.
Despite the unequal distribution of income and wealth
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among members, there was little conflict in evidence among 
them that might arise from efforts or wealthier members to 
dominate the group- The potential for conflict was more 
than balanced by other factors such as kinship or long 
standing acquaintanceship, which made for greater 
accommodation. Neither did Itlang, the kabesilya, make use 
of her political assets as the barangay captain's wife, to 
dominate the group.
However, in the larger reaping team headed by Atigan, 
wealthy members and non-members members tried to bribe the 
kabesilya to schedule their fields for transplanting earlier 
than the others.
4.5.7 Atmosphere
As mentioned previously, there were no festivities that 
marked the end of each workday or even the end of the 
reaping season. However, team members remarked that the 
atmosphere while at work was jovial, marked by banter and 
occasional singing. Members also remarked that there was an 
atmosphere of helpfulness that marked their relations. One 
instance already cited was that in the event of illness on 
the part of a member household on the day scheduled for its 
field, the team would still reap the field and they could be 
trusted to properly account for the bundles, even though no 
household member could be around to help oversee the work.
Another instance given is that of the faster reapers
166
(usually male) assisting the slower reapers (usually the 
female or older members) at the end of the workday by
handing over their fractions of a bundle reaped in order to
complete one bundle.
It was observed that members of a^ hoc teams worked in 
separate parts of the same field and did not work together, 
whereas members of the two kabesilya-led teams started at 
the same place and moved through the field together. Thus 
one was characterized by the absence of team work while the 
other displayed the opposite.
4.6 Labour Teams for Other Farm Tasks
It was mentioned earlier that the six reaping teams in
San Ramon also engaged in transplanting. However, the size 
of the teams would be smaller than their size during
reaping because the latter is more labour-intensive due to 
the use of the rakkem. Another difference between the
transplanting and reaping teams is that in the former,
members would exchange labour in terms of time spent in 
transplanting. Thus, a member household could owe another
50.5 hours of transplanting labour. Debts are paid in both 
cash and kind- A fuller study of a transplanting team is 
given in Chapter 5. Although it is located in another 
region, it is postulated that the factors Jihat account for 
its existence are the same factors which explain the
existence of such teams in San Ramon.
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Seven member households of the reaping team said that 
they belonged to land preparation (LP) teams totalling two, 
and three indicated they belonged to weeding teams, also 
totalling two. Of the two LP teams, one had a kabesilya, 
the other did not. Likewise, one of the weeding teams had a 
kabesilya (Itlang) and the other did not.
LP teams were small, having four to five member 
households on the average with as many team members (male). 
In the case of San Ramon's irrigated fields, the time 
constraint on land preparation is linked with the seedlings' 
age: when they have reached the optimum age, the field must 
be ready for transplanting. Individual field sizes are 
small (4,676 sq.m. on the average for the whole barangay) 
and can easily be prepared by a man-and—carabao team. 
However, because a farm household cultivates two to three 
parcels and in three different locations on the average, 
there is an incentive to pool labour and carabaos to 
accomplish the task quickly.
Another incentive for joining an LP team is the fact 
that a hand tractor, which is a substitute for the carabao 
and which can accomplish the task much faster, is beyond the 
financial capacity of the household. Even if this were not 
so because of government subsidized credit to purchase one 
or because hand tractors can be hired at competitive prices, 
the absence of feeder roads or paths wide enough to 
transport the hand tractors to fields beyond the side of the
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provincial read discourages the use of one. Hence, land
■o.
preparation is still a very labour— intensive process, 
lending itself to the formation of teams.
With respect to economies, associational gains 
resulting from a faster work pace and a lightened work 
burden also occur just as in the work of the reaping team, 
according to those who are in LP teams.
Weeding teams, like LP teams, are also small, 
consisting of seven member households on the average, with 
as many team members of both genders. It is recommended 
that weeding take place within 30 days after transplanting 
palay in order to obtain optimum yields (Vergara, 1979 p. 
187). Thus, there is greater flexibility in the time of 
weeding relative to transplanting.
Weeding is done entirely by hand in San Ramon. The use 
of weedicides or hand weeders, is completely absent. Thus, 
weeding is very labour— intensive.
The usual associational gains are present in group 
weeding as attested to by those who are in weeding teams.
I witnessed one unusually large land preparation 
team at work in Luzon-Ayyeng, another barangay of Manabo, 
which is also the poblacion. There were 12 members, all 
male, with 12 carabaos ploughing a field in single file, in 
increasingly smaller rectangular patterns- It was evident, 
both during the work itself and during the noon-break that 
the men derived pleasure from working together- Not only 
did it enable them to finish the job quickly, but doing it 
in the company of others made the work less burdensome. The 
team did not have a kabesilya.
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making it attractive to join one. No in—depth investiga­
tion of these teams was attempted in order to verify 
hypotheses with respect to the other factors which determine 
the cost of cooperative/individualistic behaviour. At the 
very least, it can be said that the fact of their existence 
means that, for those who joined, transaction costs were 
low.
4.7 Conclusions
Data from a sample of sixty four farmers in the
municipality of Manabo, which included both members and non-
members of cooperative labour groups, indicated that the
main factors affecting the choice between hired and 
cooperative labour in transplanting were (1) household 
labour supply; (2) budgetary constraints; (3) atmosphere; 
(4) economies; (5) timeliness and (6) transaction costs.
The findings tend to confirm the relevance of some of 
the variables previously postulated. It also showed that 
household labour supply and budgetary constraints are the
primary considerations. These are easily enough understood 
and need no further elaboration. Moreover, household 
conditions would not suffice for understanding the
factors that affect the choice between individual and
collective action in farm tasks and that explain the
existence of cooperative labour teams. Hence discussion 
focused on the other factors.
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It would also seem, from the survey, that hired labour
9
groups provided more timely delivery than cooperative labour 
since those who hired labour gave this as a reason while 
those who chose cooperative labour did not. However, no 
firm conclusion can be drawn since the hired groups included 
cooperative labour groups who hired out their labour.
Data from the survey also show that both members and 
non—members resorted to kin and residential neighbours for 
transplanting, indicating that both tried to reduce
transaction costs. However, monitoring costs of hired 
groups could be higher because more transplanters in these 
groups were not family, kin or neighbour (21.7% in Table
4.7) than in cooperative groups (10.7%). Monitoring costs 
would be reduced if these hired groups are also kabesilya- 
led teams.
Interviews with twenty three kabesilya also confirmed 
that at least two of the postulated variables, namely, 
transaction costs (which were cited most often) and
economies were relevant.
The data from the case study of the San Ramon team 
shows that the reaping team exists because of the congruence 
of several factors: (1) the necessity of a timely delivery
of reaping labour due to the biological characteristics of 
an agricultural crop; (2) a low elasticity of substitution
between machinery and labour, making reaping a very labour-
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intensive task and combining with the need for timely 
delivery of labour to generate a peak demand for labour 
during the reaping season; (3) scale economies and
associational gains arising from team work; (4) low
transaction costs because of the presence of the kabesilya, 
membership based on ethnicity, kinship and residential 
neighbourhood, and the simplicity of the reaping task 
itself, requiring only elementary accounting and monitoring; 
and (5) a not too tightly calculating atmosphere.
All of the above factors must be present at the same
time in order for the reaping team to exist. Each of them
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the
existence of a reaping team. Thus if the first four factors 
are present but a tightly calculating atmosphere is 
prevalent, then the team will not be formed or if already 
existing, will tend to break up.
On the other hand, there was a high degree of unequal 
distribution of income and wealth among team members. 
However, this did not appear to lead to conflict within the 
group as it was more than offset by kinship and friendship.
The study of the Abayon team in San Ramon also 
indicated that, contrary to our hypothesis, the team existed 
in spite of the absence of indivisibilities in reaping. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that this factor is 
irrelevant in other agricultural tasks such as irrigation.
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Based on the data in Table 4-2, one can distinguish 
labour deficit from labour surplus households. The labour 
demanders b^sé^ çn' are those who did not incur debts in the
form of wage advances. There were seven households in this
category. The labour suppliers, the rest of the team, are
those who secured wage advances. However, only two of 
these, Ligaya and Roman, easily solved the problem of with 
an adequate and timely supply of labour on their own farms 
since these were quite small. A third member, Salia, was 
concerned with adequate labour for reaping on her farm, but 
because she used her share of the labour pool to pay off her 
debts, she had to resort to hired labour.
Thus it would seem that, for most of the team, the 
factors postulated above as affecting the choice between 
individual action and collective action are relevant. For
the two households who resorted to family labour, the need 
for timeliness in reaping and the fact of a low elasticity 
of substitution between the rakkem and the sickle or a 
mechanical reaper, would still be relevant because these are 
a necessary conditions for group work, without which there 
would be no employment opportunities. From the point of 
view of the fact that they have very small farm sizes, they 
would not be as concerned as other members with securing a 
timely supply of labour on their own farms. High 
transaction costs, dominance of the group by some, and a too 
calculative atmosphere would, of course, affect their 
decision to join the team or not.
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CHAPTER 5: A PALAY TRANSPLANTING TEAM
5.1 Nagpandayan
Nagpandayan is the largest barangay in the municipality 
of Guimba, consisting of 382 households in 1984. Guimba 
lies 153 km. north of Manila in the province of Nueva Ecija 
in the Central Plain of Luzon and is reached by public 
transport in three to four hours. (See the Sketch Map of 
Nagpandayan.)
Nagpandayan lies 12 km. south of the poblacion or town 
proper and is divided into seven purok or districts 
stretching along four kilometers of road rather than 
clustered around a common center. Each purok is headed by a 
purok president. Residents have their homes on one side of 
the road and their farms on the other side or at the rear of 
their homes near a creek which travels the whole length of 
the barrio. The creek fills up during the rainy season from 
June to November but dries up in the dry season from 
December to May.
Nagpandayan had a population of 2,063 in 1984 with an 
average household size of 5.4 persons. Residents are 
largely llocano, descendants of migrants from Northern 
Luzon. They are also fluent in Tagalog, which is widely 
spoken in Nueva Ecija.
The primary occupation of Nagpandayan households is 
rice farming with an average farm size of 2.13 hectares 
devided into 1.64 parcels. Total cultivated area is
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estimated to be 750.54 hectares.^ Even those households who 
hold other jobs such as teaching in the Nagpandayan public 
school (elementary and high school) also farm a piece of 
land- Forty— four households are landless farm labourers, or 
11.5% of all households.
Average annual gross household income in 1984 was
estimated to be P21,900, with per capita income of P4,500.
The latter had a standard deviation of P2,653 and a
coefficient of variation of 0.59, an indication of a highly
skewed distribution. On the other hand, average value of
farms assets was P33,900. Per capita assets were estimated
at P6,900, with a standard deviation of P4,400 or a
coefficient of variation of 0.63, also indicating that
2
assets are highly unequally distributed.
Previously, the land had been owned by several large
landowners. However, these were purchased by the government
and tenants were made amortizing owners. While the
^ Based on a survey by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform 
(MAR).
2
Although Nagpandayan is closer to urban centers such 
as the Guimba poblacion and Cabanatuan City than San Ramon, 
the value of farm land in the latter is higher. For 
instance, one hectare of favourably located irrigated farm 
land with ownership status had a market value of P70,000 in 
San Ramon, while one hectare of similar farm land in 
Nagpandayan went for P20,000. One reason for the difference 
is that irrigation water in San Ramon is much cheaper, being 
supplied by a large gravity system, than in Nagpandayan, 
where the buyer of land has to either purchase the existing 
irrigation pump or procure a new one, aside from shouldering 
fuel and maintenance costs. Another reason is the fact that 
the buyer has to assume responsibility for amortization 
payments on land acquired through the land reform program in 
Nagpandayan whereas land' in San Ramon is generally 
unencumbered.
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amortization is being paid, cultivators hold a certificate 
of land title (CLT). However, a number of the original 
beneficiaries have leased out their farms. More than one 
half of farm households are leasehold tenants, who pay a 
fixed rate, 35.7% are amortizing owners, one out of 14 are 
owner—cultivators and one out of 28 are share tenants.
Farming is primarily limited to one crop of rice during 
the wet season. Those with small pumps, drawing from 
underground water, used to be able to raise a second crop on 
a smaller area during the dry season. However, with 
increasing fuel prices, the number of those engaging in a 
dry season crop diminished. There were 73 small pumps 
reported in 1984, with one pump having a capacity of 
irrigating an average of two hectares during the wet season 
and a little over a hectare during the dry. Pump owners 
also irrigate adjacent fields for a fee of 10% of the crop.
Several years ago, the farmers of Nagpandayan with the 
help of the Farm Systems Development Corporation (FSDC), a 
government office, dug an earthen irrigational canal on both 
sides of the barangay (see sketch map) to bring water from 
the source of the creek to the rice fields. During the dry 
season, however, the creek dries up. An irrigators 
association was organized with the assistance of the FDSC 
and a large, four-wheeled tractor was given to the 
association, financed by a soft loan. The association 
however was not functioning well due to mismanagement.
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In 1982, the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) 
installed a large electric pump near Purok 1 with a capacity 
of irrigating 40 hectares. The pump was provided to the 
farmers by means of a soft loan. A smaller irrigators' 
association was set up but also did not seem to be 
functioning smoothly. Members would not show up for 
communal work on the irrigation canals. This demoralised 
the conscientious members. Also, there was a problem of 
non-payment of irrigation fees which were needed to amortise 
the loan on the pump, and to operate and maintain the pump.
The combined total area irrigated during the dry season 
was estimated to reach 120 hectares, or 16% of cultivable
area.
Only modern or so-called high yielding varieties (HYV) 
of rice are grown. The use of fertilizer and pesticides is 
widespread, while weedicides are used by relatively few 
farmers. Yield per hectare is 80 cavans of 46 kg. each 
(3.68 tons) on the average. Approximately 3/4 of the 
harvest is sold.
5.2 The Labour Market for Transplanting
In the 1984 wet season, there were three transplanting 
teams with a leader each who was also called kabesilva as in 
San Ramon. During the harvest season, only a portion of the 
membership of these teams continued to assist each other in 
reaping, exchanging labour among themselves but not hiring
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out to other households. They would then have no kabesilya. 
The three kabesilyas found it more remunerative to contract 
for reaping and threshing on their own. Such labour was 
paid a share of the palay threshed, ranging from 1/9 to 1/8. 
This practice is called hampas. T w o  of the kabesilyas were 
landless and the third had only a very small area to
cultivate.
The three kabesilya— led transplanting teams contained 
39* 28 and 23 member households each. Two of them had been 
in existence for an average of five years and one was newly 
formed in 1984. All the kabesilyas were male. Because area 
planted in the dry season is drastically reduced, these 
teams are not active then. The three teams reside in Purok 
1 and 2.
There is a fourth team which engages in both
transplanting and reaping but which has no kabesilya. It
comprises 16 member households and is active in both wet and 
dry seasons. Its members reside in Purok 5. By 1984, it
had been existing for seven years. It previously had a 
kabesilya, but he moved elsewhere and no one else wanted to 
take his place because of the alleged difficulties of 
managing the group and disciplining the members.
Another kabesilya— led team was begun in Purok 6 in the
Meaning "to strike". Threshing is done by striking 
the palay against a small raised platform made of bamboo. 
The grain falls to the ground underneath and is collected.
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1983 wet season but disbanded mid—way through the 
transplanting season because members were reneging on their 
commitments to the team- Its kabesilya was female-
The kabesilya— led teams transplanted their members' 
fields and also hired out team labour to non—members- The 
no—kabesilya team transplanted members' fields only-
The member households of the four transplanting teams 
constituted 27-7% of all households in Nagpandayan-
Extrapolating from the data provided by the in-depth 
study of one of the kabesilya— led teams, it was estimated 
that the three kabesilya-led teams transplanted a total of 
255-3 hectares or 34-0% of total cultivated area in the 
barangay-
Unlike San Ramon, where wages were set by individual 
bargaining, wages for transplanting and other farm tasks for 
the 1984 wet season, except for reaping and threshing, were
4
determined in a barangay council meeting on June 12- Aside 
from the six council members and the barangay captain, the 
three kabesilyas were present- The kabesilyas had asked 
that the wage for transplanting be increased due to 
increases in commodity prices following an official 
devaluation of the currency at the beginning of June-
4
Transplanting wages were similarly determined in the 
large adjacent barangay of Manacsac where three 
transplanting teams existed-
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Previously, daily wage rates (arawan) had been P12 per day 
for members and P14 per day for non—members. The council 
agreed to have only one rate and set this at 1*15 per day.
As for piece rates (pakvawan), the kabesilya— led team 
had been discriminating between members and residents of 
Puroks 1 and 2 on one hand, and non—members who were
residents of other purok or of the poblacion on the other. 
For the former, the team had been charging P200 per hectare 
and for the latter, P220 per hectare. The council agreed to 
raise these to P250 and P300 per hectare, respectively.
Wages for ploughing by carabao were raised to P35 per 
day without meals and retained at P25 per day with meals.
For the pulling of seedlings prior to transplanting, wages
were kept at P3.50 per 100 seedlings.
There was also evidence, based on the in-depth study of
one of the kabesilya— led teams, of the existence of a
forward market for transplanting labour. Non—members
advanced cash to the kabesilya to assure themselves of
adequate labour when the transplanting season came around. 
The team, on the other hand, accepted the cash advances 
because of their need to fund current expenses. The case 
study, however, did not inquire into the details of 
such forward labour contracts such as how much in advance 
of the transplanting season they were contracted and on 
what terms.
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5.3 A Transplanting Team
One team of transplanters was chosen for the case study 
presented here. The team is best identified by referring to 
its kabesilya, Felipe, 50 years old. He had been kabesilya 
for the past four years, taking over from his father—in— law, 
Esteban, who claims to have led the team for twenty years. 
The kabesilya, his wife Carling, and her younger married 
sister Miling (both of them helped in the record—keeping of 
the team) claim that the households that make up the present 
team are descended from the same households that had formed 
a team under Esteban.
Based on the work records kept by Felipe and his wife, 
there were 39 member households of the team in the 1984 wet 
season transplanting. Interviews of 35 households were made, 
with four being unavailable for interview.
Mean household size was 6.3 persons, with a range of 
two to eleven. The mean number of years a household was a 
member of the team was 7.4 years, ranging from one year to 
twenty years. The total number of transplanters in the team 
members was 26.9 years, ranging from 8 years old to 70 years 
old. The majority were female, making up 62.9% of the team, 
while 37.1% were male.
5.3.1 Employment and Income for the Team
The demand for the team's labour comes from two
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sources. The first source is the demand of team members for 
transplanting labour on their own fields. The team members 
plant each other's fields on the basis of exchange labour. 
At the end of the transplanting season, a reckoning or 
tuwiran is made and any excess or deficit labour on a 
member's field is valued at the current wage rate, arawan or 
pakvawan. depending on the particular terms chosen by the 
member at the time of transplanting.
The second source of demand are non—members who need 
transplanting labour for their fields. The team 
distinguishes between prospective employers who are taqaloob 
(insiders) and those who are taqalabas (outsiders). The 
taqaloob are those who live in Purok 1 and 2, where the team 
members also reside. The taqalabas are those who live in 
the other purok of the barangay or outside Nagpandayan but 
with fields in it. The team did not transplant in 
neighbouring barangays.
The team was employed for 43 days and expended a total 
of 13,517 manhours of labour, transplanting an estimated 
109.64 hectares (See Table 5-1). The number of non—members 
for whom the team transplanted was 25, for whom they 
expended 5,388 manhours or 43.4% of total manhours. The 
team spent less manhours on the fields of taqaloob (2,425 
manhours) than for taqalabas (2,963 manhours).
Frequently, as can be seen in Table 5—1, the team was
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TABLE 5-1
Work Calendar, Contract(^erms, Man-Hours and Wages 
PALAY TRANSPLANTING TEAM 
Wet Season, 1984
DAY NO. DATE EM=LG'/ER CgfTRACT NO. OF NO. OF m\HHOURS TOTAL
CATEGORY^ §ERMS I'JORkERS HOURS WAGES
(Pesos]
1 28 June P 42 8 336 P 250.00
2 29 June 3 A 5 8 4^1) 75.00
A 6 8 48 90.01)
3 6 July 1 A 40 8 320 60:). o:)
4 7 July 3 P 31 8 248 217.00
3 A 12 8 96 180.01)
5 8 July 1 P 37 8 296 555.00
1 A 9 8 72 135.00
6 9 July 1 A 37 8 296 555. (:%:)
2 A 17 8 136 255.00
1 A 34 8 272 510.00
7 10 July 1 A 33 8 264 495.01)
2 A 14 8 112 210.01)
8 11 July 1 A 49 8 392 735.01)
1 A 9 8 72 135.00
9 12 July 1 P 22 8 176 211.20
1 A 22 8 176 330.0:)
1 P 5 8 40 42.50
1 P 22 8 178 209.0:)
10 13 July 1 A 23 8 184 345.0:)
3 A 21 4 84 315.00
1 A 10 8 84 150.0:)
1 A 21 4 84 315. o:)
11 14 July 1 A 30 10-4^ 40 450.0:)
20-8 160
1 P 19 4 76 120.0:)
12 15 July 2 A 36 8 288 540.0:)
1 A 11 8 88 165.00
1 P 31 4 124 496.0:)
1 A 2 8 16 30.o:>
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DAY NO. DATE Bi=LGYER CpjTRACT NO. OF NO. OF IWF-HOURS TOTAL
CATEGORY^ (jERMS l*J0F1---:ERSHOLFS IaJAŒS
(Pesos)
13 16 July 1 P 16 8 128 P 320. (X)
14 17 July 1 P 35 4 140 50:). (X)
3 P 15 8 120 231.0:)
1 P 16 4 64 150.0:)
15 18 July 3 P 42 4 168 620.0:)
1 A 10 4 40 150.0:)
1 A 3 4 12 45.00
16 19 July 2 A 18 8 144 270.0:)
2 A 21 4 84 315.00
1 A 3 8 24 45.00
2 A 11 8 88 165.00
17 20 July P 26 4 104 572.0:)
1 A 21 4 84 315.00
1 A 19 8 152 285.0:)
18 21 July 3 P 44 9-4 36 5(:x:).o:)
35-8 280
1 F' 14 8 112 105.00
19 22 July 2 P 43 8 334
1 A 11 8 88 165.00
20 23 July P 33 4 132 475.0:)
1 P 17 4 68 198.00
21 24 July 1 P 42 4 168 315.00
A 32 4 128 480.0:)
1 A 6 4 24 90.0:)
1 A 8 4 32 120.0:)
22 25 July 2 A 21 8 168 315.00
1 P 14 4 56 145.60
1 A 23 8 184 345.0:)
23 26 July 1 A 42 4 168 630.0:)
3 A 36 4 144 540.0:)
3 A 9 4 36 135.00
24 27 July 2 A 52 4 208 780.0:)
25 28 July 1 A 10 8 80 150.0:)
1 A 25 8 2(X) 375.0:)
1 A 7 8 56 105.0:)
3 P 21 4 84 105.00
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DAY m. DATE EMPLOYER COTTRACT m. OF M3. OF MATxPHOURS TOTAL
CATEGORY^ (gERMS WORKERS HOURS WAGES
(Pesos)
3 P 13 4 52 P 117.00
1 A 5 3-4 16 75.00
26 29 July 2 P 19 4 76 76.00
1 P 12 4 AS 165.00
1 A 8 4—4 16
4-8 32 120. CO
2 A 9 4 36 135.00
27 30 July 2 P 15 4 60 195.00
1 A 11 4 44 165.00
1 A 14 4 55 210.00
2 A 20 4 80 303.00
28 31 July 2 P 7 4 28 133.00
1 A 8 8 64 120.00
1 P 33 4 132 495.00
29 1 August 2 P 33 4 132 400.00
1 A 8 8 64 12(0.00
1 A 7 8 56 105.00
1 P 4 132 277.00
30 2 August 1 P 26 4 104 85.00
2 A 10 8 80 15(0.00
• 1 A 7 8 56 105.00
1 A 7 4 28 105.00
31 3 August 1 P 11 4 44 12(0.00
1 P 4 4 16 43.60
1 A 14 8 112 210.00
1 A 14 8 112 210.00
2 A 16 8 128 24(0.00
32 4 August 1 A 7 8 56 105.00
3 A 4 4 16 6(0.00
1 A 23 8 161 345.00
1 A 11 8 77 165.00
5 August 1 A 23 8 161 345.00
1 A 21 4 84 315.00
1 A 9 8 72 135.00
1 A 5 4 20 75.00
34 6 August P 13 4 52 25(0.00
2 A 12 8 96 18(0.00
2 A 10 8 80 150.00
1 A 13 4 52 195.00
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DAY W . DATE En=LO'iER C^TTRACT NO. OF NO. OF MATf-HOURS TOTAL
CATEGORY RERMS WORF=:ERS HOURS l^ JAGES
(Pesos)
35 8 August P 27 8 216 illegible
36 9 August 1 A 6 8 48 90. (X)
3 A 28 8 224 420. (X)
1 P 10 4 40 120. (X)
1 A 2 8 16 30. (X)
37 10 August 1 A 16 4 64 240.00
2 A 15 8 120 225.00
1 A 6 8 48
1 A 3 8 24 45.00
1 A 24 8 192 360. (X)
38 11 August 2 A 21 8 84 315.00
1 A 13 6—4 24 195.00
7-8 56
A 9 8 72 135.00
39 12 August 2 P 13 4 52 74.75
3 P 19 4 76 170. (X)
W 13 August 1 A 7 4 28 105.00
41 14 August 2 P 6 4 24 54. (X)
42 15 August P 35 8 280 595.00
43 16 August 3 P 34 4 136 404.60
^Categories : 1-Team members; 2—Taga loob; 3--Taga- labas
p — Pakyawan (area rate) : members and taga— loob P250/ha;
non—member P300/ha 
A — Arawan (time rate) : P15/day per worker for all 
categories.
Ten members worked four hours each and twenty worked 
eight hours each.
SOURCE Kabes i l y a s  records.
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divided into two or more sub-groups. The largest work group 
was made up of 52 persons and the smallest of 2 persons, 
with a medium size of 16.1. On only two occasions did the 
team transplant fields adjacent to each other but belonging 
to different cultivators. The team would usually transplant 
fields which were located apart from each other.
In order to determine the actual wage to be collected 
under pakvawan. Felipe, Carling and Miling used a 50-meter 
length of abaca rope to measure the area transplanted. The 
task is facilitated by the fact that most fields are 
rectangular and flat. Wage payment by non-members are 
sometimes given in advance to the kabesilya. This is 
referred to as tampa. The kabesilya gives these to team 
members who ask for an advance.
At the end of the team's transplanting commitments, an 
accounting or tuwiran is made to determine whether a member 
household has a surplus (sahod) or a deficit (sayad). The 
actual settling of accounts is made individually and not as 
a group. Those who have a deficit (sayad) with the group 
are given until harvest time, usually three months away, to 
pay their debts plus 25% interest. This rate of interest is 
consistent with the usual interest rate on loans made 
available by informal credit sources within the barangay to 
purchase fertilizer. However, some lenders charged as high 
as 88.0% for three months, or 29.3% per month.
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Records of the team's accounts were made availabe by 
Felipe and Carling. These were unorganized and consisted of 
bits and pieces of paper. After organizing them, it was 
discovered that they constituted the accounts of 32 out of 
39 member households. Felipe and Carling could not locate 
the remaining records. It must be presumed that these 
accounts were settled and the records disposed of, since 
they were of no further value to Felipe.
The accounts of 32 member households are given in 
Table 5—2. Total income was P 16,058.90 with a median of P 
389.25 per household and a range of P 118.90 to P 1,653.90. 
These figures exclude the kabesilya's fees. As kabesilya, 
Felipe charges a fee for his services. For team members and 
taqaloob, he charges P 15.00 for the whole season which he 
collects only at tuwiran time. This fee is called tacder, 
which literally means "to stand". For taqalabas, Felipe 
charges a "porciento" of P 10 per hectare if the team is 
hired on pakvawan basis, and P 15 per day if arawan. For 
the 1984 wet season transplanting, the household of Felipe 
earned P 1,193.50 in fees and P 1,351.50 in wages. At the 
end of the season, he still had P 38.50 owed him by the 
group.
To illustrate the transactions involved in Table 5—2, 
let us take the case of the household of Eutaquio (no. 4 ). 
Four of its members are on the transplanting team enabling 
them to earn P 1, 271.00. Since they cultivate only 0.8
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Table 5—2
Palay Transplanting Teams 
Financial Records
Wet Season 1984
MEMBER HOUSEHOUD CREDIT DEBIT SURPLUS DEFICI1
(SAHOD) (SAYAD:
1. Simplicio Sr. P 809.25 P 7cx:).(:x:) p 109. CX:)
2. Antero 129.20 93.30 -
3. Antonio 180. cx:) 53.10 -
4. Eutaquio 1,271.(X) 1,168.85 102.15 —
5. Emesto 305.00 196. (_x.) 109. CX:) -
6. Alejandro 357.40 340.9:) 16.50 -
7. Sixto 402. (X) 393.85 8.85 -
8. Vicente 473.82 443.20 30. CX:) -
9. Esteban 409. ai) 524.20 - P115.00
10. Marceline 1,653.90 1,142.5:) 511.40 -
11. Fernando 380.90 355.90 25.00 -
12. Florencio 329.20 317.70 11.60 -
13. Guillermo 502. (X) 466.25 35.75 -
14. Julian 323.00 223. CX:) 100. CxO -
15. Francisco 142. ex:) 110.00 32.CX:) -
16. Severino 1,085.20 1,069.60 15.60 -
17. Felipe 2,545.00 1,313.00 1,232. CXO -
18. Fred l,049.Cx:) 937. Cx:) 112.00 -
19» Rudy 397.60 424.9:) - 27.30
2(1). Gerardo 338.50 346.20 — 7.30
21. Felipe 624. Cx:) 5:0.85 115.15 -
22. Juan 755.20 852. Cx:) - 96.80
23. Jamito 448.40 535.20 - 86.70
24. Larry 322.95 282. CX:) 40.95 -
25. Leopoldo 282.51) 250.20 32.30 -
26. Mariano 6(1)8 « (Ixl) 541. CX:) 67.85 -
27. Aniceto 559.50 333. b :> 225.70 “
28. Manrierto 645. Cx:) 743.30 - 98.30
29. Ricardo 332.50 312.50 20. CXO -
30. Simplicio 118.90 99.40 19.50 —
31. Léon 297.70 282. CX:) 15.75 -
32. Feling 142.50 81.50
^including fees.
SOURCE : Kabesilya' 5 records.
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hectares, they needed only 8 more team members to transplant 
their field for seven hours on 3 July (cf. Table 5—1). On 
the books, they were charged R 120.00 (arawan rate) for the 
team's labour. In addition, they had not paid the tacder 
and had received wage advances of R 1,033.85. Thus, at the 
tuwiran. they had a sahod of R 102.15.
On the other hand, the household of Sixto (no. 7)
cultivates 2.9 hectares and has two family members on the 
team. The team transplanted one of his fields with 24 
workers ( in addition to family labour) for one day (10 
August) on arawan basis. He was charged in the books
with R 360.00 worth of team labour, R 15 as tacder 
payment, and R 18.85 cash advance. Against this, the 
household contributed labour worth R 402, resulting in a 
sahod of R 8.85.
Some households such as that of Leon (no. 31) paid a 
total of R 1,634.20 in cash to the team for its labour on 
various dates since they cultivated 3.5 hectares and could 
not hope to exchange sufficient transplanting labour. Only 
Leon's wife (41 years old) and his son (15 years old), were 
the team members. They were debited R 267 for the team's 
labour not paid in cash plus R 15 tacder, and credited
with R 297.70 worth of exchange labour.
The case of Eutaquio exemplifies labour surplus 
farming households with a small total farm area (1 hectare
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or less) who join the team primarily to augment their 
income. The advantages in joining the team instead of 
hiring out on their own is a reduction in search costs and
in a greater probability of finding employment because of 
the greater efficiency of the kabesilya— led team over a^ hoc 
labour as in indicated in Table 5—4.
The cases of Sixto and Leon exemplify labour deficit 
households cultivating a relatively large total farm area
whose primary aim in joining the team is to be assured of 
adequate labour supply at the proper time. This is not to 
say that labour surplus farm households are unconcerned 
about an adequate and timely labour supply and labour 
deficit households are not interested in extra income.
Assuming that all non—member households who hired the 
team have fully paid for their labour, total surplus should 
equal total deficit in Table 5—2. However, as mentioned 
earlier, the financial records of the team were incomplete
4
and hence total surplus does not balance total deficit.
With respect to contract terms, 34.7% of all
transplanting commitments were done under area rates and
4
The inclusion of the missing seven households would 
balance the books of the team. This means that each of 
these households had a deficit of P 227.24 on the average. 
If the assumption is true that the records of these 
households were missing because they disposed of their debts 
early, then it is reasonable to assume that they are better- 
off households with larger farm areas and could afford to 
generate a large deficit.
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63.3% were contracted for under area rates and 61.9% under 
time rates.
5.3.2 Size of the Team
There is an incentive, on the part of the kabesilya, 
to have a large group because he collects tacder per member 
household, and he can accept more transplanting jobs, thus 
adding to his own income because of more commissions. On the 
other hand, a large group requires more supervision and 
coordination, more paper work involved in keeping accounts 
on the part of the kabesilya. On the side of the team 
members, a large group means more employment since farmers 
want the job done quickly and they look for numbers. A 
large group could also earn less take-home pay if area rates 
are paid, since the amount earned is divided equally among 
those who work. To cite an example, on July 22, forty three 
team members transplanted a field which they estimated to be 
1.29 hectares, on pakyaw basis for a whole day. They 
were paid P 322, but when equally divided, each individual 
transplanter received P 7.49 which was half of the daily 
wage. Felipe commented that there were too many 
transplanters for the field.
A new transplanting team of 27 member households was 
formed in 1984. It was partly composed of member households 
who broke away from Felipe's group. Ben, the kabesilya of
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the new group and a former member of felipe's group, said 
that the latter's group had grown too large, consisting of 
49 households and 99 transplanters in 1983, resulting in 
lesser per capita income under area rates and in 
difficulties in the management of the group. On the whole, 
however, members of Felipe's group were satisfied with his 
management.
5.4 The Determinants of Membership in the Transplanting 
Team
5.4.1 Indivisibilities in Transplanting
Rice transplanting in Nagpandayan was carried out 
entirely by hand. No machinery and no hand tools were 
employed. Seedlings were passed on to the planters in 
bunches. They in turn, imbedded them in the mud of the rice
field by hand, bending over rhythmically and moving sideways
in a straight line until several rows of seedlings were
completed simultaneously. Then the group would begin 
another set of rows.
Thus no indivisibilities arose in transplanting rice
due to the use of large equipment or from the process 
itself. However, as in reaping, rice transplanting could 
not be "divided" over a number of days but completed in one 
relatively short time period if the maximum output was to be 
achieved. This phenomenon is more adequately explained as a
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need for the timely delivery of transplanting labour than as 
an indivisibility, as will be discussed in the next section.
However, in the case of the task of irrigation, it was 
earlier described that two irrigators' associations existed 
in Nagpandayan occasioned by the fact that indivisibilities 
existed in the form of a long earthen canal in one instance 
and of a large electric pump in the other. The construction 
and maintenance of the irrigation canal required teamwork. 
Cooperation is also required in the use and maintenance of 
the electric pump and in the maintenance of the canals.
5.4.2 Timeliness
(?
One benefit members drive from the team is timeliness
A
in the delivery of transplanting labour. De Datta (1981) 
notes that the optimum age for transplanting wet—bed 
seedlings (a method used in Nagpandayan) is 20 to 30 days, 
depending on the variety.
Farmers in Nagpandayan who plant modern varieties 
generally transplant 30-day old seedlings. They estimate 
that yields would decrease from 80 cavans (3.68 tons) per 
hectare with transplanting taking place on day 30, to 70 
cavans (3.22 tons) at the most if transplanting took place 
on day 32. This constituted a 12.5% decline in yields.
A farm household in 1983 had to cultivate one hectare
of puddy in order to ear an annual income of P 7,170, which
K
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was estimated by the World Bank to be the poverty threshold 
for Region 3 (Agricultural Policy and Strategy Team, 1986, 
p. 51).^ In fact, of the 35 member households interviewed, 
ten had farm areas below one hectare, twenty one cultivated 
from one to six hectares, and four were landless. The 
average farm size was 1.69 hectares.
All farm households would be concerned, in varying 
degrees, with an adequate and timely supply of transplanting 
labour, depending on farm size and household labour supply. 
Even those with farm areas below the minimum, who would be 
labour suppliers,would have an incentive to join the team in 
order to assure themselves of sufficient and timely labour.
On the average, a member household provided only two 
transplanters to the team. Assuming that this is also its
supply of family labour for transplanting and that it only
cultivated half a hectare of paddy, it would still need 4.38 
days for the two persons to complete the task.^ Efficiency
losses due to fatigue would probably mean a longer time in
finishing the work.
Again, the necessity for timeliness in the delivery of 
transplanting services is a necessary but not sufficient
The minimum farm size of one hectare is based on the 
estimated poverty line for Region 3 and on farm records on 
gross income and farming expenses by three households.
^Based on the claim of farmers in the village that it 
would require a team of 15 to 20 persons to transplant one 
hectare.
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condition for the existence of the transplanting team.
Whether a farming household will be assured of timeliness by 
individual action or by collective action will depend on the 
other factors postulated. For instance, if search costs are 
reduced by joining a team so that one is not hard pressed to 
locate workers more than by resorting to hired labour, then 
the household will join the team.
The situation in Nagapandayan is complicated by the
fact that the transplanting teams are also hired by non- 
members so that search costs for the latter are also 
reduced. However, membership in the team means priority in 
the execution of transplanting so that a team member is 
more assured of timely delivery than a non—member.
Members of the no—kabesilya team in Purok 4 said that
one reason for the continuation of the team despite the
absence of a kabesilya was the need to ensure a timely 
delivery of labour when the transplanting and reaping 
seasons came around.
5.4.3 Elasticity of Substitution
Transplanters in Nagpandayan use only their bare hands 
to plant palay seedlings. There are no mechanical 
transplanters in the barangay, although residents have seen 
them on display in the poblacion. The six—row transplanter 
designed and produced by the International Rice Research
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Institute (IRRI) is operated manually and can cover 0.3 to 
0.4 hectares in one day. (See Appendix 4.) It costs 
P 2,400, still a considerable sum from the small farmer's 
viewpoint, in the absence of the availability of soft loans. 
This accounts for its non-adoption in the barangay. However, 
if a farmer did acquire one, it would still mean that 
transplanting of one hectare would be spread out over 2.5 to
3.5 days, resulting in non-optimum yields. To overcome this 
constraint, it would still be necessary to form a team of 
three persons with one mechanical transplanter each.
Apart from cost considerations, there were indications 
that farm households were reluctant to adopt the mechanical 
transplanter because this would mean a reduction in the 
incomes of many families as the result of their displacement 
by the transplanter - The transplanting season was, along 
with the harvest season, the time when a lot of employment 
was generated.
Taken together, the two aforementioned factors account 
for the low elasticity of substitution between mechanical 
transplanter and transplanting labour, resulting in a very 
labour—intensive process which in turn gives rise to the 
transplanting team.
5.4.3 Economies
In considering the economies that could be reaped by
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membership in the transplanting team, we have to consider 
whether these also are available to non—members. If labour 
in the transplanting team is more efficient than under other 
arrangements, then those non—members who hire the team also 
benefit. Those who resort to a^ hoc hired labour teams or
to family labour would bear a higher cost.
Table 5—4 shows the relative efficiencies of
transplanting team labour and ad hoc team labour measured in
area per worker. The latter arrangement refers to hired
labour which has been recruited individually by the hiring
farmer. For labour paid on time rate basis,the transplanting
team's labour is more efficient than the ad hoc team for all
farm sizes. Only 38.1% of the transplanting team's labour
was on an area rate basis. However, its labour efficiency
0
was greater than arawan labour for all farm sizes.
Farmers in Nagpandayan estimated that it would take 15
to 20 transplanters to finish one hectare in one day. Felipe 
claimed that his team requires only thirteen transplanters 
on the average, to do one hectare. However, when area rate 
terms are applied, occasionally there are more transplanters 
than necessary because of a lack of employment opportunities
0
The Kabesilya's records uniformly indicated 4 hours or 
S hours, even if labour were paid on area rate basis. Hence 
there is a tendency to overstate actual mandays and 
understate labour efficiency. Nevertheless, it was still 
greater than the efficiency of labour paid on time rate 
terms- The sample of 30 households reported few cases of 
hiring pakyawan labour.
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elsewhere.
The data in Table 5-4 indicate that the transplanting 
team employed 18.3 workers per hectare per day on the 
average under time rate, whereas the a^ hoc teams employed 
19.7 workers on the average under the same terms. On the 
other hand, it took 15.9 workers from the team to finish 
one hectare in one day under area rates.
What are the sources of the greater efficiency of the 
team's labour over ad hoc team labour? The fact that member 
households pool their labour and their land for 
transplanting increases the scale on which transplanting is 
carried out by each. However, except for the creation of 
the position of the kabesilya, no specialisation and 
division of labour occurs which has not already taken place 
in the task of transplanting, whether done by the team or 
not. For example, the task of pulling seedlings from the 
seedbed is done by other workers hired especially for the 
task whether a kabesilya-led team or an ad hoc team is
9
employed for the main task of transplanting.
The kabesilya, it can be said, specialises in the 
supervision of the transplanting as well as looking for 
prospective employers. The existence of a kabesilya is
9
The pulling of seedlings requires special skills to 
prevent injury to them and thus reduce output. Hence 
farmers are willing to pay for such skills.
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TABLE 5-4
Labour Efficiency in Palay Transplanting 
by Farm Size, Labour Arrangement and Contract Terms
Farm Size Labour Arrangement Contract Total Mandays Ave. Labour
Area Efficiency ^
(has) (sq.m./manday)
Ad hoc Team
Ad hoc Team
Ad hoc Team
Ad hoc Team
Ad hoc Team
Ad hoc Team
Time
Area
Rate
Rate
7.0
4.2
154.0
90.0
454.5
466.7
Time Rate 2.77 68.0 407.4
Time
Area
Rate
Rate
18.12
9.35
376.0
188.5
482.0
496.2
Time Rate 6.03 136.0 443.4
Time
Area
Rate
Rate
20.8
6.28
402.0
113.5
517.4
553.3
Time Rate 6.49 132.0 491.7
Time
Area
Rate
Rate
14.4
15.0 171.0
648.6
877.5
Time Rate 7.2 118.5 607.5
Time
Area
Rate
Rate
10.2
4.29
154.0
58.0
662.3
739.6
Time Rate 5.1 89.0 573.0
Time
Area
Rate
Rate
70.52
39.12
1,294.0
621.0
545.0
630.0
Time Rate 27.59 543.5 507.6
1 (column 3/column 4) x 10,000 sq.m.
Sources : Kabesilya's records; sample survey (n=30).
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precisely the difference between a kabesilya— led team and an 
ad hoc one. As a result, there is greater supervision in
the former, leading to greater discipline and hence,
greater efficiency. For instance, as a result of Felipe's 
supervision, there is little horseplay among the young men 
and women in the work group.
Regarding expertise in transplanting gained as a 
result of constant "practice", there is probably a 
difference between a kabesilya— led team and an a^ hoc team 
if it is assumed that the planters who make the ad hoc team 
only plant intermittently in comparison with the team 
members who transplant throughout the season.
There is an economy which is gained from scale which 
has little to do with transplanting efficiency. It has to do 
with the reduction in search costs for prospective employers. 
Because they have banded together, the job of finding
employers is shouldered by one person, i.e. the kabesilya,
rather than by each individual member. Although the 
kabesilya charges a fee of P 15 for his services, this is 
probably low compared to individual search costs. And the 
fee is low because the kabesilya is searching for employment, 
not for one household only, but for a larger number, i.e. 39 
in the case of Felipe's team.
In addition to the greater efficiency of transplanting 
labour, team members enjoy other economies which can be
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translated into pecuniary terms. First of all, member 
households know in advance which member will be receiving 
excess labour since the labour— land endowments of each is 
known. Yet the labour surplus members who cannot afford it 
are not required to pay any cash until the tuwiran. Second, 
members are given preference over non—members in the 
schedule of transplanting, even if these latter are ready to 
pay cash. Thirdly, membership in the team increases the
probability of their finding employment because employers 
find it easier to recruit labour through the kabesilya. They 
also know the reputation of the team for efficiency. In 
this respect, a team member would have a competitive edge 
over a non—member in the labour market.
Non—members who hire the team and who are residents of 
Purok 1 and 2 (taqa— loob) also benefit from the more 
efficient labour of the team. In addition, they are charged 
a lower area rate than for non—members residing outside 
Purok 1 and 2 (taqa-labas). On the other hand, the team will 
not transplant their farms unless they have the cash ready 
and they are accorded only second priority in the 
transplanting schedule of the team. Thus, there is a 
greater possibility of less—than—optimum timing of
transplanting, resulting in yield reduction.
The taqa— labas who hire the team also benefit from the
more efficient labour of the team. However, labour costs 
may not be lower because they have a higher area rate
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compared to members and taqa-loob. Also, the team will not 
work for them unless they have ready cash. Worse than the 
taqa-loob. they are accorded third priority in the work 
schedule.
The associational gains from teamwork, which team 
members also mentioned, are in all probability greater than 
the associational gains reaped from a^ hoc teams. This is 
deduced from the fact that households who form ajd hoc teams 
work apart from each other, in different parts of the field, 
as was observed. There is not bound to be much sense of 
responsibility for other transplanters nor much natural 
competition- This is stating, in effect, that a^ hoc teams 
hardly have any teamwork.
5.4.4 Transaction Costs
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the ethnic homogeneity of a 
labour team reduces transaction costs among team members- 
With respect to Felipe's team, 37 out of 39 member 
households are Ilocano while in the remaining two, one 
spouse is Ilocano and the other is Tagalog. However, the 
younger member households speak fluent Tagalog, which is 
the dominant language in Nueva Ecija.
Another factor reducing transaction costs is kinship 
among members. In the case of Felipe's team, only eleven 
households or 28.2% of all member households constituted the
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largest kin group. Felipe's household, through his wife, is 
part of this group- On the average, a member household was 
consanguineally related to 4.9 other member households 
through either or both spouses.
Unlike the San Ramon reaping team, the Nagpandayan 
transplanting team did not choose Felipe as kabesilya. The 
job was handed down to him by his father—in— law. 
Nevertheless, the group accepted his authority. They were 
satisfied with his performance in general because they said 
that he was himself an efficient and fast worker, he was 
able to control the group, he readily passed on wage 
advances to team members and he knew how to schedule the 
work .
As in the San Ramon reaping team, the existence of a 
decision centre cuts down on bargaining and decisionmaking 
costs. The kabesilya sets the work schedule after receiving 
the requests for labour from members and non—members alike. 
He divides the team into several sub-groups when necessary 
in order to accommodate as many farmers as possible. When 
this is done, he assigns his two sisters—in— law and his two 
sons, depending on the number of sub-groups, to bring the 
sub-group to the worksite, to list down those who are 
present and to supervise the work.
The kabesilya also reduces absenteeism and work- 
shirking by his control over the group. At 4 a.m. on a work
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day, he goes to the members' homes, blowing a whistle to 
rouse them up. At 6:30 a.m. they are assembled at a junction 
near his home, and they all proceed to the worksite. All 
begin work and end work at the same time. Felipe sees to it
that there is no excessive playing around by young men and
women in the team. He lists down those who are present.
The group meets at least once before or during the wet 
season transplanting. One topic discussed during the 1984 
meeting was the need for higher wages due to devaluation- 
related inflation. The group decided to seek higher wages 
from the barangay council.
Transaction costs, particularly information and 
monitoring costs, are also reduced by the fact that team 
members are residential neighbours. All the member 
households live in Purok 1 and 2 which are compact and
adjacent to each other. (See sketch map of Purok 1 and 2.)
However, their homes are scattered throughout the two purok
as indicated by the fact that on the average, a member
household is a neighbour to 2.7 other member households. On 
the other hand, residential neighbourhood is reinforced by 
the fact that a member household is also a field neighbour 
to 1.1 other member households on the average. Fortunately 
for Felipe, he has three sons whom he uses as messengers in
the event of a change in work schedule.
In general, farmers prefer to contract for arawan 
labour because it is more easily supervised. Delaying
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tactics or a slower pace of work are easily spotted. 
Transplanting done on an area rate basis (pakyawan) is 
accompished more quickly but is open to subterfuges. 
Pakyawan labour has the opportunity of transplanting 
seedlings wide apart in the middle of a field where the 
subterfuge is not easily discovered. The employer—farmer is 
loath to go to middle of the field because of the danger of 
trampling on seedlings already transplanted, whereas 
seedlings incorrectly spaced by the side of the dikes are 
more easily discovered. Excess seedlings are easily 
trampled underfoot in the mud of the field.
Felipe, the kabesilya, however, claimed that the 
quality of work of the team is high, regardless of whether 
area rate or time rate terms prevail. Informal
conversations with several non—members who hired the team 
confirmed this and the teams records also showed that these 
non—members hired the team for the two successive 
tranplanting seasons of 1983 and 1984 on an area rate basis, 
indicating satisfaction with work performance.
Two—thirds of the team's work was contracted under 
time rates. Member households accounted for a little less 
than half of contracts with area rates- However, as 
earlier mentioned, Felipe claimed that the quality of the 
team's work remains at a high level, whether area rates or 
time rates are applied.
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In contrast with the San Ramon reaping team, the 
kabesilya keeps a record of the accounts of each member 
because monetary advances are made and because a member 
household may have a balance of exchange labour which it 
owes to or is owed by the other members- If the household 
owes exchange labour or other members, this is cleared 
against any amount of wages still due him. Felipe is 
assisted in keeping accounts by his wife Carling and his 
sister—in— law Miling.
Likewise, each member household keeps its own records 
At the tuwiran- it compares this with that of the kabesilya. 
There have been no complaints so far that kabesilya has been 
crooked in his bookkeeping. Since the transactions involved 
are relatively simple, each member household can easily 
discover whether it has been cheated or not.
Transaction costs are relevant to the decision of 
joining or not joining a team, whether the household is a 
labour demander or a labour supplier. Regarding search 
costs, joining a team would reduce these for both types of 
households precisely because the team would be composed of 
both types. The labour demander would be able to draw on 
the team's pool of labour and the labour supplier will 
recieve cash income because of his positive net contribution 
to the labour pool. In addition, for the labour supplier, 
search costs are reduced by the existence of the kabesilya 
who is the one looks for employers or whom employers
209
contact.
Regarding bargaining and decision making costs, about 
scheduling of work, contract terms etc., both labour 
demander and suppliers would be more off if these were high, 
e.g long meetings, disagreement over scheduling, poor 
managemen t .
Both types of households are equally concerned with 
monitoring costs. The labour demander is of course anxious 
that transplanting be done efficiently on his farm. The 
labour supplier would be concerned that poor performance 
would disaffect member households who are labour demanders 
and discourage non—members from hiring the groups, adversely 
affecting income.
5.4.5 Distribution of Income/Assets
As mentioned earlier, area cultivated during the dry 
season in Nagpandayan shrinks from 750.54 has. to 120 has. 
or 16% of cultivable area, shrinking employment 
opportunities in the process. Felipe's own small farm of 
1/4 hectare is unirrigated and so he is unable to grow a 
dry season crop. His two sons went to Batangas, a province 
south of Nueva Ecija, to cut sugar cane for three months 
during the 1984 dry season. Felipe and his wife earned 
money from transplanting and reaping the palay crop that 
farmers with small pumps were able to plant.
210
other farm households engage in carpentry and in 
construction work as hired workers, in the poblacion or in
Cabanatuan City, the capital of Nueva Ecija, which is 45
minutes by public transport south of Guimba. Some are able 
to find employment in Metro Manila as construction workers.
Average annual gross household income for member
households was roughly P 18,800, with per capita income of 
P 4,185. The bulk of income came from farming (88.1%), 
followed by wages earned from farm work (6.5%), with the 
balance generated by carpentry/construction work, poultry 
raising and other employment such as tricycle driving. Per 
capita income had a standard deviation of P 1,786 and a 
coefficient of variation of 0.43, indicating a moderately 
skewed distribution.
On the other hand, average value of farm assets was 
approximately P 24,600. Per capita assets were estimated at 
P 5,600 having a standard deviation of P 4,360 and a
coefficient of variation of 0.78, indicating a highly uneven 
distribution. However, despite this and the less unequal 
distribution of income among the team, there appeared no 
attempt on the part of the wealthier member households to 
dominate the group.
Compared with the whole barangay, member households of 
the team were poorer on the average.
The mean farm size of a member farm household was 1.69
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hectares ranging from -25 hectares to 6 hectares and divided 
into 1.5 parcels on the average. Only 30.3% of farm area 
cultivated by team members was irrigated during the dry 
season and produced a second crop. This contrasts with an 
average farm size of 2.13 hectares and 35.2% irrigated area 
for the barangay as a whole.
With respect to tenure status, 53% of member farm 
households were leaseholders, 16.7% were amortizing owners, 
and only 6.7% were owners. Another 6.7% were mortgagees and 
16.7% cultivated equal areas of land under two or more 
tenure statuses.
There were four member households who were landless.
5.4.6 Atmosphere
Although relations among team members were largely 
characterized by quid pro quo considerations, these were not 
unrelieved. Mention has already been made of the practice 
of waiting until the tuwiran to ask for the payment of 
debts from member households who cannot afford to pay cash 
immediately.
The behaviour of the kabesilya in some respects also 
contributes to a non—calculating atmosphere. For one, Felipe 
collects the fee known as tacder only at the time of 
reckoning. Members also say that he is very
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accomodating i.e. he readily lends money to members who ask, 
as long as he has funds to spare.
There are no festivities that mark the workday, except 
for an occasional afternoon snack enjoyed together in the 
field. Similarly, no festivities mark the end of the 
transplanting season. However, members remarked that others 
would try to lift up the spirits of a depressed member by 
sharing stories and jokes. Several members mentioned that 
they like being in the team because they were with their
circle of friends (barkada).
5.5 Labour Teams for Other Farm Tasks
Among the members of Felipe's transplanting team, 
membership in a reaping team was most widespread, followed 
by membership in a land preparation team and lastly, in a 
weeding team. The same pattern holds for the random sample 
of 30 households. (See Table 5—5). The overwhelming 
majority of those who belonged to these other teams said 
they had no kabesilya. This means that team members 
exchanged labour among themselves but did not hire out 
their labour.
Land preparation teams, using carabaos, averaged 5
persons in number, all male. Land preparation consists of
ploughing, followed by harrowing or breaking up of clods of
earth into finer pieces, and finally levelling of the field 
in order to ensure that water is evenly distributed- A team
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Table 5—4
Membership in Labour Teams for Other Farm Tasks
Farm Tasks Member households of 
Transplanting Team
Sample of 
30 households
No. % of members N o . % of
sample
Land Preparation 11 28.2 12 40.0
Weeding 3 7.7 2 6.7
Reaping 22 56.4 17 56.7
could exist for one phase only, usually ploughing. 
Alternatively, it could undertake all three phases. 
Each phase can be separated in time by several days or can 
be done on successive days, the primary constraint being 
the fact that the field must be ready for transplanting 
when the seedling are mature. There is no indivisibility 
inherent in the process of land preparation.
Only one—third of the interviewees resorted to 
mechanical power (hand tractor and four-wheeled tractor) to 
perform the task of land preparation. The hire price for a 
hand tractor was P= 320 per hectare for ploughing including 
labour to handle the machine. The Irrigator's Service 
Association (ISA), set up with the help of FSDC, owned two 
four-wheeled tractors which were leased out. The charge was
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p 460 per hectare. By comparison, the hire price of a man 
and carabao team was P 35 per day, excluding meals. With 
six days needed to plough a hectare by a man and carabao 
team the total cost would be P 210. Thus one reason for 
the relatively high incidence of membership in land 
preparation teams was the relatively high hire price of 
mechanical substitutes for the water buffalo.
Those who were members of land preparation teams cited 
associational gains as one benefit of membership. In
particular, they cited the fact that, when working together, 
the tempo of work is faster than when each works alone. 
Thus less mandays are required to prepare a given area. 
They estimated that a team of three would require only 4.5 
mandays to plough one hectare, whereas a single farmer- 
carabao team would need 6 days.
In spite of the absence of a kabesilya, transaction 
costs within land preparation teams are low because of their 
small size, ranging from three to five members.
With respect to weeding, close to 90% of farmers in 
both the transplanting team and in the random sample 
resorted to hand weeding, and only 10% applied herbicides. 
None of them used a mechanical weeder.
In fact, in Nagpandayan, farm records kept by one 
farmer show that only an average of three mandays was 
devoted to weeding (by hand) and that this was spread out
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over a long period of time, anywhere between 10 and 34 DT. 
Also, yields of modern varieties were nowhere near the 
levels cited by De Datta, even though farmers in 
Nagpandayan exhibit optimising behaviour, due to factors 
such as inadequate application of fertilizer from lack of 
credit, inadequate irrigation water, etc., factors
understandably absent from scientific experiments.
The high cost of herbicides (P 166 per liter) compared 
to low wages for weeding labour discourages the substitution 
of the former for the latter. Depending on the brand, from 
1/2 to 2 liters of herbicides are prescibed per hectare. In 
Nagpandayan, farmers use 1 liter per hectare.
Notwithstanding the fact that most weeding is done by 
hand, the small amounts of labour devoted to the task, along 
with the practice of spreading out the task over a long time 
period, accounts for the low incidence of weeding teams in 
Nagpandayan.
The factors affecting the existence of reaping teams 
have been discussed at length in Chapter 4. There are only 
three differences to note in Napandayan vis-a-vis San Ramon. 
The first is that the reaping team in Napandayan is largely 
engaged only in exchange labour. This is denoted by the 
fact that it does not usually have a kabesilya. The 
absence of a decision center increases transaction costs 
but the reduction in work activities, since the group does
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not hire out its services, would tend to counterbalance 
this. The second is that the reaping machines which are 
available are designed for modern, short—stalked varieties, 
which are grown in Napandayan in contrast to San Ramon 
which grows the tall, traditional varieties. However, no
such machines were in evidence in Napandayan, due to its 
prohibitive price and maintenance costs and to a desire not 
to displace labour and add to unemployment. The third is 
the size of the reaping team. In Nagpandayan, it averaged 
17 member households whereas in San Ramon it averaged 
23.7. This means that transaction costs within Nagpandayan 
teams would tend to be lesser, ceteris paribus.
5.6 Conclusions
The findings of the case study can be summarised as 
follows. The transplanting team has two goals, shared by 
labour deficit and labour surplus farm households and 
landless labourer households: to secure an adequate and
timely supply of transplanting labour and to augment
household income. However, the team would not have come into 
existence or would not continue to operate, if the following 
conditions did not hold.
It was observed that the task of transplanting cannot 
be spread out over an indefinite number of days due to 
biological characteristics of an agricultural crop such as 
rice, thus requiring a pool of labour. Capital, in the
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form of transplanting machinery, could easily be substituted 
for labour but the cost of the former is still prohibitive 
for the small farmers. In addition, farmers appear 
reluctant to make the substitution because of the effect on 
income and employment. There are also associational 
gains and other economies to be reaped from membership in a 
transplanting team.
Further, the team is characterized by some features 
which minimize transaction costs, and by other features 
which could increase such costs. Among those which 
minimize transaction costs are the existence of a decision
centre, meetings at least once during the transplanting
season and ethnic homogeneity- On the other hand, only a 
little more than one quarter of member households form the 
dominant kin group and member households are spread out 
among purok 1 and 2, tending to increase transaction costs.
Although relations within the team are based on quid 
pro quo considerations, this is softened by non—calculative 
characteristics. On the other hand, there is a high degree 
of inequality in the distribution of assets among members, 
which would be expected to foster conflict. Nevertheless, as 
in the case of the San Ramon reaping team, this element
appears to be tempered by ties of kinship and personal
friendship.
The hypothesis regarding the existence of 
indivisibilities as a determinant was not verified since it
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was found out that rice tranplanting does not involve any. 
However, this does not mean that it is irrelevant in other 
situations e.g. in the task of irrigation. As postulated at 
the outset, all the hypothetical variables taken together or 
singly, determine the choice between cooperation and 
individual action, depending on the situation under study.
The evidence also indicates that the same hypothethical 
variables, whether singly or together, were critical in the 
formation of labour teams in other farm tasks. The
exception is weeding where the cultural practice is to do 
little weeding. Thus, even though it is labour—intensive 
since it is largely done by hand, there appeared to be very 
few weeding teams.
In general, the same factors affect a household's 
decision to join a team, whether it is a demander or a 
supplier of labour. By a supplier of labour is meant that a 
household in Nagpandayan cultivates less than one hectare of 
paddy and thus earned less than was necessary to keep it 
above the poverty line. Thus it would be in need of more 
income which it could secure by offering its labour for the 
performance of farm tasks.
It was shown in Section 5.4.2. that a household with a 
half hectare of paddy and two members for transplanting 
would still be concerned with securing an adequate and 
timely supply of planting labour. The fact that they cannot 
afford to buy transplanting machines and there are none for
219
hire is also a consideration - They would also be concerned 
with the existence of economies in team labour, both on 
their own field and on the field of non—members who employ 
them since these latter hire them because they are more 
efficient than a^ hoc teams.
The four member households who are landless, would not 
be concerned with the adequacy and timeliness of 
transplanting labour since they would have no fields of 
their own. They would be concerned with transaction costs 
including all its three conponents. Search and information 
costs regarding employment opportunities would be reduced 
by membership in the team since it is the kabesilya who 
arranges for work. Bargaining and decision making and 
monitoring costs would also be of concern to them. So would 
the possibility of dominance of the team by any one group 
and the atmosphere that would exist.
Finally, the fact that the team hires out its labour to 
non—members breaks the dichotomy between hiring labour and 
joining a team. Non-members can thus secure the benefits of 
timeliness and efficiency by hiring the kabesilya— led team 
in advance. However, this fact does not negate the 
usefulness of investigating the determinants of membership 
in a team since it can still provide an understanding of 
the factors which make for cooperation among farmers in a 
developing country which is the main objective of this 
thesis.
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CHAPTER 6 : A SAMPLE SURVEY OF PALAY
TRANSPLANTING TEAMS
6.1 Preliminary Considerations
The aim in conducting a sample survey of palay 
transplanting teams was to universalise the findings from 
the two case studies. Such a survey would provide a wider 
picture of bavanihan as currently practised in the 
rural areas of the Philippines and at the same time 
enable the testing of hypotheses with respect to the 
factors that affect such cooperation. Due to resource 
constraints, however, such a "wider picture" is limited 
to North and Central Luzon, i.e.. Regions 1 and 3,
and to palay transplanting teams.
A further limitation has been necessary with respect 
to the number of hypothetical variables that could be 
tested. Out of the seven postulated, testing could only be 
done on transaction costs, distribution of assets and
atmosphere via multiple regression.
The reason for the limitation of the explanatory
variables to the three are the following. With respect to 
the existence of indivisibilities, these invariably are 
absent in transplanting paddy. Hence, there is no need to
test for it. With respect to the elasticity of substitution
/
among inputs, technically, this variable can be measured by 
estimating a production function for transplanting in which
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output would be thé total number of seedlings tranplanted by 
a team, and inputs would be labour, land and machinery. In 
the case of transplanting, the only meaningful substitution 
among inputs in terms of its effect on the existence or 
viability of the team would be the substitution between 
labour and machinery. Since there is in fact no 
machinery employed in transplanting in the areas 
investigated, the elasticity of substitution between the two 
inputs is invariably zero.
Regarding the existence of economies, the case studies 
have indicated that the economies that are obtained by 
membership in a team are a combination of scale economies 
and associational gains and a reduction in the search costs 
of employment. Accurately measuring labour efficiency for 
twenty eight teams as an index of economies of scale and 
associational gains went beyond resource constraints. With 
respect to the reduction in the search costs of employment, 
this too would be difficult to measure.
Finally, the need for timeliness in transplanting is 
also in variably present and so was not tested for.
6.2 Description of the Sample
Twenty eight transplanting teams were surveyed. They 
averaged 19.5 member households, with Region 3 teams being 
larger on average than Region 1, having 25 member households 
as against 15.4 for the latter. The largest team had 42
member households while the smallest had 6. The average 
total number of transplanters in a team was 45.1 with 45.3% 
male and 54.7% female. Region 1 teams averaged 42.2 
transplanters (42.2% male and 57.5% female) while Region 3 
teams had 57.8 transplanters (47.3% male and 52.7% female). 
The average age of transplanters was 32.2 years overall, 
with 34.2 years for Region 1 and 30.1 years for Region 3. 
Male transplanters in both regions were younger, being 29.3
years old on the average as compared with 34.5 years for
females.
With respect to length of membership, households 
claimed to have been in the same team for an average of 9.2 
years. Region 1 households have been in such teams for an 
average of 10.2 years with 7.9 years for Region 3 
households.
The teams engaged in both exchange labour among member 
households and in hiring out labour to non—members for
payment in cash or in kind (mostly in cash). The system of 
accounting for teams in both regions followed that of the 
case study teams. Average income for a member household 
from the team's activities during the 1984 wet season 
transplanting was P 516.60, with P 443.80 for Region 1 teams 
and P 613.60 for Region 3.
Of the 28 kabesilyas, seventeen were male and eleven 
female, with ten of the latter from Region 1. Only one
kabesilya in the sample from Region 3 was female. The
majority belonged to farming households, although average 
farm size was less than one hectare. Eight of the
kabesilyas were from landless labour households, with the 
majority of them from Manabo.
Half of the kabesilyas were chosen by the team members 
while the other half took the position by organizing the
team or by being appointed. Of the kabesilyas chosen by 
team members, ten came from Region 1. Two were af^pointed by 
the kabesilyas who immediately preceded them and who were 
also their relatives by either affinity or consanguinity. 
One was asked by another kabesilya to assist him . in
managing a large group which they eventually split. 
Another was appointed kabesilya by his godfather in
marriage, who happened to grow rice for certified seed
purposes and needed the services of a large group of 
transplanters.
Kabesilyas in Region 1 did not charge any fee. Their
"compensation" came from being able to borrow from
prospective employers by pledging the team's labour. Those 
in Region 3 charged fees similar to those described in 
Chapter 5.
With respect to ethnic homogeneity, the vast majority 
of the teams were highly homogeneous, with 87.6% of team 
members belonging to only one ethnic group on the average.
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with little variation between Regions 1 and 3 (See Appendix 
2). In Region 1, six teams were largely Ilocano and ten 
teams largely Itnoeg (Tingguian). In Region 3, teams were 
similarly highly ethnically homogeneous, with 89.0% of 
membership being Ilocano, with a small proportion of 
Tagalogs and Pampangos.^
With respect to consanguineal relations, on the 
average, a member household was related by blood to 4.4 
other member households, on both spouses' sides. There was 
little difference between teams in Region 1 and 3 in this 
respect. With respect to neighbourhood, both residential 
and field but largely residential, a member household was 
neighbour to four other member households on the average, 
with practically no difference between the two regions.
Regarding primary occupation, eight out of nine member 
households on the average were farmers and one out of nine 
were landless labour households, with Region 1 teams having 
a slightly higher proportion of landless than Region 3. 
Average farm size was 1.07 hectares overall, with 0.82 
hectares for Region 1 and 1.29 hectares for Region 3. Almost 
two—thirds of farmer members in Region 1 were share tenants 
while one— third were owner-cultivators. In Region 3, 10.8%
The Tagalog form the majority of the population in 
Nueva Ecija. Guimba is in north of the province, which is 
predominantly Ilocano. The province of Pampanga borders 
Nueva Ecija on the southwest (See Map of the Philippines in 
Chapter 1).
were owner-cuitivators, 37.2% were amortising owners and
38.8% were leaseholders.
Average household income overall was P 9,310 
annually, with an average of P 6,790 for Region 1 member 
households and P 12,620 for Region 3. Average per capita
income overall was P 1,680, with P 1,262 and P 2,165 for
Regions 1 and 3 respectively. The main crop was palay, with 
corn and vegetables as secondary crops.
Distribution of per capita income among member 
households of a team was highly unequal, with a coefficient 
of variation (c.v.) of 1.03 on the average. Region 1 teams 
showed a slightly more unequal distribution with a c.v. 
of 1.08 as against a c.v. of 0.97 for Region 3. Distribution
of assets was also unequal, with an average c.v. of 1.16.
Region 1 teams exhibited an average c.v. of 1.21 as against 
1.10 for Region 3.
On the average, the teams held a meeting at least once 
during a transplanting season. Twenty one out of 28 teams 
kept a written record of member households' accounts. These 
were usually kept by the kabesilya. Several teams had a 
secretary who kept the records.
The vast majority of teams were fairly satisfied with 
the performance of the kabesilya. Only a small proportion 
were dissatisfied. Of those who were satisfied, the two 
major reasons given were efficiency and
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honesty/fairness/helpfulness on the part of the kabesilya. 
With respect to efficiency, the kabesilya was seen as having 
a good command over his/her team, enabling it to finish its 
work according to schedule. S/he even trained the group in 
transplanting techniques on occasion and was on time for 
work. The kabesilya was also seen as being helpful, e.g. 
looking for work for members, patient, as being honest and 
as treating team members equally. Not paying members 
completely and on time, laziness and inefficiency were the 
major reasons for dissatisfaction with the kabesilya.
Again, the vast majority of team members were 
satisfied with the team, and only a small number were 
unhappy. The major reason for satisfaction was the
cooperation that existed among members, i.e. each one did 
his/her share of work so that the task was made easy and 
readily completed. There was a minimum of shirking. There 
was an atmosphere of honesty and openness. A secondary
reason were the socials, e.g. drinking and dancing that took 
place after work and after the season. Some teams, composed 
of a large number of unmarried young men and women, 
sponsored a dance after the transplanting season. This
contrasts with the findings of the case studies where no
festivities were held by the teams either during or after 
the seasons of transplanting and reaping.
No major reason was given for dissatisfaction with the 
team. Mentioned were absenteeism among members, delays in
payment, failure of a scheduled job to push through, and 
poor management by the kabesilya.
6.3 The Hypotheses
It was basically postulated that the degree of 
cooperation within a team depends on the extent of 
transaction costs, the degree of inequality in income/asset 
distribution and the degree of existence of a non— 
calculative atmosphere. This can be expressed in general 
functional form as:
C = f ( X,Y,Z )
where C = degree of cooperation
X = transaction costs
Y = degree of inequality in the distribution of 
income/assets 
Z = degree of non—calculative atmosphere
In the above formulation of the problem, it is assumed 
that causation runs in only one direction, namely that C is 
the dependent variable and X, Y and Z are the independent or 
explanatory variables. It could very well be that causation 
also runs in the opposite direction, i.e. that X, Y and Z 
are the dependent variables and C is the explanatory 
variable. This is palusible if we consider the variables
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which are used to measure C, which will be discussed in the 
next section.
For instance, the longer the average household has been 
a member of the team (one of the measures of the degree of 
cooperation which will be discussed below) it could be 
expected that transaction costs will be lower because of the 
greater degree of familiarity and trust that has grown up 
among member hosueholds. There would also tend to be a 
less calculative atmosphere.
Similarly, the more satisfied the members are with 
their team (another component measure of the dependent 
variable C which will be discussed below) the less 
transaction costs such as bargaining and decision making 
costs, will tend to be and the more probable the presence of 
a non—calculative atmosphere.
A more plansible assumption, therefore, would be that 
cauation runs in both directions at the same time and thus 
estimate a simultaneous equation to test hypotheses. 
However, since the objective is to explain variations of 
cooperation within an agricultural labour team, it seemed 
logical to place C as the dependent variable and X, Y and Z 
as the explanatory variables. Thus we employed only a 
single equation linear regression which gave good results. 
Nevertheless, in their interpretation, the possibility of 
simultaneity of causation has to be kept in mind.
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6.3.1 The Dependent Variable
More specifically, C , the dependent variable, was
postulated to be measured by three component elements. First 
is average income per member household arising from the
team's activities for the wet season. The reason for
limiting observations on income to the wet season is due to 
the fact that most Region 3 teams are inoperative during the 
dry season due to lack of irrigation. Second is the average 
number of years a member household has been in the team 
weighted by team size. Third is the extent of members'
satisfaction with the team, measured by the percent of
favourable response to a question on the subject.
Average income per member household arising from the
team's work is postulated as an index of cooperation within 
the team since, if team members are cooperative,the team 
will be efficient in its work. If the team is efficient, 
more employment will be given it by both farmer members and 
non- members. But if relations among team members are not 
smooth, e.g. they renege on their commitments, are 
dissatisfied with the kabesilya, etc., then the work is 
bound to be inefficiently done, leading to less employment 
and lower income.
It is postulated that the more cooperative the team
is, the longer a household will remain in the team and the 
larger will be the team membership since it will attract
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other households to join. However, while average number of 
years of membership may be high, a team may have remained 
small while the opposite may be true of another team. Thus, 
length of membership in the team is weighted by team size.
A team, while successful, may have remained small
either because of personal preferences of individual members 
for a small team or because of limitations on the part of 
the kabesilya in managing a larger team. Although not 
formally tested, the latter hypothesis is suggested by the 
fact that the largest team in the sample (42
households, 72 transplanters), located in Region 3 had a
kabesilya who had finished some high school and
industriously kept systematic records with the help of his
wife.
A counterindication, however, is given by the largest 
reaping team in Manabo in the 1983 wet season (33
households, 64 reapers) whose kabesilya is illiterate by
the standards of formal schooling. Two other factors, 
though, may have offset this shortcoming: her integrity
(she refused bribes by team members and non—members alike 
to have their fields reaped ahead of the others) and
the fact that another member of the team also female, who 
was a high school graduate, kept records for the group.
While the two preceding elements of cooperation may be 
considered objective indicators, the third, namely, the
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extent of member satisfaction with the team, is a subjective 
indicator based on members' perceptions.
6.3.2 Transaction Costs
Transaction costs were postulated to be indicated by 
team size, by the extent of homogeneity within the team as
expressed by ethnicity and kinship, by whether or not
members were residential and/or field neighbours, by the
educational attainment of the kabesilya, by the manner in 
which the kabesilya was selected, by how well the kabesilya 
perfofrmed his/her functions, by the number of meetings 
held, by the existence of written records and by the number 
of officers.
Team size affects transaction costs. The larger the
team, the greater information, bargaining, decisionmaking, 
and monitoring costs are.
It was postulated that the more ethnically homogeneous
a team was, the lower transaction costs would be. This was
measured by the largest percentage of member households that
belonged to the ethnic group. It was also hypothesised that
the larger the proportion of member households that were
related consanguineally, the lower transaction costs would 
be. An index of this is the average number of households
that a member household was related to, on both
spouses sides.
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Being residential and/or field neighbours reduces 
transaction costs by reducing information and monitoring
costs. This was illustrated in the case studies. Neighbours 
are also, to a certain extent, "known quantities" to each
other. Thus, they are more willing to enter into a joint 
enterprise.
It was also postulated that the existence of a 
decision centre reduced transaction costs. Only one no— 
kabesilya team (as distinguished from an ^  hgic team) could 
be found in the study areas. This means that a team without 
a kabesilya cannot survive for long due to high transaction 
costs.
For those teams with a kabesilya, how well s/he
functioned would determine whether transaction costs were 
high or low. This was measured by the group's rating of the 
kabesilya and by number of years of formal schooling s/he 
attained.
Further, it was postulated that the manner in which 
the kabesilya was chosen would also affect transaction 
costs. If elected by team members, i.e. chosen
democratically, the kabesilya would be more acceptable to 
them, they would readily accept his/her decisions and 
monitoring would not be resented. If the kabesilya were
appointed, transaction costs would rise.
The number of meetings held by a group is ambivalent
as an indicator of transaction costs. Fewer meetings could 
affect the efficiency with which information was 
disseminated and could mean less participation in 
decisionmaking, leading members to renege on commitments. 
On the other hand, fewer meetings could mean that 
transaction costs were low. Team members readily agree and 
keep their part of the bargain. Hence there would be no 
need for more meetings. This seemed to be the case with 
the transplanting teams. Invariably, the team met only 
once during the transplanting season, only occasionally 
meeting more often. Because of this invariance, the number 
of meetings was dropped as an explanatory variable in the 
regressions.
The number of officers was also used as an indicator of 
transaction costs. The greater the number of officers, up 
to a certain point, the lower transaction costs would be 
since this would allow for division of labour in the tasks 
of information collection and dissemination, decisionmaking 
and monitoring of performance.
6.3.3 Distribution of Income and Assets
It was hypothesised that the more unequally income 
and assets were distributed among the member households of 
a team, the less cooperative the team would be because of 
tensions generated by conflicts among members. It was 
assumed that a high degree of inequality would give
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incentives to the wealthier member households to use the 
group to their advantage. In the event of competing claims 
on the team's labour, the wealthier household could use its 
superior income/asset position to swing the group's decision 
in its favour. However, it was also recognized that a 
positive realtion could exist between the unequal 
distribution of income/assets and the income of the team 
since the bigger farmer members provide income for the 
smaller ones.
Measurement of member households' income was limilted 
to value of farm produce and wages from farm work, including 
imputed wages for exchange labour contributed to the group. 
Measurement of assets was limited to the market value of 
farm assets: land, farm implements and draft animals. In
the case of land, the presence of irrigation, location and 
tenure status were taken into consideration. The index of 
inequality of distribution used was the coefficient: of 
variation (c.v.) which is the ratio of the standiard 
deviation of the variable in question to its mean. The 
higher the c.v. is, the more unequal the variable ' s 
distribution.
6.3.4 Atmosphere
It was postulated that the presence of a nton- 
calculative atmosphere moderating the execution oi the 
group's contracts, both among members and between the tteam
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and non-members, contributed to the success of a team. It 
was further postulated that ethnicity, kinship, 
neighbourhood and the kabesilyas management of the team 
determined such as a non—calculative atmosphere. For 
example, being kin would tend to moderate strict compliance 
with the terms of a contract.
6.3.5 Region
The variable Region was added to take into account the 
existence of differences between Region 1 and Region 3, e.g. 
in the level of development. No hypothesis was formulated 
as to the sign of this variable.
6.4 Tests of Hypotheses
The hypotheses discussed in the previous section were 
tested by estimating four equations through multiple 
regression using the method of ordinary least squares (GLS). 
Since there were no a prior beliefs about the nonlinearity 
of the relationship between the dependent variables and the 
independent variables, a linear functional form was first 
employed since this form is the most covenient one to 
handle. A direct examination of the residuals by means of a 
scatter plot for each of the estimating equations did not 
show any curvi1inearity. Thus the linear functional form 
was retained.
The same set of regressors or explanatory variables
236
were utilized in all the four equations which follow 
except for equations (3) and (4) where SIZE is included in 
the dependent variable. The dependent variable, however, is 
different for each equation. The first three equations 
regress separately each indicator of the degree of
cooperation achieved within each team into the explanatory 
variables. The fourth equation linearly combines the
standardised  ^ values of the three indicators into one
dependent variables. The estimating equations are:
(1) EVAL
(2) INC
(3) HHYRS
(4)
} = a + b^SIZE + b2ETHN + b?KIN
+ b^NBHR + b^KEDUC + b^KSELEC
+ byKPER + bgGREC + bgOFF
+ b^oCVINC + bi^CVASS + REGION
} = a + b2ETHN + b^KIN + b^NBHR
+ bsKEDUC + b^KSELEC + byKPER 
+ bgGREC + bcyOFF + b^QCVINC 
+ b^iCVASS + REGION
where EVAL = 
INC
index of members' evaluation of the team 
average income per member household from the 
team's activity for the wet season 
HHRYRS = (number of households in the team) X (average 
number of years in the team per household)
The standardised value of a variable is Z =
where Z = standardised value of X, X = variable, mean,
and = standard deviation.
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c = index of degree of cooperation
a = constant
= coefficients (i = 1,2......... 11)
SIZE = team size 
ETHN = ethnicity 
KIN = kinship
NBHR = residential and field neighrbourhood 
KEDUC = education of the kabesilya
KSELËC = process of selecting the kabesilya
KPER = the team's evaluation of the kabesilya's 
performance 
GREC = existence of team records
CVINC = coefficient of variation of per capita
income
CVASS = coefficent of variation of per capita
assets
REGION = Region 1 ; Region 3
Dummy variables were used for the manner of selecting 
the kabesilya, the existence of group records and region. If 
the kabesilya were chosen by the team members, a value of 
one would be entered in the regression; if self-appointed or 
appointed by others, a value of zero was entered. For the 
existence of records, a value of one was entered if there 
were group records, and a value of zero if there were none. 
For region, a value of one was entered if teams were located 
in Region 1, and a value of zero if located in Region 3.
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In order to take account of the possibility of 
interaction among the explanatory variables, new variables 
were created out of combinations of some of the explanatory 
variables- The dependent variables were then regressed on 
the explanatory variables plus the interaction variables. 
For instance, the education of the kabesilya, the existence 
of group records, the number of officers and how well the 
kabesilya functioned can interact together in affecting the 
degree of cooperation or success achieved by the team.
The explanatory variables were entered stepwise into 
the regression equations using both the standard regression 
method and the hierarchical method (Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences, 1975, pp.336—339). In the standard 
regression method, each variable was treated as if it had 
been added to the regression equation in a separate step 
after all other variables had been included. In the 
hierar^chical method, variables were added to the regression 
equation in a predetermined order. For example, aside 
from directly accounting for variability in the dependent 
variable, the degree of kinship can affect the degree of 
cooperation in the team through its effect on the 
distribution of income/assets. It was postulated that a 
poorer member household would be financially assisted by 
other members who are its kin, thus lessening the disparity 
in income/assets and reducing possible tensions within the 
team. The more that member households are related to other
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members by blood, the lower would be the coefficient of 
variation of income/assets. Thus kinship is entered into 
the equation ahead of the c.v. of income/assets.
Initial results indicated that only the variable on
ethnicity was consistently not statistically discernible at
the 10% error level and had the wrong sign in all four 
2
regressions. Other variables which also exhibited these 
two characteristics in individual regression were
dropped from those equations. Team size was excluded from 
equations (3) and (4) since it is part of the dependent 
variables HHYRS and C .
The c.v. of income (CVINC) was highly positively 
correlated with that of assets (CVASS). Of the two, the 
inclusion of CVINC in the regressions gave better results 
and was therefore used while CVASS was dropped.
All the coefficients of the interaction variables were 
statistically not discernible and so were also dropped.
6 .5 Regression Results
The regression results are presented in Table 6—1.
2
Statistical discernibi1ity or significance at the 10% 
error level means that there is a 10% probability that a 
variable does not really explain the variation in 
cooperation. The 10% level was chosen as the cut-off point 
for statistical discernibility because of the small sample 
size which increases sampling error and because of strong a 
priori beliefs about the regressors. A bigger sample would 
verify the discernibi1ity of the regressors at a lower 
error level.
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DEPENDENT
VABIABIE
Table 6-1
Regression Results: Cooperative Behaviour Model
2 - 2
CONSTANT SIZE KIN KEDUC KSELEC KPER GREC OFF CVINC REGION R R F
1. EWL 18.686 -8.312* 8.4% 3.835 8.928 2.469 -14.193* -8.244 . 5 %  .468 3.949*
(8.198) (8.878) ( 3.442) . ( 8.466) (3.993) (4.258) (4.497)
2. INC -1,287.97 -7.144® 26.542* 18.498* 89.933 15.5411® 121.718* 111.288 -318.% 1 *  .538 .376 2.766
(3.541) (19.182) (12.782) (72.637) (8.995) (74.584) (98.913) (76.78)
3. C -14.968 8.831 8.861 8.117 1.897* 8.164® -1.857® 1.414 .552 .429 3.528*
(8.198) (8.163) (8.118) ( 8.662) ( 8.883) (8.755) (8.6%)
* Significant at the 1.6% level.
6 Significant at the 5.8% level.
* Significant at the 18.0% level.
NJ'
Data entries for each team are given in Appendix 2. The 
regression of the average number of years a household was 
with a team, weighted by the team size (HHYRS), gave poor 
results and was not included.
2
The multiple coefficients of determination (R ) of the
three regressions indicate that half or more of the
variations in the indices of cooperation was accounted for by
eight regressors, the particular regressor depending on the
2 —2equation. The corrected R , or R , are relatively high, 
given that only a small sample was used.
Given the small sample size, these results compare
favorably with those obtained by Osuntogun (1972) who
attempted to identify the factors affecting the success of
Western Nigerian cocoa marketing cooperatives. He reported 
2
an R of 0.40 for a regression based on a cross section study
of 45 cooperatives, using 14—year averages (p. 306). No
-2
figure was given for R .
The F—tests for all three regressions are statistically 
discernible at the 5% level or less, which means that, taken 
together, there is a probability of 95% or more that the 
regressors do affect the dependent variables as hypothesised.
3 2R is corrected for the possible inclusion of 
irrelevant explanatory variables or variables which do not 
really have any effect on the dependent variable but whose 
coefficient is nonzero because some small part of its 
fluctuation, by sheer coincidence, coincides with the 
fluctuation in the dependent variable.
24:
Among the eleven postulated variables explanatory of 
the degree of cooperation achieved in a team, eight were 
shown to be statistically discernible at the 10% level or 
less in at least one equation. These are team size, kinship, 
education of the kabesilya, manner of selecting the 
kabesilya, the kabesilyas' performance, the number of 
officers, the distribution of income and region. Although 
these regressors are marked as being discernible at the 10% 
error level in Table 6—1, some are actually discernible at a 
lower error level but still above the traditional 5% cut-off 
point- An example of this is SIZE in equation (1) which was 
discernible at the 5.8% error level. The same can be said 
for those regressors at the 5% and 1% error level noted in 
Table 6— 1.^
The statistical discernibi1ity of the variable CVINC at 
the 1% and 5% levels in two equations goes counter to the 
findings of the case studies that the unequal distribution 
of assets did not adversely affect cooperation in the two 
labour teams because this appeared to be mitigated by 
kinship and friendship. The use of the hierarchical method 
explained previously, where variables are entered into the
4
Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1979) discuss the
difficulties of arbitrarily selecting an error level or cut
off point- They suggest using the observed level of
discernibi1ity of a regressor or its "prob—value" which is 
"an excellent way to summarize what the data says about the
credibilitv of Hq  [the hypothesis that the regressor has no
relation whatever with the dependent variable]" (p.91)
24:
equations in a predetermined order also showed poor
results. In this method, KIN and NBHR (which can be 
regarded as a proxy for friendship) were entered ahead of 
CVINC/CVASS because they were postulated to mediate the 
effects of the latter on the degree of cooperation.
Under the standard regression method, the variable KIN 
was discernible at the 10% level in only one equation and
the variable NBHR was not discernible at the 10% level in
any equation. Both also showed the wrong sign in one
equation each. These results indicate that these variables 
in general did not affect cooperation within the team as 
strongly as the other variables. They would therefore not 
have as much of a mitigating effect on CVINC as would be 
indicated by the results of the case studies.
Although individual regressors in a particular equation 
may not be statistically discernible at the 10% 
level or less, they have the correct signs. Because they 
provide confirmation, though weak, to strong a priori 
beliefs, it was decided to retain them. For instance, with 
respect to NBHR which was statistically indiscernible at the 
10% level, it was postulated that the greater the number of 
neighbours per member household, the greater the degree of 
cooperation. This translates into a positive coefficient 
since the hypothesis is that the two variables move in the 
same direction. Since the regressor NBHR had positive 
coefficients and since it is reasonable to suppose that the
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extent of neighbourhood among team members does affect the 
degree of cooperation, it was retained in equations (1) and 
(3). However, it was dropped from equation (2) where initial 
results showed a negative and indiscernible coefficient.
The numbers displayed under each variable heading are 
the coefficients of those variables, measuring the amount of 
change in the dependent variable for a given unit change in 
the explanatory variable, keeping all other variables 
constant. Thus, in equation (2), for an increase (decrease) 
of one in the number of team members, average income per 
member household decreased (increased) by P 7.144. The 
numbers displayed under each coefficient constitute its 
standard error.
The above results, however, while generally confirming 
the hypotheses put forward, have to be qualified. 
In the first place, the dependent variable that is being 
measured is the degree of cooperation, which is not easily 
quantifiable. Thus the question of whether the correct 
indices of cooperation have been chosen arises. This is 
always a difficulty that confronts those who are trying 
to measure the factors that account for the success or 
failure of cooperatives.
In particular, the variable HHYRS by itself does not
appear to have been an appropriate measure of cooperation as
-2
seen from the fact that R was quite low and the F—statistic
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was not discernible at the 10% level even if the same
regressors were used on EVAL and INC, two other measures of 
cooperation, with resulting statistical significance of the 
overall relationship between dependent variable and
regressors.
The variation in HHYRS among the teams surveyed is 
probably due to factors other than those postulated. An 
example is the reduction in the size of one team in San
Ramon due to the creation of a new team in an adjacent
neighborhood, which in turn was the result of the influx of 
refugees from a nearby municipality where there was 
increased rebel activity. The creation of the team drew 
members from the older team. Thus the reduced size of the 
team was not necessarily due to lack of cooperation among 
team members.
However, the three dependent variables of EVAL, INC, 
and HHYRS, when standardised and combined, gave good 
results. The challenge for future research would be to 
come up with variables which would more accurately measure 
cooperation.
A second caveat is the fact that the regression 
results were based on data generated for only one cropping 
season. The dangers of this limitation are brought out 
clearly in the example cited above of the reduction in the 
size of one team due to the creation of a new team in the
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next cropping season. The reality is much more dynamic than 
the results of one survey in one point of time would lead us 
to believe. Thus, an inter-temporal study, i.e. a time 
series study, of the same 28 teams would give a clearer 
picture of the situation and lead to a more accurate 
assesment of the factors that affect the degree of 
cooperation.
A third caveat in the application of the empirical 
results presented here would be the fact that only a small 
sample of transplanting teams was surveyed. A bigger sample 
covering a wider geographical area would provide better 
grounds for generalization.
A fourth caveat is the problem of incomplete 
specification of regressors, also known as the problem of 
omitted variables. Some candidates for omitted variables 
are (1) farm fertility; (2) transplanting skills; (3) age 
of transplanters; (4) sex of transplanters, and (5)
kinship between the team and non-member farmers who hired 
the team. These were not specified but could very well 
have affected the results.
For example, differences in farm fertility of the 
fields transplanted could have led to differences in INC, 
which would lessen its usefulness as a measure of 
cooperation. In this particular study, however, the teams 
were paid on the basis of hours worked or area transplanted,
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and not on the basis of expected yield, which would be 
affected by soil fertility.
Differences in transplanting skills, in the age and 
sex of transplanters could indeed affect the way the team 
memebers assessed their team. However, field observations 
indicated that these differences were randomly distributed 
among the various teams and there did not appear to be any 
systematic distribution of such variables. That there might 
soon be a systematic distribution of skills and age of 
transplanters "was indicated by the existence of a team of 
four young men in San Ramon who banded together and hired 
themselves out at area rates, based on their claim that they 
could transplant the same area as a larger team, but in a 
shorter time. For farmers who were concerned with timely 
delivery of transplanting services, this was an attractive 
proposition.
A factor which probably affects the income of a team 
but which was not included in the regressions is kinship 
between the team and non-member farmers who hired the team. 
In Region 1, close to one half of hired transplanters were 
related to the host farmer, either by blood or marriage. 
(See Table 4—7.) Among the hired groups would be kabesilya— 
led teams.
In one barangay in Region 3 which was included in the 
survey, the kabesilya of one of the transplanting teams was
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a godson of a large landowner who invariably hired the team 
to transplant his fields. The existence of such 
relationships could explain the differences in incomes 
among teams. However, it stands to reason that the 
godfather would not hire his godson's team if they did a 
poor job. Inefficiency in turn, would be determined by the 
degree of cooperation among team members.
Finally, attention should be drawn to the existence of 
errors of measurement which would explain, in part, the 
existence of statistically insignificant individual 
regressors. Such errors can be minimised in future research 
by more extensive and more careful participant observation, 
a better designed interview schedule, and better trained 
interviewers.
6.6 Conclusions
As indicated at the start of this chapter, the four 
variables of indivisibility, elasticity of substitution, 
economies and timeliness could not be treated for. What 
were tested were the factors of transaction costs, 
distribution of income/assets, and atmosphere.
Transaction costs were hypothesised to be a function of 
several characteristics of each team such as degree of 
kinship among members. The more these characteristics were 
present in a team (except for team size), the lower
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transaction costs would be among members, and the greater 
the degree of cooperation. Atmosphere was also postulated 
to be a function of some of the same characteristics and to 
move in the same direction as these characteristics.
The distribution of income/assets was measured by the 
c.v. of income/assets. Since the two were highly correlated 
and since the use of the c.v. of income gave better 
statistical results, it alone was entered into the 
regressions. In general, the hypothesis was that the degree 
of cooperation in a team and CVINC would move in opposite 
directions. However, it was also recognized that average 
incomes of team members could move in the same direction as 
CVINC. This was verified in equation (2).
Among the seven variables indicated as discernible by 
the sample, the most likely to affect cooperation is the 
kabesilya's leadership/management abilities as indicated by 
his performance, since it was discernible at the 5% levelof 
all three regressions. This does not mean that it would have 
a greater impact than other variables as indicated by the 
magnitude of their relative coefficients but that it was 
more likely to have an effect than the other variables.
The second factor that is most likely to affect 
cooperation is income distribution. It was statistically 
discernible at the 1% and 5% levels in two equations, 
including equation (3). The third most likely factor is
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team size, followed by the manner of selecting the 
kabesilya, and lastly kinship, education of the kabesilya 
and the number of officers, each of the last three having 
an equal likelihood of determining cooperation in the 
transplanting teams.
Region, a highly discernible variable, was utilized to 
express differences between Regions 1 and 3. The negative 
coefficient of this variable should not be interpreted to 
mean that households in Region 1 were generally less 
cooperative than those in Region 3. However, it can be 
interpreted to mean that differences in such factors as 
incomes, farm sizes, etc- due to geographic location 
accounted for differences in the degree of cooperation 
achieved.
Finally, the results of the regression can be improved 
with (1) better indices which more accurately measure the 
degree of cooperation achieved in a group; (2) a time series 
analysis in combination with cross-section analysis; 
(3) a larger sample; (4) a more complete specification of 
independent variables, and (5) a minimisation of measurement 
errors.
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CHAPTER 7 : SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Summary of Research Results
The objective of this study has been to investigate 
the factors that affect cooperation among small farmers in 
the rural areas of a developing country. Cooperation was 
defined as encompassing both market transactions and 
internal organization. In a market transaction, an 
individual cooperates with another to achieve a common goal, 
namely the satisfaction of needs and wants in general. But 
the particular need or want for each individual is 
different. We have called this cooperation in the broad 
sense in order to distinguish it from cooperation in the 
narrow sense where two individuals engage in joint efforts 
(collective action) to satisfy the same particular need or 
want.
In the light of the above distinction, an individual, 
who has a particular need or want in common with others, has 
basically two choices open to him: to act alone (individual 
action) or to cooperate with others in the narrow sense of 
cooperation (collective action). If he chooses individual 
action, there are two further possibilities: "pure"
individual action, or cooperation in the broad sense, i.e. 
market transaction. Within a market transaction, 
cooperative and non-cooperative strategies are possible.
If an individual chooses collective action there are
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also cooperative and non-cooperative strategies that are 
open to him. The Prisoner's Dilemma situation can occur in 
both a market transaction and in collective action.
This study of cooperation among small farmers in a 
developing country focuses on the performance of farm tasks, 
where the farmer has a choice between individual action and 
collective action, and among cooperative and non-cooperative 
strategies within collective action. A review of relevant 
but diverse literature has suggested a number of factors 
which affect both choices, namely (1) the existence of
indivisibilities in inputs and/or processes; (2) the 
elasticity of substitution between inputs; (3) the existence 
of economies; (4) transaction costs; (5) the distribution of 
income/assets among potential or actual co-operators, (6)
the degree to which a non-calculative atmosphere governs the 
relationships among co-operators and (7) timeliness in the
execution of the farm task. The first six factors also
determine cooperation in non—agricultural situations, 
whether singly or together.
The focus of field research was on indigenous forms of 
cooperation in rural villages or baranoavs in North Luzon 
(Region 1) and Central Luzon (Region 3) in the Philippines. 
After extensive probing, it was discovered that the most 
widespread and most frequently recurring form of cooperation 
among rural households was in the performance of certain 
tasks in palav (paddy) farming. These farm tasks were
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transplanting and reaping.
In the two case study villages, farm households have a 
choice between family labour, hired labour and cooperative 
labour in the performance of farm tasks. A sample survey of 
sixty four farmers in the municipality of Manabo, which 
included both members and non—members of cooperative labour 
groups, showed that, on the individual household level, 
household labour supply and budgetary constraints were the 
main considerations in choosing between hired and 
cooperative labour for transplanting. These were followed 
by considerations of atmosphere, the existence of economies 
timeliness in the execution of farm tasks, and transaction 
costs.
Twenty three kabesilya of cooperative labour groups in 
Manabo were also interviewed as to the reasons for the 
existence of their teams. The major consideration was 
transaction costs, followed by budgetary constraints and the 
economies achieved by teamwork.
A study was made of transplanting teams in which 
approximately 19.5 households on the average, both farmers 
and landless labourers, would pool labour, providing as 
many as 45.1 workers.
These labour teams had been in existence for 9 years 
on the average, with the tradition of setting up such teams 
going back many more years. The teams were seen by members
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as an expression of the cooperative spirit generically known 
as bayanihan, but variously called suvuan or ammovo 
depending on the region. They existed solely for the 
performance of these farm tasks and did not extend to other 
farm tasks or non—farm tasks or welfare services. 
However, a number of team members joined teams for other 
farm tasks such as land preparation and weeding.
The teams engaged in exchange labour among members and 
in hiring out to non—members for wage compensation. Among 
members, there was a very clear ratio between inputs and 
rewards. In North Luzon, labour given was compensated for 
by equal amounts of labour either in units of time for 
transplanting, or in units of palay reaped for reaping. Any 
member could hire out the group's labour to a non-member 
and he would keep the wage payment for himself. In Central 
Luzon, where such teams existed largely for transplanting, 
equal amounts of labour were also exchanged among members. 
Wages received as compensation from non—members were equally 
divided among team members. In both North and Central 
Luzon, any imbalance in exchange between members in the 
course of the transplanting or harvesting season was 
rectified at the end of the season by payments in cash or 
in kind.
In organizational form, the teams were what Williamson 
terms "simple hierarchies", with only one officer (the 
kabesilvas) making most of the day-to-day decisions for the
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group. Some teams had one other officer who could record 
the presence of members during a work period and their
output- A team meeting would be held at least once during 
the transplanting or harvesting season where important 
matters such as wages would be discussed and decided upon.
The role and compensation of the kabesilya differed 
between the two regions. In North Luzon, the kabesilya did 
not look for employers of the group's labour while in 
Central Luzon, the kabesilya undertook this task, 
receiving the wages given and paying individual members in 
turn. In North Luzon, the kabesilya received no
compensation for her office, while the kabesilya in Central 
Luzon charged each member a membership fee and each non- 
member who employed the team a commission. Kabesilya in
North Luzon were predominantly female, while in Central 
Luzon they were predominantly male.
The farm tasks in which the teams engaged were also 
relatively simple. In transplanting, the teams only did the 
actual transplanting and not the pulling up of seedlings, 
which requires greater skill and was usually reserved for 
persons hired for the purpose. In harvesting, the teams 
(mostly in North Luzon) were limited to the cutting of the
paddy stalks and their bundling. Thus, these task required 
a minimal degree of division of labour.
Another feature of these farm tasks was that no farm
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machinery was involved, only labour. Field supervision by 
the kabesilva and record keeping were quite simple and 
straight forward.
In sum, the groups were relatively small, engaged in 
uncomplicated farm tasks and required simple organizational 
forms.
The review of the literature suggests variables which 
may help to interpret co-operative labour groups by taking 
account of data which cannot be explained by the analysis of
household conditions alone. A pool of hired labour is
engaged by j u s t . one individual or household and for a
specific period of time. But a pool of co—operative labour
is responsible to its own members and does not cease to 
exist after completing a given task; rather, it continues 
until all the members' claims upon it have been satisfied.
Because of this, mechanisms must be established to settle
conflicting claims and in general to manage the pool.
Hence, the same variables which have been used to explain, 
for instance, collective property rights over assets such as
land can also be used to explain collective property rights
over labour.
Regarding the verification of the seven hypothetical 
variables which affect agricultural cooperation, the focus 
was on the agricultural work teams. No control group of 
non—member households in either case study villages was
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studied because it was felt that the results of the sample 
survey of six four farm households in Manabo, which included 
non—members, gave a good picture of the reasons for the 
choice between hired labour (individual action) and 
cooperative labour (collective action) in transplanting. 
Given resource constraints, and the fact that very liitle 
was known about these agricultural work teams, the latter 
were studied in depth- In the course of investigating them, 
the hypothetical variables would also be verified or denied.
Moreover, participant observation indicated that a good 
number of households in both case study villages were 
members of at least one agricultural work team. Selecting a 
random sample of households who were not members of any team 
would have been difficult, given resource contraints. 
However, the results of the case studies can be improved 
with the inclusion of a control group of non—member
households in each case study village.
Nevertheless, even with the inclusion of control 
groups of non—members, the dichotomy between hired and
cooperative labour for farm tasks is broken by the fact that 
the agricultural work team hires out its labour to non- 
members, resulting in the fact that non—members can enjoy 
some of the benefits of team membership. Still, the case 
studies can contribute towards understanding the
determinants of cooperation among farmers.
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7.1.1 Results of the Case Studies
The results of the two case studies showed that, in the 
transplanting and reaping of paddy, indivisibilities did not 
exist and so were not relevant in determining the choice 
between individual action and group action. However, it was 
evident in the barangays where the case studies were
conducted, that indivisibilities in physical assets such as 
dams, tunnels, cannais and large electric pumps played a 
large role in the formation of irrigators' associations in 
order to carry out the task of irrigation.
While indivisibilities were not a relevant factor in 
the formation of the labour teams, timeliness in the 
execution of transplanting and reaping was, due to the 
biological nature of an agricultural crop such as rice.
Any delay in the transplanting of rice seedlings after 
they have reached a certain age, or any delay in the 
harvesting of rice after the grain has attained a
certain level of maturity, would result in a loss in 
output. Hence, it is to the interest of the farmer to 
complete these operations in a relatively short time. Thus, 
the need for a pool of labour. Membership in a
transplanting or a reaping team assured him of an adequate 
and timely supply of labour.
With respect to the elasticity of substitution, this 
was verified in the case studies as a factor affecting the
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choice between cooperation and individual action- This was 
demonstrated by the fact that the labour teams 
existed largely in the tasks of transplanting and 
reaping where elasticity of substitution between machinery 
and labour are zero- On the other hand in the tasks of land 
preparation and weeding, where elasticity of substitution 
among inputs are positive, labour teams existed to a lesser 
extent-
With respect to economies, the case studies indicated 
that team labour was more efficient than family labour for 
reaping in Region 1, and more efficient than 3^ hoc team 
labour for transplanting for Region 3- The greater 
efficiency of team labour was the result of both physical 
and psychological factors-
□n the physical side, the scale of reaping or 
transplanting was increased for each household because the 
formation of the team meant pooling their labour and their 
land- This resulted in a certain amount of specialization 
such as the creation of the position of kabesilva who was 
better at supervising the team than any other member- In 
addition, in Region 1, it was the choice of the more capable 
young men to be bundlers. In both, the large scale reaping 
and transplanting honed team members in these skills more 
than non—members would be, making the former more efficient 
in these tasks.
On the psychological side, associational gains were
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made possible. This meant increased effort levels as a 
result of natural competition among team members and the 
desire to be regarded as a diligent and industrious worker.
Apart from greater work efficiency, team membership 
also reduced job search costs for each member household 
since it was the kabesilva (in the case of Region 3 teams) 
who looked for employment for the team.
As to the remaining variables, their validity as 
constraints were verified by the case studies and by the 
results of the sample survey. In particular, with respect 
to transaction costs, these were hypothesised in the 
context of the labour teams to be a function of team size, 
ethnicity, kinship, neighbourhood, the kabesilva's level of 
education, the manner in which s/he was selected, his/her 
performance, the number of officers, and the existence of 
written records. Atmosphere was also hypothesised to be 
functions of ethnicity, kinship, neighbourhood and the 
performance of the kabesilva.
The survey of sixty four farmers in Manabo indicated 
that both those who joined cooperative labour groups and 
those who hired labour for transplanting, relied chiefly on 
family, kin, and neighbours, both residential and farm. 
However, a larger proportion of hired labour than of 
cooperative labour did not fall into these categories, 
suggesting that transaction costs for hired labour are 
greater than those of cooperative labour and also suggesting
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a difference in atmosphere in the two arrangements.
In fact it was observed that in San Ramon, members of 
hired work groups worked in separate parts of the field 
unlike the cooperative labour teams whose members worked 
together. This difference could be due to the fact that a 
number of hired transplanters were neither family, kin or 
neighbour to the host farmers and were not as well 
acquainted with the rest of the work group.
In the case studies, the kabesilva's level of 
education did not seem to matter since both kabesilva 
achieved only an elementray level of education and yet the 
team had been continuing in existence for a number of years, 
with few defections. Whether s/he was chosen by the group 
or was self-appointed or appointed by someone else also did 
not seem to matter.
In the case of the Nagpandayan transplanting team, 
residential neighbourhood was less significant since member 
households were spread out over a wide area. Since this same 
team was the larger of the two case study teams, and since 
the smaller team had a higher average number of neighbours 
per member, the indication is that the latter and team size 
are negatively correlated. This is borne out by the sample 
survey results which show a simple correlation coefficient 
(r) of = —0.225 between the two in the correlation matrix.
The fact that only one team (which engaged in both
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transplanting and harvesting) was discovered in the research 
area which did not have a kabesilya indicates that 
transaction costs in no—kabesilya teams are high; otherwise, 
there would be more of them- In teams which have 
kabesilyas, his good performance means that his decisions 
will be readily accepted by the group and his monitoring 
will not be resented- This was also verified by the case 
studies-
The case studies also indicated that most members 
belonged to one ethnic group- However, with respect to 
kinship, it was evident that this was also negatively 
correlated with team size, i-e- degree of kinship among 
members diminished as team size increased- In the smaller 
group, nine households or half of the members comprised the 
dominant kin group- In the bigger group, twelve households 
or 30.8% of the members, made up the biggest kin group- 
This correlation was verified by the result of the sample 
survey which showed a negative correlation coefficient (r) 
of -0-127-
The case studies also revealed a high degree of 
inequality in the distribution of income and assets- 
Despite this, however, there was no attempt on the part of 
the wealthier members to dominate the team in terms of 
preference in the schedule of work and in other matters. 
Other factors such as kinship may have counter balanced any 
tendency towards dominance on the part of the wealthier
263
members. However, in a second, larger team in San Ramon, 
weathier members tried to bribe the kabesilya to have their 
fields transplanted ahead of the others- A third reaping 
team also experienced a dispute between bigger and smaller 
farmers regarding output quotas with the former wanting 
larger quotas so as to complete the task on their farms and 
avoid having to hire labour which would be more difficult to 
secure since the reaping season would be progress. The 
smaller farmers wanted to manintain the smaller quota of ten 
bundles per worker since this would suffice to complete the 
task on their fields .
Finally, there were indications that agreements among 
team members were moderated by a not—too—rigorous 
enforcement as expressed, for example, in the kabesilya's 
handling of the team and of team members assisting another 
member complete a bundle as in the case of the reaping team 
in Region 1.
7.1.2 Results of the Survey of Cooperative Labour Teams
In the analysis of the results of the sample survey 
of twenty eight cooperative labour teams, only the 
significance of the three factors of transaction costs, 
distribution of assets and atmosphere were tested, for 
reasons given in Section 6.1. Four regression equations 
were employed.
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Once more, transaction costs and atmosphere were 
measured by the indicators mentioned above, namely, 
ethnicity, kinship, etc. Taken together, all these 
indicators plus the distribution of income/assets and 
region, explained a significant proprotion of the variation 
in the dependent variables, i.e. the degree of cooperation 
achieved by the team. Eight out of eleven individual 
regressors were statistically discernible at the 10% error 
level or less in at least one equation and had the correct 
signs (see Table 6— 1). These were team size, kinship, 
education of the kabesilya, manner of selecting the 
kabesilya, the kabesilya's performance, the number of 
officers, the distribution of income and region.
Excluding region, the most likely variable to affect 
cooperation within labour teams is the kabesilya's 
leadership and management abilities, since this variable 
was the most discernible. The second factor most likely to 
affect the viability of a team is distribution of income 
among the members. This finding is different from the 
results of the case studies, indicating that kinship and 
neighborhood were not significant in mediating the effects 
of inequality in income and asset distribution in the labour 
teams in general.
A third factor most likely to affect cooperation is 
team size, followed by the manner of selecting the 
kabesilya. Lastly, kinship, education of the kabesilya and
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the number of officers also have an effect on cooperation, 
with each of them having an equal likelihood.
These results confirm that transaction costs, income 
distribution and atmosphere, as postulated, are relevant in 
determining the degree of cooperation within a cooperative 
labour team.
However, the result of the sample survey of twenty- 
eight agricultural work teams should be treated with caution 
due to the fact that only a small sample size was used and 
for one cropping season only. There is also the problem of 
more accurately measuring the dependent variable 
cooperation. It is also possible that some explanatory 
variables were omitted which should have been included, such 
as kinship between members of the team and non—members who 
hired the team. Finally, errors of measurement of variables 
have to be considered.
Since we are interested in the factors that affect 
cooperation, the latter was made the dependent variable and 
causality was assumed to be unidirectorial. However, it is 
likely that causality runs in both directions at the same 
time. Use of a simultaneous system of equations could 
improve the results.
7.2 Conclusions
In chapter two, attention was called to the distinction
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made between a Prisoner's Dilemma and an assurance game. In 
the former, the payoff to non-cooperation is greater than 
the payoff to cooperation. It is the reverse in an 
assurance game. It was also suggested that the way to 
achieve a cooperative outcome in a Prisoner's Dilemma 
situation was through altruism and trust. Since, in many 
situations, the achievement of cooperation would result in a 
positive sum game, it would be desirable to know what 
factors bring altruism and trust about. But this is a study 
for which disciplines other than economics are better 
equipped to undertake.
Nevertheless, the science of economics can still
contribute toward understanding how cooperation can come 
about. It can do this by identifying the factors which 
affect the payoffs, i.e. the costs and benefits, of
cooperation and of non—cooperation and by extension, between 
individual and collective action-
The research undertaken has tried to identify the 
factors which affect cooperation in an attempt to isolate 
those variables which promote cooperation among small
farmers in a developing economy. These determinants have 
been discussed in various contexts, e.g. the nature of the 
firm, property rights, etc., but never explicitly to
analyse cooperative behaviour, which is a topic of interest 
in itself. Where it has been analysed as such, as in 
Olson's work, the determinants of such behaviour have not
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been discussed, except for group size, which affects 
transaction costs.
A decision tree was drawn up where the individual (1) 
chooses between individual action and cooperation, i.e. 
collective action and (2) within collective action, he 
chooses among various strategies of non—cooperation and 
cooperation, ranging from individualistic behaviour, which 
would include free riding, to consummate cooperation. It 
was postulated that the choices would be affected by the 
costs and benefits of alternatives and that these costs and 
benefits in turn are determined by certain factors.
The research results presented here confirm that the 
variables which were postulated at the start do indeed 
affect the choice between cooperation and individual action 
and thus explain the existence of agricultural work teams 
and the extent of cooperation that exists within these 
teams. The exception is the factor of indivisibilities
which were shown not to be existent in the case studies- 
However, this result cannot be interpreted to mean that it 
is not a relevant factor in other situations, such as those 
mentioned in the literature reviewed in Chapter Two and in 
other farm tasks. It was stated earlier that one or all of 
the postulated variables affect cooperation, depending on 
the particular situation being studied.
The determinants of the costs and benefits of 
collective action/cooperation and the direction of their
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effects are briefly discussed in the following paragraphs 
and summarised in Table 7—1.
The first four factors affect only the choice between 
individual and collective action and only as necessary but 
not sufficient conditions for collective action- Thus, if 
it is stated, as it is in Table 7— 1, that the existence of 
indivisibilities tends toward the choice of collective 
action, this is to be interpreted to mean that this is so 
only insofar as it is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for such action-
The last three factors affect the choice between 
cooperative and non-cooperative strategies within.a group as 
well. To indicate this, the terms "collective
action/cooperation" and "individual action/non—cooperation 
are used in the Table. It is postulated that six of the 
seven variables, i.e. timeliness in the execution of farm 
tasks excluded, apply to both agricultural and non— 
agricultural situations. It could very well be that 
timeliness in task execution applies to non—agricultural 
situations as well but we do not have data in our processing 
to verify this.
If there is an indivisibility existing in an input or 
process the costs to the individual of undertaking alone a 
venture which involves such an input or process is likely to 
be high. If there is no indivisibility, then in all
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likelihood, the costs of individual action are low and there 
is a tendency toward such action and not toward collective 
action. Thus, in ventures marked by the presence of 
indivisibilities, cooperation tends to take place.
If timeliness is necessary in the execution of a 
farm task, then costs of individual action are high, leading 
toward collective action. If it is not necessary, then the 
costs of individual action are low and will thus be favored.
Regarding the elasticity of substitution ( ^  ) among 
inputs , if a particular production process is 
labour— intensive to begin with, a low sigma ( ^  < 1 ) 
would indicate a high payoff to cooperation and it will 
tend to be favoured. Symmetrically, if a production 
process is capital-intensive to begin with, a low sigma 
would mean that the payoff to collective action is low 
leading to the choice of individual action. Individual 
action here is synonymous with the substitution of 
machinery for labour, which means that the individual has 
less need of others to carry on some activity. In the case 
of a labour— intensive process, if it is difficult to 
substitute machinery for labour, i.e. sigma is low, then 
the cost of collective action is relatively low.
Where sigma is high id > 1) and an activity is 
labour— intensive to start with, the payoff to cooperation 
will tend to be low and there will be a tendency toward 
individual action if the cost of capital falls or the cost
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of labour increases. On the other hand, where sigma is 
high but the activity is capital-intensive to begin with, 
the payoff to collective action will be on the high side 
and there will be a tendency to favour it if the wages of 
labour fall or the cost of capital rises.
If economies are present in group work, then the 
benefit—cost ratio of collective action will tend to be high 
and thus it will be favoured over individual action. If 
they are absent from group activity, then the benefit—cost
ratio of collective action will tend to be low and the
opposite choice will be made.
If transaction costs of group work are low relative 
to individual action, then the benefit—cost ratio of 
collective action is high and it will be favoured. If
transaction costs of such group activity are high, then the 
benefit—cost ratio of collective action will be low and 
there will be a tendency to choose individual action. 
Within a group, high transaction costs will encourage non- 
cooperation whereas low transactions will encourage 
cooperation.
A more or less equal distribution of assets or income
among potential members of a group will keep the benefit-
cost ratio of collective action on the high side, leading 
to its selection whereas an unequal distribution will reduce 
the ratio resulting in individual action. Within an
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Table 7-1
Effects of Determinants on Benefits and Costs of 
Cooperation with the Resultant Tendencies
D E T E R M  I r^ lATTTS B/C T E N D E N C Y
1. I n d i v i s i b i l i t i e s
Ex i s t i n g  
Nkiri-Existing
2. T i m e l i n e s s  of
Task E x e c u t i o n
Ex i s t i n g  
N o t i- E x i s t i n g
3. E l a s t i c i t y  of
S u b s t i t u t i o n
< 1 : l a b o u r - i n t e n s i v e  
: c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e  
> 1 : 1 aboLir-in t e n s i v e  
; c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e
4. E c o n o m i e s
P r e s e n t
Ab s e n t
C o l l e c t i v e  A c ti on  
Individual A c ti on
C o l l e c t i v e  A c ti on  
Individual A c ti on
C o l l e c t i v e  A c ti on  
Individual A c ti on  
Individual A c ti on  
C o l l e c t i v e  A c t i m
C o l l e c t i v e  Acti on 
Individual Ac::tion
existing groups, an equitable distribution of income/assets 
will encourage cooperation and an unequitable distribution 
will foster individualistic behaviour.
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Table 7—1 Con't.
E f f e c t s  o f  D e t e r m i n a n t s  o n  B e n e f i t s  a n d  C o s t s  o f
C o o p e r a t i o n w i t h  t h e  R e s u l t a n t  T e n d e n c i e s
D t  1 hHMIhJAIMTS B / C  TETvlDENCY
5. T r a n s a c t i o n  C o s t s
H i g h ^  Individual Act i o n /  
N o n - c o o p e r a t i o n
L o w A C o l l e c t i v e  Acti on/ 
C o o p e r a t i o n
6. D i s t r i b u t i o n  of 
Inc o m e / A s s e t s
Equal f C o l l e c t i v e  A cti on/ 
C o o p e r a t i o n
Uhequal ^  Individual A cti on/ 
N o n - c o o p e r a t i o n
7. A t m o s p h e r e
R igi d ^  Individual A cti on/ 
N o n - c o o p e r a t i o n
F l e x i b l e  ^ C o l l e c t i v e  Act i o n /  
C o o p e r a t i o n
A  r i g i d ,  c a l c u l a t i v e  a t m o s p h e r e  i n  a  g r o u p  w i l l  
r e d u c e  t h e  b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  o f  c o l l e c t i v e
a c t i o n / c o o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  a t t e n d a n t  c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  a  
t e n d e n c y  t o w a r d  i n d i v i d u a l  a c t i o n / n o n — c o o p e r a t i o n .  O n  t h e  
o t h e r  h a n d ,  a  m o r e  f l e x i b l e ,  n o n — c a l c u l a t i v e  a t m o s p h e r e  
w i l l  r a i s e  t h e  b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  o f  c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n / c o o p e r a t i o n .
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It might be helpful to recapitulate the results of
this research in the form of guidelines for projects or
programmes which involve a group. Depending on the
circumtances, it may turn out that either some or all of the 
following guidelines are relevant- Those
projects/programmes which:
1. involve indivisibilities in inputs or processes will
fare better than those where no indivisibilities are 
present;
2- involve timeliness in the execution of farm tasks will
fare better than those where it is not involved;
3. are labour—intensive and have a low elasticity of 
substitution among inputs (sigma) will fare better than 
those which have a high sigma;
4. realise economies, whether associational gains or 
economies of scale, will fare better that those which 
do not;
5. have low transaction costs of search information, 
bargaining, decisionmaking and monitoring will fare 
better than those with high transaction costs;
6. involve persons or households who are more or less 
equal in terms of income and assets will fare better 
than one wherein the distribution of income and assets 
is highly skewed;
7. temper a rigorous enforcement of contract terms with a 
non—calculative atmosphere will fare better than one 
which does not.
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APPENDIX 1
LABOUR EXCHANGE MATRIX ^
ABAYON COOPERATIVE LABOUR GROUP 
WET SEASON HARVEST (NOVEMBER 1983 - JANUARY 1984)
The rows indicate the amount of labour received (in terms 
of bundles recorded in the upper left corner of each box) by 
each member household and the columns indicate the amount of 
labour given. For example. Household No.l (Agmaoan) 
received 28 bundles from Household No.3 (Bados) and gave 16 
bundles in return. It received a total of 408 bundles and 
gave 290 bundles worth of labour in exchange.
A positive number in the lower right corner of each box, 
indicates that a member (rowwise) received more labour (in 
terms of bundles harvested) than it supplied another. A 
negative number indicates the opposite. For example,
Household No.l (Agmaoan) received 12 bundles more than 
it gave Household No.3 (Bados) whereas the latter 
received 12 bundles less than it gave the former.
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NO.
egion
SAMPLE
SIZE
1
EVAL (%) KHYEARS INCOME
(Pesos)
SIZE ETHN (%) KIN NBHR KEDÜC KSELEC KPSR
(%)
GREC OFF CVINC REGION
1 11 100.00 158.76 388.18 18.00 90.91 4.09 2.62 2.50 1. 100.00 1. 1. 1.3282 1
7 7 85.71 92.52 531.57 9.00 100.00 4.2 4.50 6.00 0. 100.00 1. 1. 1.4579 1
3 5 100.00 40.80 457.00 6.00 40.00 5.14 4.43 0.00 0. 100.00 1. 1. 1.8719 I
4 10 100.00 96.20 627.90 13.00 100.00 4.0 3.66 6.00 0. 100.00 1. 1. 0.7437 1
5 11 100.00 ' 141.75 430.73 15.00 100.00 4.72 2.20 6.00 1. 100.00 1. 1. 0.7832 1
6 7 100.00 260.70 543.57 22.00 71.43 3.43 2.76 12.00 0. 100.00 0. 0.5455 1
7 8 87.50 252.00 414.38 24.00 62.50 5.625 4.73 2.50 1. 100.00 1. 1. 1.1510 I
b 8 100.00 116.00 534.88 16.00 100.00 8.0 10.47 2.50 1. 100.00 1. 1. 1.2172 1
9 6 66.57 73.58 401.67 13.00 100.00 3.16 2.79 2.50 0. 100.00 0. 1. 2.0403 1
1C 9 100.00 211.54 152.22 14.00 100.00 4.77 4.08 8.00 0. 100.00 0. 1. 0.4964 1
11 8 100.00 100.32 371.75 11.00 87.50 3.55 5.84 6.00 1. 100.00 0. 1. 1.2728 1
12 11 100.00 291.00 399.45 15.00 81.81 3.70 3.70 2.50 1. 100.00 0. 1. 0.9989 1
13 12 91.67 194.40 221.67 20.00 83.33 4.83 2.44 0.00 1. 100.00 1. 2. 0.7488 1
14 16 93.75 230.00 572.75 23.00 100.00 2.81 4.85 2.50 1. 100.00 0. 2. 0.8304 1
15 12 100.00 268.20 591.54 20.00 83.33 3.983 2.86 2.50 1. 100.00 0. 1. 0.8295 1
16
legion
7
3
100.00 . 61.68 462.14 8.00 85.71 4.71 4.13 2.50 1. 100.00 1. 2. 0.9951 1
: 8 100.00 175.00 657.38 14.00 100.00 4.875 5.45 8.00 0. 100.00 1. 1. 0.3221 0
2 16 100.00 310.32 457.75 24.00 97.75 2.5 5.42 2.50 0. 100.00 1. 1. 0.8141 0
3 9 100.00 239.94 948.22 18.00 100.00 9.33 4.70 6.00 1. 100.00 1. 1. 0.6317 0
4 16 69.75 211.99 797.25 29.00 81.25 6.0 3.59 6.00 0. 100.00 1. 1. 1.4100 0
5 5 100.00 101.40 528.00 13.00 100.00 5.2 6.84 2.50 0. 100.00 1. 1. 0.5986 0
6 16 93.75 275.52 478.00 42.00 87.50 3.8 2.99 8.00 0. 100.00 1. 1. 1.2854 0
7 9 100.00 76.65 857.14 15.00 88.89 3.22 2.62 2.50 0. 100.00 1. 2. 0.9696 0
8 10 100.00 63.00 708.00 14.00 80.00 2.90 1.88 2.50 1. 100.00 1. 1. 0.3799 0
9 13 69.23 254.56 430.84 28.00 76.92 4.0 4.52 6.00 1. 83.33 1. 1. 1.3000 0
10 9 88.89 161.00 522.22 23.00 88.89 3.44 3.47 2.50 I. 87.50 1. 1. 1.3140 0
11 92.86 288.60 576.47 39.00 100.00 4.90 2.70 2.50 0. 100.00 1. 2. 0.4268 0
12 15 85.71 221.41 401.80 41.00 66.67 2.8 3.11 6.00 0. 100.00 1. 1. 1.1932 0
N>
'J
00
Mean:
Overa11 
Region 1 
Region 3
11.0 93.73 177.46 516.59 19.54 87.66 4.42 4.05 4.25 0.5 98.96 0.75 1.21 1.0342 0.71
9.2 95.33 161.84 443.84 15.44 86.65 4.42 4.13 4.00 0.62 100.00 0.56 1.25 1.0819 1
13.4 91.68 198.28 613.59 25.00 88.99 4.41 3.94 4.58 0.33 97.57 1.00 1.67 0.9704 0
souRc: Random Sample Survey.
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reaping pa±a_‘£, ‘.paaoy)..
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y 4)
IRAI TR4 6 -Row rice transplanter
5
: i : r  M  '-
- K # '  ^
Q - -
FEATURES
H IG H  C A P A C I T Y   ____ 0 . 3 - 0 . 4  h e c t a r e  p e r  day,  d e p e n d in g
u p o n  t h e  s k i l l  o f  t h e  o p e r a t o r .
EASY TO O P E R A T E  & M A IN T A IN  _  _   _________ Machine  is operated by single push-pul l
of the handle. Requires few adjusments.
L O W  P O W E R  R E Q U I R E M E N T  _   _________________M a c h in e  is o p e r a t e d  by o ne  p e rs o n .
S I M P L E  C O N S T R U C T I O N   ------- ----- -----------------------------C a n  be  f a b r i c a t e d  by  s m a l l  sh ops
u s i n g  r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b l e  m a t e r i a l s .
h i g h l y  P O R T A B L E   ____________ C an  b e  c a r r ie d  by one or two p e r s o n s .
SOURCE; Ap,ricvi] tura I Engineering Department,
Tiie International Rice Research Institute 
Los Banos, Laguna, Philippines
281
Seedling Tray 
Path o f P icker j
Handle
Picker Assembly
Pivot 
A rm  Assembly
Wooden Skid
Tray Indexing 
Mechanism
—  Seedling 
Pusher
— Main Frame
S c h e m a t i c  o f  IRRI  6 - R o w  M echan ica l  Rice Transplanter
120 cm
10 100
3 0  /  Wooden frame
'  M / /  P lastic sheet 
' 1.2 -1.8 cm.
, ' soil thickness
a.  M o d i f i e d  D a p o g  5-10cm.
120 cm 5 -1 0  cm.
1.2-1.8 cm 
Depth of cut
b.  M o d i f i e d  W e t  -  b e d
S E E D L IN G  PREPARATIONS suitable 
for IRRI M e c h a n i c a l  T ran sp lan ter .
MACHINE SPECIFICATION
P O W E R ____________________________________________________________________________________ 1 p e r s o n
F I E L D  C A P A C I T Y _________________________________________________________ 0 . 3  -  0 . 4  ha.  per  da y
PI A N T I N G  D E P T H  3 to 5 cm .
^RAY D I S P L A C E M E N T  PER S T R O K E  A D J U S T M E N T ____________________________ 1 . 0 /  1 .3  cm.
F I E L D  S T A N D I N G  W A T E R  D E P T H  1 to 5 c m .
W E I G H T  2 0  k g s .
L E N G T H   ______________________________________________________________________  8 5  c m .
W I D T H ______________________________________________________________________________ 1 2 5  c m .
C O N S T R U C T I O N _______________________________________________________________ s t e e l  a n d  w o o d
S E E D L I N G  P R E P A R A T I O N  :
S I Z E  O F  S E E D L I N G  M A T _______________________________________________ 2 0  c m .  x 5 0  c m .
N O .  OF S E E D L I N G  M A T  P E R  H E C T A R E ____________________________________ 4 0 0  -  4 5 0
S I Z E  OF  S E E D B E D  PER H E C T A R E _____________________________________ 1 . 2  m.  x 4 5  m .
S E E D  R E Q U I R E M E N T  P E R  H E C T A R E _______________________________________3 0  -  4 0  k g s .
For fu rthe r inform ation wr i t e  ; A g r i c u l t u r a l  E n g i n e e r i n g  D e p a r t m e n t  
T he  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  Rice R e s e a r c h  I n s t i t u t e  
P . O .  Box 9 3 3 ,  M a n i l a ,  P h i l i p p i n e s  
C a b l e  ; R I C E F Ü U N D ,  M A N I L A
CÂAMS"!RRf 1.0 m reaper
«^>^5R«î3ylB®84
Harvests paddy of different varieties
features:
HIGH C A P A C IT Y ............................................................................................................................... 2 .4  hectare per day
LOW HORSEPOWER R E Q U IR EM EN T......................................................................................................... 3-hp engine
LOW LABOR R E Q U IR E M E N T....................................................................................... One to three men to operate,
prepare plots and gather crop.
EASE OF O P E R A T IO N ..............................................................................S im p lic ity  of design-reduces operation
and maintenance problem,
HIGHLY M O B IL E ........................................................................................ Can be operated and carried w ith ease
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C À A M S '- IR R l  10m  REAPER
Compact design
# M
Reaper is adaptable to other hand tractor unit
Machine specifications:
P O W E R ..........................................................................................................................................3 hp gasoline engine
WEIGHT OF R EAPER -T ILLER  U N IT ........................................................................................................ 135 kg
WEIGHT OF REAPER A L O N E .......................................................................................................................... 4 8  kg
TOTAL LENGTH OF REAPER PLUS 3 HP T IL L E R ............................................................................218 cm
TOTAL W ID T H ........................................................................................................................................................117 cm
TOTAL HEIGHT OF 3 HP T ILLE R , MINIMUM  .......................................................................................... 9 0  cm
FIELD CAPACITY . .  ...........................................................................................................2 . 4 hectare per day
FIELD L O S S E S  Less than 1%
MINIMUM C U T .......................................................................................................................................................... 7 cm
FORWARD S P E E D ................................................................................................................................2 ,5  to 4 ,5  kph
KNIFE AVERAGE S P E E D ....................................................................................................... 1.3 x forward speed
C O N STR U C TIO N ............................................................................ All steel except the non-metallic starwheels
A D JU S T M E N T ................................................................................... Throttle (synchronized w ith cutting speed),
fla t belt tension, windrow deflector,
FUEL C O N S U M P T IO N ................................................................................................ Approximately 1 liter per hr
A g ricu ltu ra l M ach inery  D evelopm ent P ro g ra m  
In te rn a tio n a l R ice  R esearch  In s titu te  
P .O . Box 9 3 3 ,  M a n ila , P h ilipp ines  
Cable: RICEFOUND, MANILA
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